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The quest for how legal concepts generate and reproduce themselves and how those concepts are 
applied to specific cases is one of the most intractable and difficult to answer. This is even more 
true when old concepts are used to understand new realities. Traditional legal methods used to 
trace the power of precedent on courts still struggle to capture intricate, if not more subtle, 
conceptual change. This paper investigates the conceptual links throughout the precedent chain 
using the guiding hand of cognitive linguistics; namely, conceptual metaphor. Using computer-aided 
coding methodology
 
to explore the use of metaphor to build conceptual structure concerning data 
control in EU law as a case study, this work analyses the recent ÔSafe HarborÕ case in the European 
Court of Justice and its chain of case citations to provide a proof of method to show the viability of 
using cognitive linguistics to explain notions of coherence, interpretation, conceptual change, and 
the power of precedent. The goal is to lead to a larger forecasting model of legal scholarship. It 
addresses the questions: how can metaphor analysis help clarify the transfer and interpretation of 
legal concepts throughout a chain of precedent and understand the concepts through which data 
privacy via traditional privacy are built as a case study? The scaffolding on which the lawÕs abstract 
concepts are built is taken apart to reveal the underlying, non-abstract components of how ideas 
link together and affect conceptual transformation. This paper argues for a supplement to the 
traditional method of legal category building and holds out an extended arm from the world of 
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ÒJust before I doze off, I counsel myself grandiosely: F*** concepts. 
Don't be afraid to be confused. Try to remain permanently confused. 
Anything is possible. Stay open, forever, so open it hurts, and then 




                                            









The Need for a Method 
 
 
ÒIf the word ÔclearÕ is imprecise, it is mercifully so. And not 
necessarily to the detriment of meaning. ÔIt is clear thatÉÕ 
carries with it a bit of transparent glass, the bright ring of a 
bell, a sunny day, a candid conversation, an uncluttered 
table. Bebuhw has left these senses separately imprisoned 
in their own categories, and it seems the poorer for it.Ó 
- Arika Okrent1 








At least, that is what it would have meant had John WilkinsÕ universal language ever gained any 
traction.2 ÔClearÕ was classified in his taxonomic system of language under ÒTA.I.9Étranscendental 
relations of action > belonging to single things > pertaining to the knowledge of things, as regards 
the causing to be known.Ó3 Wilkins - polymath, clergyman, associate of scientists like Boyle, Hooke, 
and Christopher Wren - was pursuing a language that would categorise all human knowledge into 
a universal system. It would be Òa man-made language free from the ambiguity and imprecision that 
afflicted natural languages. It would directly represent concepts; it would reveal the truth.Ó4 
Unfortunately for Wilkins, that plan would never come to fruition. The Great London Fire didnÕt 
                                            
1 Okrent, Arika; 2009. In the Land of Invented Languages: Esperanto Rock Stars, Klingon Poets, Loglan Lovers, and ahe Mad 
Dreamers Who Tried to Build a Perfect Language. Random House. at 717 (digital edition). 
2 Wilkins, John; 1668. An Essay Towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language. Printed for the Council of the 
Royal Society, London. 
3 Okrent, Arika; 2009 at 656-657 (digital edition) 
4 id at 271-272 (digital edition) 
 2 
help much with the effort, destroying half of his work that would take him the next decade to 
replicate. His goal was to make his taxonomy of all concepts his languageÕs syntactical and phonetic 
organising principle,    
He divided the universe into forty categories or classes, which were then 
subdivided into differences, and subdivided in turn into species. To each class he 
assigned a monosyllable of two letters; to each difference, a consonant; to each 
species, a vowel.5 
 
It seems the fatal error in the approach (aside from the difficulty of using the language practically) 
was the proposition that language or even knowledge itself, could maintain clear boundaries, bridle 
itself with categories, or be subject to the caprice of the human want for control and specificity. 
This was not the first error of its kind, nor the last. 
 
The familiar idiom of something being Ôlost in translationÕ, is not a concept exclusively reserved for 
those who interpret foreign texts, who travel to a different culture, or those who create their own 
language. The phrase suggests that as one idea is converted from one language to another, 
something is lost: be it a subtlety, a nuance, or a whole family of associations that beg for 
explanation. It could simply be a symptom of language itself - that, if we had full fluency, we could 
boil down the idea to an essence in the first language and then find a suitable replacement in the 
second. However, this is not the case. The problem is not one of perfect fluency or perfect 
language, and it is not one that just sits on the borders between languages, or among the most 
noble attempts at circumventing the multiplicity of language by creating a universal one. Even within 
the same language, we often have a hard time finding the words that might express the cavalcade 
of concepts in our minds as we translate from thought to speech; from reasoning to explanation. 
We face this problem due to the intrinsic structure of concepts and the incessant vagaries in 
languagesÕ ability to concretely represent them.  
 
How do we decipher what someone else may mean by invoking a concept that is characterised 
more by ambiguity than it is by explicit language? This is not simply a matter of semantic 
interpretation (if one would even attempt to call that simple). It is one individualÕs structure of 
                                            
5 Borges, Jorge Luis; 1999. ÔThe Analytical Language of John WilkinsÕ in Selected Non-Fictions. Eliot Weinberger (Ed.). 
Viking. 229, at 230. Emphasis added. 
 3 
concepts attempting to reconcile itself with anotherÕs. It is a translation problem. Though it may be 
humorous when these misinterpretations occur in day to day life, in the law, it is a persistent and 
weighty issue. Given the consequences of interpreting ambiguity one way or the other, sorting out 
how to conceptually translate indistinct and often fluid terms and tie them down, is of the utmost 
importance. Not only do we face this problem when trying to derive meaning from ambiguity (of 
which there is plenty in existing legal theory6), a far more complex challenge is posed by the 
obligation to find concrete meaning in these theories and apply them - somehow uniformly - while 
the world changes around us, often at exponential speed. In short: to translate the universal 
principles in law to fit the ever-changing socio-cultural milieus. And the reverse. 
 
As technology and society change, law is left to catch up. Its only recourse in the judicial setting is 
to try to interpret existing frameworks and apply them to a novel situation. It attempts to translate 
from one notion to another. Judges in differing forums and traditions have attempted this in a 
multitude of ways. It is usually the same type of approach anyone might use if pressed to give a full 
explanation of their own reasoning, in that it relies on boiling down a concept to its barest and 
most abstract sense to use it in a different context. Replacing ambiguity with ambiguity; the exact 
problem Wilkins was trying to solve. While this may settle a particular debate temporarily, or 
attempt to reconcile a personÕs view with situations arising in a rapidly changing society, this 
approach cannot provide consistent and adequate answers to inevitable future problems. 
 
In todayÕs world, the notion of privacy (as it has been pushed to the brink conceptually) presents 
an exceptional subset of this kind of dilemma. Finding method to understand the translation 
problem is not just about explaining how we conceptualise privacy, but, more importantly, it must 
allow us to look at how courts interpret when using or reading ambiguous terms. Rather than 
relying on finding some common essence between a novel circumstance and a principle that is 
more established in the law, this work searches for a method that is based on the way concepts 
are structured and not on what we hope them to be. It is not mere translation, but a structure; an 
architecture of concepts that would offer a chance for us to keep pace with the ever-changing 
technological world. It is anti-Wilkins. Instead of presenting a fleshed-out way to prescribe legal 
interpretationsÕ best form, it searches instead to study how law interprets, in the wild. 
                                            
6 See for instance, Gibbons, John; 2014. Language and the Law. Routledge; Sunstein, Cass R.; 1995. 'Incompletely 
Theorized Agreements,' 108 Harvard Law Review 1733;  
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This goal in this chapter is to distance ourselves from the law for a moment. To recognise the lens 
we choose when we talk about interpretation. Then, with that acknowledgment in mind, give an 
overview of the history of trying to conceptualize privacy in its barest sense; to create its 
taxonomy, noting that privacyÕs essential character is best understood as something that is 
impossible to pin down to a fundamental essence. That, if one is to make sense of the notion of 
privacy, one must take into account the structure of concepts in language. The chapter will then lay 
out the main questions of the research and state how each chapter contributes to building a proof 
of concept for a method that aims to understand legal ambiguity, legal categories, and the structure 
of judicial interpretation. 
 
1. Law, in the Wild: 
 
Robert Sapolsky is a behavioural biologist. His aim is to look at the underlying biological functions 
that can help to comprehend human aggression (among other things). However, he doesnÕt for a 
moment take that word ÔhelpÕ for granted. In his most recent book,7 he perfectly explains the 
general approach that is taken in the present work: ÒWe tend to use a certain cognitive strategy 
when dealing with complex, multifaceted phenomena, in that we break down those separate facets 
into categories, into buckets of explanation.Ó8 Different disciplines, different points of view, different 
starting assumptions change the way we decide where those boundaries lie, what ÔbucketsÕ we use; 
we have inevitably made a choice of the kinds of explanations we are going to give. In SapolskyÕs 
words, Òwhen you think categorically, you have trouble seeing how similar or different two things 
are. If you pay lots of attention to where boundaries are, you pay less attention to complete 
pictures.Ó9 This is no less true when thinking about the law than it is about biology. One of the 
ways he explains his approach is to note the difference between the differing schools of 
psychologists in the early to mid-twentieth century: behaviourism in the US, and the ethologists in 
Europe. The behaviourists were content for their lab experiments and conclusions to apply 
universally. Ethologists on the other hand, chose to practice of Òthe science of interviewing an 
                                            
7 Sapolsky, Robert; 2017. Behave: The Biology of Humans at our Best and Worst. Penguin. 
8 id at 18 (digital edition). 
9 id at 20 (digital edition). 
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animal in its own language.Ó10 Their effort was to study animals in the wild, incorporating variety and 
context to draw up generalisable conclusions rather than universal laws being produced solely in 
the lab. 
 
This project adopts a similar approach with that premise in mind. However, this is not an exercise 
in putting judges on the couch, or an attempt to read their minds. It is a research project that aims 
to see if among differing conditions, time frames, factual circumstances, etc, there may be 
something in common, some pattern of legal interpretation, or way for dealing with ambiguity that 
this study can tease out. It is an ethology of the law, interviewing it in its own language: judicial 
decisions. 
 
Legal theorists tend to start from a unique bucket.11 Entrenched from the beginning in a swirl of 
normative commitments and predetermined puzzles, they search for the correct kind of law, and 
what it should do. This type of legal theory looks at ÔcorrectÕ interpretation as a normative goal, 
rather than as a practice to be explored. Judicial interpretation is in a separate bucket from biology, 
neuroscience, economics, politics, or, in the case of the bucket chosen for this study, cognitive 
linguistics. As such, the questions asked about things like interpretation as a whole concept, or 
ambiguity, or coherence, come from within the legal theory vocabulary and its boundaries, at the 
expense of the wider angled lens of judicial practice incorporating other points of view. Pardo and 
Patterson make a similar point, 
As an account of correct and incorrect action in a practice (whether in ethics, 
law, arithmetic, or measurement), interpretation is a non-starter because 
interpretation draws our attention away from the techniques that make 
understanding possible. Correct and incorrect forms of action are immanent in 
practices. Correct forms of action cannot be imposed on a practice, by 
interpretation or otherwise. It is only when we master the techniques employed 
by participants in a practice that we can grasp the distinction between correct 
and incorrect action (e.g., in ethics or law)É As Wittgenstein says, ÒIt is not the 
interpretation which builds the bridge between the sign and what is signified/ 
/meant/ /. Only the practice does that.Ó12  
                                            
10 id at 156 (digital edition). 
11 Not all, of course, but the type this study is trying to distance itself from, if that is possible. 
12 Pardo, Michael S & Patterson, Denis; 2013. Mind, Brains, and Law: The Conceptual Foundations of Law and 
Neuroscience. Oxford University Press, at 16. Quoting, Baker, Gordon P., and Hacker, Peter Michael Stephan; 2009. 
Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity: Volume 2 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, 
Essays and Exegesis. John Wiley. at 136. 
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Practice and a wider lens is is where this study finds its locus. Its focus is on the judicial use of 
conceptual language; its varying commitments and frameworks to understand law in its own 
language. A language that is not purely legal, but human. In short, to inspect law in the wild. This 
study focuses in on a small subset that represents all of the above-mentioned features exemplifying 
problems in investigating judicial (or any) interpretation: legal ambiguity, technological change, and 
the traditional legal approach to solving it. To do this it delineates judicial interpretation in the sub-
category of privacy law in the EU Courts. It takes as a case study the recent case from the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (hereafter, CJEU) that epitomises adjusting old principles to new 
realities and the struggle to clearly interpret the notion of privacy in the light of new technology: 
Maximillian Schrems v the Data Protection Commissioner (hereafter Schrems).13 
 
2. The State of Privacy Law 
 
There does not exist a more robust or prolific contemporary author on privacy law than Daniel 
Solove. In his multiple books and articles, he has traced the concept of privacy in its many guises 
through case law and legal theory. Though his work is commendable, and certainly methodical, the 
concept of privacy has been breached but not conquered; dissected but not with a derived 
essence. This, according to Solove, is a not only distinct facet of the ways in which privacy has been 
approached, but an essential feature of privacy itself. I agree, but would add that it is also the 
problem of the legal lens, our inevitable bucket. 
 
Privacy, Òmight not have a single common characteristic; rather [it] draw[s] from a common pool of 
similar elements.Ó14 Paradoxically, privacyÕs ambiguity, its non-generalisable character, and fluid 
nature, are the only things generalisable about it; at least in so much as it exists as a legal term. As 
Solove has traced15, the essential ingredient of privacy constantly escapes thorough and strict 
                                            
13 Maximillian Schrems v the Data Protection Commissioner, Judgement of the Court of 6 October 2015. EU:C:2015:650 
(hereafter, Schrems). 
14 Solove, Daniel J.; 2002. 'Conceptualizing Privacy,' 90 California law review 1087. 
15 Solove, Daniel J.; 2006. 'A Taxonomy of Privacy,' 154 University of Pennsylvania law review 477; Richards, Neil M. & 
Solove, Daniel J.; 2007. 'Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality,' 96 Geo. LJ 123; Solove, Daniel J.; 
2004. The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age. NYU Press. 
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review.16  His rectifying endeavour is to look at privacy not as an assemblage of differing meanings 
that share a core element, but as a concept that is tied together through the tangents that 
associate it with similar and familial concepts. He presents privacy as a conceptual web spun from 
notions that incorporate such diverse claims as, Òfreedom of thought, control over oneÕs body, 
solitude in oneÕs home, control over information about oneself, freedom from surveillance, 
protection of oneÕs reputation, and protection from searches and interrogations.Ó17 His is a 
pragmatic account of privacy that aims to focus on its contexts, values, and goals, rather than its 
adherence to some objective existence that would ground it as a concept.  
 
Privacy, as he notes, has been taken through multiple conceptual frames. Following its history in A 
Taxonomy of Privacy and Conceptualizing Privacy, he considers that the traditional attempts to outline 
privacy are almost always set in the terms of Warren and BrandeisÕ Òright to be let aloneÓ18. Many 
commentators and theorists use this understanding of privacy to lay the groundwork and build the 
concept in order to describe salient features that may be essentialised to try to understand privacy 
as a concept that involves Ònecessary and sufficient conditionsÓ19. Whether it is William ProsserÕs 
ÔtortsÕ20, Judith DeCewÕs Ôthree categoriesÕ21, Ken GormleyÕs Ôareas of lawÕ22, Jerry KangÕs Ôoverlapping 
clustersÕ23, or Alan WestinÕs Ôbasic statesÕ24, among others, privacyÕs conception has defied a singular 
definition that can pull them all together to find whether it is properly placed within a frame of 
autonomy, dignity, property, control, intimacy, or elsewhere.25 One can see the many ways in which 
privacy is translated into another term in the hope of understanding it. 
 
                                            
16 Ò[p]rivacy is a value so complex, so entangled in competing and contradictory dimensions, so engorged with various 
and distinct meanings, that I sometimes despair whether it can be usefully addressed at all.Ó Post, Robert C.; 2000. 
'Three Concepts of Privacy,' 89 Geo. LJ 2087, at 2087; Ò[L]egal privacy consists of four or five different species of legal 
rights which are quite distinct from each other and thus incapable of a single definition.Ó Gormley, Ken; 1992. 'One 
Hundred Years of Privacy,' 5 Wis. L. Rev.  1335, at 1339. 
17 Solove; 2002 at 1088. 
18 Turkington, Richard C.; 1989. 'Legacy of The Warren and Brandeis Article: The Emerging Unencumbered 
Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy,' 10 N. Ill. U. L. Rev 479, at 481. 
19 Solove; 2002 at 1090. 
20 Prosser, William L.; 1960. 'Privacy,' 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, at 389. 
21 DeCew, Judith Wagner; 1997. In Pursuit of Privacy: Law, Ethics, and the Rise of Technology. Cornell University Press, at 
75-77. 
22 Gormley, Ken; 1992. 
23 Kang, Jerry; 1998. 'Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions,' 50 Stanford law review 1193, at 1202-3. 
24 Westin, Alan F.; 1968. 'Privacy and Freedom,' 25 Washington and Lee Law Review 166. 
25 See generally, Solove, Daniel J.; 2006. 
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Rather than continuing the Sisyphean project of locating privacyÕs essential character, SoloveÕs effort 
is an, 
ÔapproachÕ to understanding privacy rather than a definition or formula for 
privacy. It is an approach because it does not describe the sum and substance of 
privacy but provides guidance in identifying, analyzing, and ascribing value to a set 
of related dimensions of practices.26 
 
His approach is an attempt to look at Òunderstanding privacy in specific contextual situations.Ó27 It is 
a bottom up approach, informed by the pragmatism of Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Dewey, 
which differs from the traditional essential features approach typically taken by legal and social 
scholars. This approach seems to bear fruit. He shows, through an analysis of US case law, how 
misconstruing privacy as secrecy, disclosure, or a spatial consideration of the boundaries of public 
vs. private, misses a conception of privacy that would be reasonably deemed important or typical 
of how we, the public, may imagine it. This is a flaw in the Ôprivacy as a set of conditionsÕ approach; 
that, 
[t]he conceptions are often too narrow because they fail to include the aspects 
of life that we typically view as private, and are often too broad because they fail 
to exclude matters that we do not deem private.28 
 
SoloveÕs pragmatism intends to form a method by which the contextual and the historical notions 
of privacy can be taken into account without allowing the abstract to further muddy already 
opaque waters. He shows through an examination of just three aspects of the traditional realms of 
privacy (the family, the home, and the body), how the history of these notions informs how 
cultural standards and expectations of privacy vary greatly over space and time. 
 
Differing Paths:  
 
These differing standards are seen even more clearly in the legal context when looking at the 
development of the idea in a comparative sense. The development of the notion of privacy takes 
                                            
26 Solove, Daniel J.; 2002 at 1129. Original emphasis. 
27 id at 1128. 
28 id at 1094. 
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two very distinct conceptual paths when one compares legal histories in the US and the UK.29 
Though Warren and BrandiesÕ landmark paper is often considered to be the beginning of the right 
to privacy in its contemporary sense, Solove and Richards argue that it is a Òfork in the path of 
privacyÓ30 stemming from Prince Albert v Strange,31 where two quite distinct notions of privacy 
become apparent. The US conception, stemming from a reading of the Albert v Strange by Warren 
and Brandies (and later, others), regards privacy as a function of the Òinviolate personalityÓ.32  The 
UK version of privacy differs. It relies more fundamentally on the breach of confidence, a sorting 
out of the expectations of various types of relationships. This raises a question; as the right to 
privacy puts itself up against more ingrained and established fundamental rights, are we to base 
privacy in the individual herself or in her relationship(s) with others? More aptly, how does privacy 
law envision the personal of personal information? As part of the inviolate personality or as a 
negotiated set of relationships? Solove and Richards track two distinct paths through the differing 
histories. 
 
They go beyond seeing the disparate traditions of UK and US privacy law as simple generalisable 
oppositions, such as James WhitmanÕs separation Òbetween liberty and dignityÓ.33 Their main focus 
is on the evolution from an older law of confidentiality established in the common law before the 
Warren and Brandies paper to a notion developed in the US that focused less on the law of 
confidentiality and more on the notion of a privacy tort that relies on disclosure of information. As 
they explain it, 
The public disclosure tort focuses on the nature of the information being made 
public. By contrast, the focus of the tort of breach of confidentiality is on the 
nature of the relationship.  As one scholar has put it, Òwhile the private-facts tort 
focuses on the nature of the information published, the breach of confidence 
action focuses on the partiesÕ obligations to each other.Ó34 
 
These conceptual frameworks are radically different and there are many consequences which could 
stem from these distinctions. For instance, William ProssersÕs privacy torts (and much of the US 
                                            
29 Richards, Neil M. & Solove, Daniel J.; 2007. 
30 id at 126. 
31 Prince Albert v Strange (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1171. 
32 Solove, Daniel J.; 2006 at 125. 
33 Whitman, James Q.; 2004. 'The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty,' 113 Yale Law Journal 1151. 
34 Richards, Neil M. & Solove, Daniel J.; 2007 at 174 quoting Gilles, Susan M.; 1995. 'Promises Betrayed: Breach of 
Confidence as a Remedy for Invasions of Privacy,' 43 Buff. L. Rev. 1 at 20-25. 
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conception of privacy) require a level of scrutiny into the nature of the information involved, 
whether the information disclosed can be understood to be, for example, Òhighly offensive to a 
reasonable person.Ó35 The breach of confidentiality on the other hand, 
does not contain a Òhighly offensiveÓ requirement, as it views the injury not 
exclusively in terms of the humiliation caused by the revelation of information 
but also in terms of the violation of trust between the parties.36 
 
In addition, these differing conceptions require fundamentally different ideas of how one is to draw 
the line between private and public. In the case of the US, these are distinct Òbinary oppositesÓ, 
unlike the UK system which sees privacy more in line with a continuum.37 These distinctions are 
extremely relevant when considered in conjunction with the speed of technological change. Rather 
than debating which approach may work better, it is crucial to understand how these distinctions 
are translated into new and ever developing situations that are born from technological change. 
 
While we can applaud SoloveÕs effort of tracking the conceptualisation of privacy, we have yet to 
find a robust enough interpretation that not only takes into account WittgensteinÕs initial insight 
into the nature of categories, but also considers everything we have learned about the structure of 
concepts since Wittgenstein. We have learned much about the limits and mechanisms of how we 
form concepts and have developed methods outside of philosophy and law that are much more 
complete. Cognitive science (particularly the strand which deals with conceptual semantics) has 
developed one such branch of inquiry. If we are concerned not with the essence of privacy but 
with the relationships which link both the flow of information between people and the meanings 
on which the concept is built, then we must not cherry pick those ties or we risk proliferating the 
essentialism we are hoping to escape. Using an alternate lens grounds us in the world of cognitive 
science rather than that of pure legal theory. And, there are many pressing issues that involve 
privacy law that bear down on its definition: technological change, jurisdiction, cross border data 
flows, developments in DNA sequencing and storage, and surveillance, to name a few. 
 
                                            
35 Solove, Daniel J.; 2001. 'Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy,' 53 Stanford 
law review 1393 at 1432. 
36 Richards, Neil M. & Solove, Daniel J.; 2007 at 175. 
37 id at 182.  
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Technological Change:  
 
When technological change (and here technological can be meant in its broadest sense) forces 
variations between traditional notions of privacy and the practices one might expect to be private, 
the law must deal with analogising an old law to a new circumstance. Often, this analogising is 
reliant upon concepts that have no hope of having any concrete meaning outside of the ones given 
to them on a case by case basis. Moreover, the speed at which these changes occur leaves the law 
in the dust, staring gritty-eyed at what escapes it. If there is any hope of keeping pace, we must 
understand not what these concepts mean, but the process of how they have been defined and if 
a way forward exists. We can introduce three technological changes that have not only started to 
push the boundaries of definition of legal privacy but will continually do so as technology moves 
forward: the jurisdictional issues of transborder data flows, the use of biomedical data in research, 
and the technologies of surveillance. These three technological changes highlight aspects of privacy 
that rely on our traditional conceptions of territory, personal property, dignity, autonomy, and 
ultimately our relation to the state. Not only are these interesting legal contexts in their own right, 
they provide concrete examples of what we mean by Ôthe abstract structuring of conceptsÕ. They 
highlight notions of legal space, temporality, agency and causality when it comes to the depiction of 
information and relationships surrounding information in privacy law.  
 
Jurisdiction and Adequate Protection:  
 
Borders have long played a fundamental role in jurisdiction. Territory, sovereignty, boundaries, 
fragmentation; these are all stalwarts of international law. Migration, international criminals, 
responsibility to protect; these have all played their parts in calling into question the feasibility of 
lawÕs reliance on territorial sovereignty in questions of jurisdiction. Yet, no change has done more 
to usurp this conception than the development of a worldwide network of data. Data not only 
hangs on the edges of the traditional concept of jurisdiction, it calls into question the ability of the 
jurisdiction as a force to regulate it.38 
 
                                            
38 Ryngaert, Cedric & Zoetekouw, Mark; 2014. 'The End of Territory? The Re-Emergence of Community as a Principle 
of Jurisdictional Order in the Internet Era,'   Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2523354 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2523354  . 
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Lawmakers are struggling to keep up and even categorise how data flows and jurisdiction interplay, 
and face difficulties in how to conceptualise the movement of data across borders. The question 
for the future is: how can the law regulate and protect data if it does not fit into the ready-made 
categories we have for jurisdiction? Christopher Kuner, puts it this way, 
Since the Internet is structured to transit data based not on geography but on 
technical parameters, it can be assumed that a large amount of the personal data 
transmitted on it must cross national borders, so that the actual route they take 
is unpredictable. Indeed, technological complexity and the effort required to 
track data sent over the Internet means that it may no longer be feasible to 
differentiate between transborder data flows and those that do not cross 
national borders. Thus, the regulatory framework for transborder data flows is in 
effect the same as that for data transfers on the Internet, and for the Internet 
itself.39 
 
The opacity of frameworks gives rise to numerous legal issues including the Ôroles and obligations of 
parties, particularly when there exist numerous legal regimes to deal with a given situation.40 How is 
a country supposed to use its local or regional framework for the protection of data if it is unclear 
where the data exists or who controls it? Even more pressing is the ambiguity in data protection 
laws regarding the definition of what counts as data and what counts as the ÔflowÕ or the ÔtransferÕ 
of data.41 This ambiguity arises due to the concept of transfer being embedded in a larger concept 
of causality and agency. ÒThe law tends to conceive of transborder data flows as if they were the 
result of a discrete act, such as someone pushing a button and causing data to be transferred. In 
fact, nowadays data transfers often take place as part of a process.Ó42  This process is framed not 
only in the obvious notions of flow or transfer, but also in the ways in which those metaphors 
conceptualise space, and therefore contribute to different perceptions of causality. That, Òthe 
                                            
39 Kuner, Christopher Barth; 2013. Transborder Data Flows and Data Privacy Law. Oxford University Press at 6. 
40 id at 8-9. 
41 ÒThe EU Directive refers to Ôtransfer to a third country of personal dataÕ (Article 25(1)), without defining Ôdata 
transferÕ; the Commission's 2012 proposal to amend the EU data protection framework also fails to do so. The APEC 
Privacy Framework variously uses the terms Ôinternational transferÕ, Ôinformation flows across bordersÕ, Ôcross-border 
information flowÕ, and Ôcross-border data transferÕ interchangeably to refer to the movement of personal data across 
national borders. The Canadian Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) does not 
distinguish between domestic and international flows of data, and a Ôdata transferÕ is considered to mean ÔuseÕ of the 
data by an organization. The OECD Privacy Guidelines refer to Ôtransborder data flowsÕ, defining the term as 
Ômovements of personal data across national bordersÕ (¤1(c)), while Council of Europe Convention 108 refers to 
Ôtransborder flows of personal dataÕ, defined as Ôthe transfer across national borders, by whatever medium, of personal 
data undergoing automatic processing or collected with a view to their being automatically processedÕ (Article 12(1))Ó. 
id at 11. 
42 id at 12. 
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geometry of spatial language divides up space into regions with different causal consequences.Ó43   
As noted by Daniel Solove, if data protection is a process rather than an act of agency, the clichd 
metaphor of data privacy as a fight against an Orwellian Big Brother, is rather more akin to KafkaÕs 
absurd bureaucratic nightmare in The Trial.44 
 
This is not just a question of changing the term. The ambiguity of the definition of the flow of data 
across borders means it is reliant on the meanings given to it found in case law and the 
interpretations of the relevant definitions change conspicuously from case to case, from country to 
country. This is also true when the law employs an agency framework that looks at a Òdata 
controllerÓ vs. a Òdata processor.Ó45  Any international framework can only hope to provide broad 
definitions of these terms and must rely on the conceptions that are made, in the wild, if they are 
to have any meaning at all. As noted before, the importance of finding a new method is to avoid 
essentialising what one may mean by a transfer of data which spans all contexts. The aim is to 
identify the ways in which its interpretation works so as to keep up with (and ideally anticipate) a 
continually changing landscape. One particularly interesting approach is to look at the metaphors of 
data transfer and how they help to conceptualise this process. 
 
We have noted one obvious distinction already: the conceptual difference between ÔflowÕ and 
ÔtransferÕ when it comes to notions of process vs. agency. However, it is important not to make the 
mistake of choosing just the most obvious, glaring metaphors. As will be shown shortly in Chapter 
3, the embedded metaphors are often not as apparent as these examples. This is quite clear in the 
literature about (but not exclusively about) data flows. There have been quite a few studies that 
look at overarching metaphors, such as Solove cited above. But there are also those that look at 
somewhat more subtle ones,46 or even look to use a metaphor for solving the problem.47 What all 
these inquiries have in common is an assumption that the obvious metaphor is the relevant one. 
What is needed is a means to look at the construction of abstract concepts through a detailed 
                                            
43 Pinker, Steven; 2007. The Stuff of Thought: Language as a Window Into Human Nature. Penguin. 
44 Solove, Daniel J.; 2001. 
45 See Article 29 Working Party, ÔOpinion 1/2010, on the concepts of ÒcontrollerÓ and ÒprocessorÓ 
46 See, Larsson, Stefan; 2013. 'Metaphors, Law and Digital Phenomena: The Swedish Pirate Bay Court Case,' 21 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology 354; Hunter, Dan; 2003. 'Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of 
the Digital Anticommons,' 91 California law review 439. 
47 Jimenez, William Guillermo & Lodder, Arno R.; 2015. 'Analyzing Approaches to Internet Jurisdiction Based on a 
Model of Harbors and the High Seas,' 29 International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 266. 
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study of metaphors, so as to begin to decide on the relevant ones for study. In this instance, the 
case study of Maximillian Schrems v the Data Protection Commissioner and its chain of cited 
precedent will be used to examine how this process works, not only because of its relevance for 
transborder data flows, but for the other categories of privacy relied upon to inform its judgement, 
to measure notions like essential equivalence, or adequate protection. 
 
DNA, Genes, and  the  ÔPersonalÕ  of  Personal  Data:  
 
Imagine for a moment that we have made a very minor advance in our ability to map individual 
genomes. You go online to fill in those extended branches in your family tree. You go to a site like 
23andme.com to procure a DNA swab to uncover and identify your more distant relatives. The 
website lists your results and you find you have relatives (3rd, 4th, 5th cousins etc.) who you never 
knew existed. It linked your genetic markers with that of a distant cousin who had also taken the 
test, letÕs call her Ms. X. Ms. X has also consented to use her genetic data to make all of this 
possible. She now shares her results with you, which show even more relationships than even 
23andme.com could find. By sharing information that her family members (your new relatives) 
unknowingly provided, has she breached the privacy of her own family? LetÕs take this a little 
further. You contact one of these further relations that you would have otherwise never known 
about. LetÕs call them Mr. Y and his daughter, Ms. Y. Ms. Y is excited to find out that she potentially 
has other close relations. So, she agrees to a mouth swab to see how closely related you are. It 
turns out that there is enough information to suggest that Mr. Y could be your mutual biological 
father. Ms. Y is astounded because there has never been any mention of a previous marriage or 
any infidelity in her family. Has Mr. YÕs privacy here been breached? It would seem that through no 
fault of his own, with no consent, something quite revelatory and possibly damaging has been 
disclosed to someone who, up until now, had been a complete stranger. This example is not pure 
fiction48 and its implications are increasingly important as the technology of genetic information 
speeds up and costs less. 
 
                                            
48 See Hughes, VirginiaÕ 2013. Ô23 and YouÕ, Medium. 04 Dec. Available at: https://medium.com/matter/23- and-you-
66e87553d22c 
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The idea of privacy is, if anything, rooted in the idea of something quite personal. The idea that it 
should be protected as such, though intuitive, may be quite erroneous. Genetic data provides the 
perfect avenue to investigate such a claim. As Mark Taylor notes, 
I am especially keen to encourage a critical evaluation of the weight placed upon 
the idea of Ôpersonal dataÕ É it is a concept that has been forced to shoulder a 
disproportionate burden of work and it has made a rather convenient vehicle to 
transport us from some difficult questions.49 
 
The legal framework which protects genetic privacy is based on the idea of data being personal, 
singular, and related to the autonomy of the individual. Take for instance, the importance that 
consent plays in directing privacy claims. But genetic research and the ways in which it is used, 
stored, and analysed, make this a very treacherous definition, particularly given the importance of 
what can be achieved through genetic research.50  Consent, for Taylor is built on the lawÕs 
understanding of data as a concept not wholly related a singular individual, and on the inherent 
distinction to be made between data and information. That information is, Òa composite concept: 
the generation of information relies upon a particular interpretive framework being applied to 
data.Ó51 He understands the importance of securing this distinction, 
Understanding the significance of fluid interpretive frameworks to the 
relationship between data and information is key to understanding the limitations 
associated with the lawÕs current protection of privacy.52 
 
TaylorÕs critique of the ÔpersonalÕ of privacy is quite compelling, as is his use of genetic privacy to 
explore it. It is as compelling as the rationalisation of privacy as a notion of control53 or of 
exclusivity.54  There is a penchant for privacy theorists to quote the rhetoric of the overarching 
                                            
49 Taylor, Mark; 2012. Genetic Data and the Law. Cambridge University Press at xii. 
50 ÒOne of the problems associated with the concept of personal data is that it tends to assume that there will be a 
single identifiable individual to whom personal data will ÔrelateÕ and that this individualÕs privacy is only at risk for as long 
as they are identifiably associated with that data. These are both assumptions that can be readily challenged within the 
context of research use of genetic data. They are, however, also assumptions that sit comfortably with the widely 
adopted mechanisms of ÔconsentÕ and ÔanonymisationÕ as ways to protect fundamental rights and freedoms, including 
the right to privacy. The Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC  has effectively consolidated the mechanisms of ÔaskÕ or 
ÔanonymiseÕ as key routes towards lawful processing of personal data. The emphasis placed upon these two 
mechanisms is unfortunate for privacy protection.Ó id at 7. 
51 ibid. 
52 ibid. 
53 Laurie, G.; 2002. Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms. Cambridge University Press, at 53. 
54 Nissenbaum, Helen; 2004. 'Privacy as Contextual Integrity,' 79 Wash. L. Rev. 119. 
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metaphor. But as we saw earlier, privacy is a constantly fluctuating concept, one that defies 
essential characteristics. It is commendable to attempt to use metaphor to describe aspects of it, 
but we are no closer to understanding what grounds the dynamics of that fluctuation from 
metaphor to metaphor, from category to category. To take the same tract as jurisdiction; if we are 
trying to understand Òfluid interpretive frameworksÓ, the work should not be directed by pure 
reason alone. By developing a method to look at how genetic privacy law conceptualises 
information, we can inch closer to understanding the present and the future of the protection of 
privacy information. Mr. Y should be pleased. 
 
Surveillance, Possession and Data Retention: 
 
There are a few different things we can take from the previous two conceptions of privacy. One, 
that the way in which we imagine space and geography, and their links to communication, change 
the way in which the law imagines privacy claims. Second, the ways in which we envisage 
autonomy or exclusive ownership of information impact the ways in which privacy is or isnÕt 
protected. The next task is to look at how these two dimensions interplay as technology allows 
governments and private entities to make decisions on how surveillance can be conducted. The 
aggregation of data and the availability of technology to store information to mine at a future point, 
allow information to last in perpetuity.55 This temporal aspect brings what was once private (due to 
the limitations of human memory) into view of the digital network. It forces us to ask a number of 
questions. 
 
LetÕs imagine for a moment that we had a good working definition of what would define a space as 
being public or private. This would require a knowledge of the spatial and agency related aspects of 
the possession of, and in fact pure concept of, information. Even then, we would still have to ask 
questions like: what remains private in a public space? Our body? What parts? Our location? Our 
behaviour? What is it one retains as their own? Can we, should we really frame these concerns in 
                                            
55 ÒSurveillance is a sweeping form of investigatory power. It extends beyond a search, for it records behavior, social 
interaction, and everything that a person says and does. Rather than a targeted query for information, surveillance is 
often akin to a dragnet search, which can ensnare a significant amount of data beyond that which was originally sought. 
Moreover, unlike a typical search, which is often per- formed in a once-and-done fashion, electronic surveillance goes 
on continuously.Ó Solove, Daniel J.; 2011. Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff Between Privacy and Security. Yale 
University Press at 179. 
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terms of ownership or possession? Does that matter? What is the link between reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a public space vs. private place and secrecy? A way into these questions is 
through an exploration of the idea of surveillance and protection from it. 
 
When one talks about surveillance, the image that readily comes to mind is the ever-vigilant eye, 
the Benthamian Panopticon, or the ear to the window underneath the eaves of a building (as 
invoked in the term ÔeavesdroppingÕ). There is, in all these images, an unease about the agent who 
is watching, what they are doing with the images and sounds they collect and the lack of reciprocity 
in us not knowing their identity when we are so naked in front of them. But it is not only the 
secrecy surrounding the identity of the surveyor that causes us to shrink to one side and shrivel 
down a bit in our seats. There is a temporal aspect that delineates public and private in a public 
space. For example; is there a difference between looking at someone and taking their picture? A 
glance is a momentary behaviour, it lasts perhaps in the microcosm of a few seconds. Whereas a 
picture, particularly if digitally stored, can potentially last forever. Is the deciding factor between a 
look and a photograph that a gaze from a passer-by is reasonably public where a photograph is not 
only contingent on the behaviour of taking a picture but also on its potential uses? Is there 
something to the distinction between temporary and permanent? The problem of permanence 
was in fact invoked by Warren and Brandies. They were concerned about the press having the 
ability to take instantaneous photographs and use them for the sake of gossip. Traditionally, this 
distinction focused on the subsequent uses of that information; whether an image is sold, disclosed, 
or used for libellous purposes. But this is a distinction that may miss an important feature of 
reasonable expectation: the data, once taken, lasts, and the proprietor of that information wonÕt be 
the only one who uses it. Thus, a notion of time (that consent was given - in the past tense) isnÕt 
represented for the future uses of that information. Regulating data use on expectations of what an 
original party might do with it seems to be an inadequate way to protect data given the unknown 




In many data protection laws (particularly in the EU), there is a distinction between a data 
controller and a data subject.56 At the moment a subject transfers information, responsibility is 
transferred along with it to whomever now controls the information.57 However, that data, given 
willingly by a subject for a consented purpose, can then be aggregated together with other data 
that was collected for a wholly different reason to serve some future, third purpose. Even if totally 
anonymised, aggregated information can be mined to reveal a whole litany of information that (if it 
were made clear as the initial goal) may have led to an individualÕs refusal of consent as it changes 
the reasonable expectation of what information would be public or private.  
 
The purview of most privacy protection is not built to handle the digital world. Consent is based 
on a temporal notion of information that is static in the specious present, to use the Jamesian term. 
Consent is based on the idea that information is like the gaze of the passerby in that it only lasts 
momentarily; if you consented to be in a public place, then surely the information you expose 
about yourself, in the least, shouldnÕt be considered as private. There is an ambiguity of time and of 
the substance of information that even the growing body of legislation struggles to address. 
Technological change has led information to become something quite different from a parcel or a 
phone call. The aggregation of and ability to mine new sources of information means that 
protecting against the search inside of a parcel is different to just knowing its comings and goings, it 
is inapplicable as an analogy to modern digital information. There is a translation problem when 
trying to ask whether this kind of search is in fact the same kind of search traditionally defined (in 
the US sense), or whether it falls under a Òright to privacyÓ (in an EU sense). Legislation grows to 
try and find a new approach but it has an inevitable difficulty keeping up. This reactive approach is 
no way to protect something that in the Brandies sense is, Òthe most comprehensive of rights and 




                                            
56 See e.g. Bodil Lindqvist v klagarkammaren I Jnkping on interpretation of the Data Protection Directive 95/46 Bodil 
Lindqvist v klagarkammaren I Jnkping, Judgement of the Court of 6 November 2003. EU:C:2003:596. 
57 While this may be true primarily in an EU context, this is usually not the case in the US which follows a general 
principle of third party doctrine. That once information is transferred with consent, unless specifically prohibited (i.e. 
doctor-patient privileges) the uses of that data to third parties is not implicitly protected. 
58 See, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, (1928) (at 478 Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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If it is the relationships between these various categories of privacy we are concerned with, as 
Solove contends, then a method needs to be developed to investigate how those relationships are 
borne out in the law itself. If our language is judicial decisions, then those relationships are their 
precedents. Given SoloveÕs work on the conceptions of US and UK law, this study turns to the 
conception of the Òright to private lifeÓ as enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ÔECHRÓ or Òthe ConventionÓ),59 Article 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental 
rights of the European Union (Òthe CharterÓ),60 and the interpretations and conceptual framing 
used by the CJEU and the ECtHR in forming the conceptual linkages throughout a chain of 
precedent. To do this, it locates the study around the Schrems case and its antecedent cited cases. 
 
The Schrems case is an interesting example for this inquiry. Though there are many cases that 
involve the right to privacy in the digital realm, Schrems contains and combines a number of unique 
aspects. First, unlike other cases, it involves a judgment where the substantive question of whether 
the infractions of Mr. SchremsÕ data could be considered a breach of privacy isnÕt examined. It only 
questions whether his challenge rises to the level based on the hypothetical question (or 
reasonable suspicion) of his data being breached in the US and whether that protection scheme 
could be considered as adequate based on the essence and purpose of the right to privacy. This 
situation is comparable to asking whether a bridge is strong enough to bear a certain load, not by 
driving a truck over it, but by considering the design plans of the bridge building company, 
comparing those to another bridge building company's calculations, and then assessing whether 
that means the bridge building safety commission has a duty to inspect the bridge in question 
based on the purpose of the right to safe bridges, rather than just testing the offending bridge in 
the first place. It is a use of analogical reasoning that asks for considerable reflection, the authorÕs 
own use of flimsy analogy notwithstanding.  
 
Second, it is a case that has immediate ramifications and reflects current challenges in the field of 
privacy. It sets a benchmark by which to test the viability of researching metaphor and to measure 
the power of spatial metaphor to understand the strength of precedent on future cases. It is highly 
likely to be cited in future cases brought before the Court that relate to the application of the new 
                                            
59 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights, as amended) (ECHR). 
60 European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26 October 2012, 2012/C 326/02 
 20 
data privacy mechanisms enshrined into law. Safe Harbour has been replaced by the ÔPrivacy ShieldÕ 
and Directive 95/46 substituted with the ÔGeneral Data Protection RegulationÕ, but questions are 
already arising about the efficacy or appropriateness of these policy measures, one in particular 
coming from Mr. Schrems himself.  
 
To say this can be seen as a watershed case is a conservative estimate of the repercussions of this 
project. One could think of other cases (Digital Rights Ireland or Google Spain, for instance) that are 
landmark cases of this type, but neither holds the direct comparability for an immediate challenge 
like the Schrems case does (though both of the referenced cases will almost certainly be 
considered, but not with the same force of analogous precedent.). Schrems can be conceived of in 
the sense that it provides the closest analogous precedent for the inevitable objections or 
difficulties of implementation that the new privacy schemes will face. It is a consideration of the 
consequences of moving from privacy as the inviolability of the [physical] person to the uses of 
many people's data to conceptualise that right. 
 
 
3. Research Questions 
 
Overall, this research is primarily focused on providing a proof of concept for a method which will 
help solve what we can call the translation problem: the translation not between languages, but over 
time between all of the legal contexts and concepts involved in privacy law. As we have already 
seen, the legal enterprise has a continual quagmire with ambiguous language. The international 
judicial and academic worlds have dealt with this ambiguity in different ways, often by trying to 
remedy the situation by devolving into discussions of originalism vs. various processes of finding 
contextual meaning. This ranges from the struggle typified by general theories of law to the thick 
and diverse approaches to understanding judicial interpretation. This discussion is evident in ideas 
such as the Ôdemarcation problemÕ or the ÔLimited Domain ThesisÕ (see Chapter 2). In its entirety, 
this is one particular problem I am not aiming to solve. For any author to purport to have ÒsolvedÓ 
the problem of ambiguity in law would be a foolish embodiment of hubris, and therefore this 
project is best described as an effort to supplement traditional legal analysis with a different lens, a 
different bucket. It is a mystery beyond the capacity of one work to explain the complex inner 
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workings of all that is involved in legal interpretation. A more achievable goal for now is developing 
a method to take a new lens to an effort that requires multiple avenues. 
 
However the law deals with the ambiguity of concepts, a feat all its own, it still has work to do in 
translating and continually reinterpreting those concepts to fit new circumstances. I have chosen 
privacy/digital law to highlight the process of conceptual change in order to develop a method that 
gets to the root of how judicial opinions make sense of a concept. This proof of concept can then 
be explored further (see Chapter 9) in how we might apply it in varying ways, and expand it to an 
even larger extent. 
 
This can be broken down into two main activities: 
 
1. Investigating how (by what processes) the law is framed, and how that framing affects 
interpretation; and, 
2. Exploring how competing reasons and competing frames are weighed and balanced against each 
other. 
 
The method I am developing here makes use of the last 40 years of research in Cognitive 
Linguistics, primarily the use of conceptual metaphor theory to dig out the underlying conceptual 
framework of legal categories as they apply to digital law using the case study of Schrems and the 
case-law cited within it. This research makes use of computer-aided coding methodology 
developed by Michael Kimmel (see Chapter 4) to explore the use of metaphor in building a 
conceptual structure concerning data control in EU law, and the conceptual reasoning behind 
precedent use and, for lack of a better word, its translation. 
 
The goal is to answer the following questions:  
¥ one,, as compared to traditional legal tests, how can cognitive linguistics and metaphor 
analysis help understand the act of category building in law (framing) through precedent Ð the act 
of applying a universal rule to a particular case (i.e. building and applying legal principles) 
¥ two, if/how the combination of network analysis and cognitive linguistics can help us 
understand the framework of legal interpretation and reasoning Òin the wildÓ, and how this can be 
used to measure practices of weighing and balancing through precedent; and, 
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¥ three, how the uses of the framing and balancing of competing fundamental rights applies in 
the context of digital information and traditional privacy. 
 
The scaffolding on which these concepts are built are taken apart to reveal their underlying, non-
abstract components. Far from the legal method of tests of necessity and sufficiency, this research 
argues for a supplement to the traditional method of legal category building and extends an arm to 
the world of cognitive linguists from the conceptual mores of the law. 
 
4. The Layout of the Thesis: 
 
The study is broken up into 8 subsequent chapters: 
 
Chapter 2: Discusses and reviews the literature on legal theory which this work takes as its 
foundation. This covers the theories of legal interpretation of authors such as Neil MacCormick, 
Karl Llewelyn, Robert Alexy, Brian Leiter, and Henrik Palmer Olson, among others. It outlines the 
problems stemming from the lawÕs insistence on the use of necessary and sufficient conditions as a 
model for categorical framing and the weighing of reasons. Finally, it will lay out the previous work 
on law and metaphor studies by the scholars Steven Winter and Stefan Larsson. 
 
Chapter 3: Similarly, this chapter gives an in-depth look at of the last 40 years of research in 
cognitive linguistics, assessing its usefulness in addressing the problems outlined in Chapters 1 and 
2. It pays particular attention to the importance of conceptual schemas and spatial metaphors in 
cognitive reasoning and highlights the problems inherent to human reasoning as it is applied to law, 
relying on the work of cognitive linguists such as George Lakoff, Gilles Fauconnier, Len Talmy, 
Diedre Getner, and others, and linguist/psychologists such as Steven Pinker and Lera Boroditsky.  
 
Chapter 4: This chapter deals with the methodological approach used for the analysis of Schrems 
and its cited case law. It goes over previous attempts to explain the force of precedent and the use 
of network theories of precedent in particular. It outlines an updated method for achieving more 
informative results by considering the linguistic aspects of the force of precedent. It will then 
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explain the approach taken in cognitive linguistics to code and analyse metaphor, providing a 
structured and tested method of analysis. 
 
Chapter 5: This chapter begins the preliminary analysis of Schrems, studying the dismantling of the 
Safe Harbour agreement. It introduces the case and outlines the legal argument made by the 
European Court of Justice. It then presents and discusses the initial empirical results of the Schrems 
case in isolation, focusing on the spatial metaphors used in the judgment to ground the next two 
chapters of analysis. 
 
Chapter 6: This chapter delves deeper into the precedent cases cited in Schrems to explore the 
blending of two dominant strains of framing and explains resemblances between cases to show the 
underlying logic of why they may have been applied. This chapter is focused on the first of the two 
activities mentioned above: framing. By coding and analysing the use of metaphor in specific 
networks of cases, concepts such as the margin of appreciation are broken down into their spatial 
structures to see how and when those are translated through precedent cases. 
 
Chapter 7: This chapter focuses on the second activity: weighing and balancing. It uses the 
precedent network to explore how courts employ precedent to measure the importance of a 
competing reasons, and how terms like essence, equivalence, sufficiency, and quality, are measured 
and understood. It applies the metaphoric fit hypothesis to examine the results from the networks 
under review in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 8: This chapter combines the analyses of the previous two chapters and considers the 
counter-concepts in the precedent chain made by the dissenting opinions in some of the cases, as 
well as other image schematic conceptions of privacy and information to evaluate how this would 
affect the reading of the aforementioned concepts: margin of appreciation, essence, equivalence, 
and sufficiency. 
 
Chapter 9: The concluding chapter, takes the three empirical chapters to evaluate the now re-
understood concepts and consider the strengths and weaknesses of the method. Perhaps more 
importantly, Chapter 9 looks into the future of metaphor coding with the use of automatic 
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processing of case law, intra-textual network analysis, and the use of the method for other means 
of inquiry in legal theory.  
 
Chapter 2:  
Situating the Study in the Literature:  
Interpretation, Precedent, and Privacy Law 
 
ÒOh, if only it were possible to find understanding,Ó Joseph 
exclaimed. ÒIf only there were a dogma to believe in. Everything 
is contradictory, everything tangential; there are no certainties 
anywhere. Everything can be interpreted one way and then 
again interpreted in the opposite sense. The whole of world 
history can be explained as development and progress and can 
also be seen as nothing but decadence and meaninglessness. 
IsnÕt there any truth? Is there no real and valid doctrine?Ó 
 
The master had never heard him speak so fervently. He walked 
on in silence for a little, then said: ÒThere is truth, my boy. But 
the doctrine you desire, absolute, perfect dogma that alone 
provides wisdom, does not exist. Nor should you long for a 





The notion of a concrete and coherent rule-delineated system of interpretation in law, a system 
where the meaning of ambiguous terms could be predetermined with the precision required to 
ubiquitously apply them in all circumstances, is as idealistic and fleeting as things get in legal theory. 
One could trace a history of interpretation back from Roman law through to Hart, through to 
modern theories of the Critical Law movement, or feminist studies of legal interpretation, and still 
be left without a perfected system. To say it is intractable is an understatement and misleading.  To 
attempt to find a perfect doctrine - to qualify objective standards of fully justified interpretation - is 
to walk the same path as Joseph. It is a quest to quell the inherent uncertainty built into the system. 
This is an impulse we must supress. Rather than writing an historical taxonomy of legal 
interpretation, this thesis situates itself in the middle of perhaps the most difficult of interpretationÕs 
challenges: the application of a universal principle to a particular situation. It investigates the 
concept of legal reasoning as a indicator of what the law does, rather than what it is or what it 
should be, and does not treat judges (their subject specific expertise aside) and their reasoning as a 
                                            
1 Hesse, Hermann. 2002. The Glass Bead Game (Magister Ludi) A Novel. Henry Holt and Company at 83. 
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separate, impenetrable, or limited domain, as an exhaustive aporia. This projectÕs aim is to push a 
little further beyond Steven WinterÕs pilot venture into cognitive structure and legal theory2 to see 
if it can be operationalised into the nuts and bolts of the law; how coherence is structured, how 
weight is weighed, how equilibrium is achieved, are questions that lie within the realm of empirical 
study in cognitive science, and the law would fare well to embrace them.  
 
The goal isnÕt to find that perfect dogma, but to explore law in the wild and build from interviewing 
the law in its own language. Though interpretation has its many issues (the ÔcorrectÕ reading of a 
contract or statute, objective justification, intent of an author, to name a few), the divide over what 
constitutes the dynamic of applying general principles stands out as the most in need of systematic 
analysis in order to Ôstudy law in the wildÕ. Given this positioning, the thesis uses Neil MacCormickÕs 
discussions of universals and particulars as a jumping off point to then discuss the various attempts 
at finding coherence within a system of precedent application.  
 
1. Ethics and Objectivity in Law: 
 
Prior to publishing Rhetoric and the Rule of Law3, Neil MacCormick workshopped his ideas (in 
particular those contained in Chapter 5 of that work) at a seminar celebrating the 25th anniversary 
of his Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory4 at the University of Edinburgh. The resulting publication5 
was presented as a collection of essays responding to the challenge of interpretation in order to 
make sense of the dilemma of universals and particulars in law. The contributions iterated the 
significance of the transparency of legal reasoning, justifying it as, Òethically importantÓ and stating 
that,  
legal theory must address the question of what counts as a rational and 
therefore transparent determination from the rules. If we were not able to do 
this then the whole ethical basis of legality would collapse.6  
 
                                            
2 Winter, Steven L.; 2001. A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and Mind. University of Chicago Press. 
3 MacCormick, Neil; 2005. Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning. Oxford University Press. 
4 MacCormick, Neil; 1978. Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. Oxford University Press. 
5 Bankowski, Zenon(ed); 2006. The Universal and The Particular in Legal Reasoning. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 
6 Bankowski, Zenon and James MacLean; 2006. ÔPrefaceÕ in The Universal and The Particular in Legal Reasoning. 
Bankowski, Zenon(ed), Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. at xiii. 
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Brian Leiter describes this ethical dilemma as the search for justification of a legal ruling through its 
objectivity: Òwe expect legal decisions to be objective in the sense of reaching the result that the 
law really requires without letting bias or prejudice intervene.Ó7 This objectivity, he stipulates, can be 
understood as having two forms: an ÔepistemicÕ objectivity and a ÔmetaphysicalÕ objectivity.8 The 
metaphysically objective in Law is the claim that the law contains Òright answersÓ.9 Epistemic 
objectivity is the idea that Òmechanisms for discovering right answers (e.g., adjudication, legal 
reasoning) [that] are free of distorting factors [such as bias or subjectivity]Ó exist.10 The distinction 
between the mechanistic link between law and morality is not one that this work addresses in its 
entirety. I agree with Leiter in that law itself is an ÒartefactÓ in that, it Òowes its existence to human 
activities intended to create [it]Ó,11 and that the ÒDemarcation problemÓ12 as he calls it - that ÒÕ[L]aw 
and moralsÕ must be Ôrecognized as different kinds of normative systemsÕÓ13 - has not been wholly 
solved by the efforts of Hart14, Raz15, or Kelsen16, among others. Instead of debating the location or 
strength of the line between law and its moral (or amoral) justifications and in turn we should,  
Éabandon the Demarcation Problem in favor of arguing about what ought to 
be done, whether by judges confronted with novel cases, or citizens confronted 
with morally objectionable laws, on the grounds that human artefacts never 
admit of successful analysis in terms of their essential characteristicsÉ17 
 
Though I agree with LeiterÕs rejection of attempts to solve the demarcation problem, the 
normative questions of what should be done is not as interesting (or important) as what is done. In 
the least, it can be said that the normative question is secondary to the factual one and - despite its 
tenuous philosophical path of inference - the is, should come before the ought. Whether or not an 
artefact is created in a normatively justifiable way, imbues the problem with an inherent purpose 
derived from an assumed premise: that there is a proper way to create that artefact. This is a 
                                            





11 Leiter, Brian; 2011. 'The Demarcation Problem In Jurisprudence: A New Case For Skepticism,' 31 Oxf J Leg Stud 663. 
at 666. 
12 id at 666 
13 id at 663, quoting Kelsen, Hans; 1967. Pure Theory of Law. University of California Press. 
14 Hart, HLA; 1994. The Concept of Law. Clarendon Press. 
15 Raz, Joseph; 2009. The Authority of Law. OUP Oxford. 
16 Kelsen, Hans; 1967. Pure Theory of Law. University of California Press. 
17 Leiter, Brian; 2011 at 677. 
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question which presupposes that the normative requirement exists beforehand, as a prerequisite 
for law having justificatory authority. This is a bit of a non-starter for the analysis (or creation) of a 
theory of law. It separates law out as some sort of special domain of thought and normative action. 
Though we can certainly and readily admit that the law has its eccentricities and unique properties 
in reasoning; it is still unfounded to call it a different form of reasoning altogether. To echo Brian 
Tamanaha,  
Éthe project to devise a scientific concept of law was based upon a misguided 
belief that law comprises a fundamental category. To the contrary, law is 
thoroughly a cultural construct, lacking any universal essential nature. Law is 
whatever we attach the label law to.18 
 
Having reverence for the lawÕs power to coerce through its application and the supposition that in 
its application it must justify its own practice are secondary to examining how it is, in fact, applied. 
The ethical nature of legality only collapses if itÕs application is opaque, not if it conforms to a 
structure that it normatively predetermined. LawÕs ethical quality is based on the ability for any 
given individual to identify whether the law will (or may) turn out one way or the other, not if it 
should turn out this way or that. This is to take the Òquestion of legal indeterminacyÓ19 seriously. 
That, Ò[l]egal indeterminacy needs to be constrained if Ôrule of lawÕ values such as stability, 
predictability and certainty are to amount to more than mere words.Ó20 However, sketching out 
what stability, predictability or certainty means without grounding those precepts in data derived 
from decisions themselves, is to put the cart before the horse. If lawÕs ethical grounding lies in its 
ability to be predictable and/or certain (whether stable is even desirable is an entirely different 
conversation), then the ethical question becomes: can one have any sense of being able to predict 
an outcome? A perfection of that predictability, the perfection of pattern recognition, the 
perfection of lawÕs design, dismisses and divorces law from its discursive and creative project as an 
artefact. To attempt beforehand to say Ôthe law must contain thisÕ, is to start at the wrong end of 
the project. One can contend that the law should do this or that, or that it is more morally justified 
by doing this or that ad nauseum; without an understanding of the outcomes of law actually doing 
this or that, it is an exercise akin to JosephÕs quest for an all-encompassing dogma, and his sageÕs 
advice should be well heeded: ÒNor should you long for a perfect doctrine, my friend. Rather, you 
                                            
18 Tamanaha, Brian Z.; 1997. Realistic Socio-Legal Theory: Pragmatism and a Social Theory of Law. Clarendon Press at 128. 
19 Klatt, Matthias; 2008. Making the Law Explicit: The Normativity of Legal Argumentation. Bloomsbury Publishing. 
20 id at 2. 
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should long for the perfection of yourself...Ó21 A perfection of oneself, in our terms, is to identify the 
ways in which we can probe the law to find patterns and predict outcomes; not to ask the law to 
do that work for us. 
 
With this introspection in mind, we ask: how does a decision apply justification to reasoning 
between competing interests and/or in novel cases? More generally: how does a decision reflect 
the application of a general rule to a specific case? Some strains of thought approach this question 
with a focus (like above) on the metaphysical content of lawÕs moral grounding and investigate 
whether objective or subjective justifications of lawÕs authority are present. Others are more 
concerned with the epistemic value of lawÕs mechanisms to give right answers and its ability to 
produce predictable outcomes in terms of a proper interpretation. But, a proper interpretation is 
not what we are after here, only a method of discovering what interpretations do. 
 
2. The Universal, Particular and Interpretation 
 
To return to Neil MacCormick, the practice of applying any general principle to a particular 
circumstance is an act of generalisation. This is a question for MacCormick that asks: Òwhen is it 
justifiable to apply this category in our explanation of events, and how [should we] apply it?Ó22 The 
problem is, of course, to justify that act in a way that escapes the subjectivity of a certain point of 
view, 
To show that it is right is to show that upon any objective view of the matter, 
the act ought to have been done, or even had to be done, given the character 
of the act and the circumstances of the case. To say: Ôit is right to do this in these 
circumstances because of what this is and what these areÕ, however much one 
might expand on oneÕs particular allusion by pointing and nodding, is to fail to 
show anything other than a purely subjective view of the matter. It is only once 
the ÔthisÕ and the ÔtheseÕ are given some quantified value Éthat anything is 
available for objective scrutiny at all. Only once you show me that the Ôthis-nessÕ 
of the act É does an objectively discussable question arise at all.23 
 
                                            
21 Hesse, Hermann. 2002 at 83. 
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The search for an objective standard is a reach to construct law in a way which allows it to 
somehow exists outside of the human animal. MacCormick, and those who search for this standard 
do not ignore the humanity of a judge or their decision. It is precisely their human fallibility and 
subjectivity in decision-making they are trying to circumvent by constructing an objective notion of 
the law. It is an attempt to justify the law by means of its generalisability, 
There is, I submit, no justification without universalization; motivation needs no 
universalization; but explanation requires generalization. For particular facts Ð or 
particular motives Ð to be justifying reasons they have to be subsumable under a 
relevant principle of action universally stated.24 
 
If this premise is true, then it is incumbent on the legal theorist to understand those generalisations 
and their applications to particular circumstances. For MacCormick, the defeasibility (in the 
Popperian sense) of universal principles is the best recourse to provide justification for the 
outcomes of legal reasoning. A generalisation, or a principle derived from a common set of 
particulars, must allow itself to be tested over and over again to define its boundaries, core 
assumptions, and ultimately its ability to be falsified, if it hopes to be a justified generalisation. 
However, this is a double-edged sword. Any single case, once classified as an instance of ÔxÕ allows 
(in fact even calls for) some inductive reasoning along the lines of; if x then y, or x has a value of y, x 
exists in a set of premises that leads to y, etc. The particular exists in a larger conceptualisation of 
the universal principle, and that universal dictates (at least in part) the inductive reasoning that 
follows from it. He uses the death of Cleopatra as an example of this logic: 
Éwhat enables us so to conceptualize the death of Cleopatra is that the 
particular fact of the biting snake belongs as minor premise in an argument of 
which the major premise is a hypothesis culled from the snake-venom theory 
and the conclusion is the death.25 
 
The particulars in each case test our notions of the snake-venom theory of death so that the 
general principle can be honed to fit more and more circumstances, making us more assured of its 
justified content, and by extension increasing our trust that the law is just, or a decision or 
interpretation of a statute or precedent was, if not certainly ÔÔcorrectÕ, at least reasonable or 
justifiable.  
                                            
24 id at 19. 
25 id at 17. 
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There are two distinct notions here: 
 
1.  the choice of the framing of the particular case to fit with a principle (or set of principles), and 
2.  the testing of that principle by the particular case to define the boundaries of its application and 
to establish whether or not the particular circumstances outweigh the guiding force of the principle 
at hand. 
 
The first idea requires containing the principle within a set of criteria to see where it fits within the 
law. It is a decision claiming that circumstance A is a case of x. The second notion addresses the 
remaining question of just how that testing occurs. 
 
3. Precedent as a Tool of Conceptual Framing: 
 
More often than not, the framing of a case can obscure the other distinctions that may be made 
about the generalisation of a particular case and how it fits within existing law. To take the words 
of Iain Scobbie,  
Éthe categorization of facts is dependent on the rule under which they are 
alleged to be subsumed, each party may stress different laws and precedents as 
decisive. A consequence of the concentration on adhesion is that the 
interpretation of a given text might not be disputed. At most this can only lead 
to the conclusion that possible alternative interpretations of the text did not 
interest either party because these offered neither any advantage.26 
 
The ascription of circumstance A to category x is the first tool a court can use to apply a generality 
to a case. The motivation behind this is to feed into the legitimacy thesis of law, or otherwise 
stated, to appeal to the metaphysical objectivity of law: Òto attempt to construct answers to legal 
questions through the concepts that inhere in established canons of interpretation, and in doctrinal 
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Bianchi, Andrea, Peat, Daniel & Windsor, Matthew (Eds.). OUP Oxford. 61. at 73. See also, Bengoetxea, Joxerramon, 
MacCormick, Neil and Soriano, Leonor Moral; 2001. ÔIntegration and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of the European 
Court of JusticeÕ in The European Court of Justice. Grinne De Brca, Joseph Weiler (Eds.). Oxford University Press. 43 
at 53. 
 32 
analysis that seeks to establish commonalities and differences between various legal categories.Ó27 It 
is an appeal to ÔfindÕ that which is ÔwithinÕ the law already, thus justifying its proscription to the given 
circumstance as reasonable and an objective finding of fact, rather than a subjective moral stance.28  
 
However, the circumvention of subjectivity by find that which is within the law has been noted time 
and time again for its misconception that a judge, or even a panel of judges is able to do this in 
reality. The initial framing of a circumstance to a set of principles in itself is an act of subjective 
reasoning: Ò[t]he original context from which meaning is derived consists of the presuppositions of 
the rule makers. These, categorized broadly, consist of presuppositions about matters of fact, 
presuppositions about matters of law, and presuppositions about values.Ó29 As MacCormick noted, 
understanding the cause of CleopatraÕs death relies on the acceptance of the snake-venom theory 
of death. There can be no application of a general category without a prior acceptance of some 
underlying premise that frames subsequent judgements. Once framed, judgments can, and do, fall 
prey to the over reliance on category membership or, in the least, the kinds of conclusions that are 
deducible from their framing. As Andrei Marmor points out, 
legal inferences have to rely on a legal finding of facts, that is, facts legally 
established for the purposes of the relevant inference. However, this notion of 
an authoritative finding of fact is ambiguous between the finding that something 
actually happened in the world, and the finding that it conforms to the relevant 
legal categorization of it.30 
 
This categorisation, this framing, is constructed through the use of analogical reasoning and an 
appeal to precedent.313233 The literature on analogy takes on a number of issues regarding the 
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application of reasoning by analogy to law. Past scholars have noted the intricate workings of how 
we might classify different types of analogical reasoning34 and whether this is a justifiable way for a 
court to reason. What they do agree on is that often enough the use of analogical reasoning, 
whether to a precedent case or a hypothetical example, is Òa form of classification under a genus, 
specifically, a predicate attributed to different kinds (concepts) belonging to the same semantic 
category (substance, quality, etc.).Ó35 In such cases, Òtheir relevance depends on the fact that they 
both belong to the common genusÉIt is the perspective under which they are considered in the 
text.Ó36 This shared genus (or semantic categorisation) allows a court to organise disparate 
occurrences under the same general rule when Òthe conclusion is drawn deductively from the 
generalization [sic], that is, the predicate is attributed to the target subject.Ó37 
 
Generally (but not always), this jump from predicate case to the target subject, is done by means 
of an appeal to precedent or a universal rule as understood by a generalisation or comparison to 
precedent cases. Precedents serve to inform new cases by constructing the boundaries within 
which the framing of a new circumstance takes place. That being said, in international law, 
precedent is not seen as having a Ôbinding effectÕ.38 Whether or not precedent is binding in theory, 
there is no getting away from the conceptually constricting nature precedents have on international 
law.  
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The universal is constructed from the framing of individual circumstances in line with the principles, 
genera, or analogical correlates of a given circumstance. It is a paradoxical construction which 
entails rereading past cases through the lens of similar (enough) characteristics in order to apply 
the current circumstance to a category that holds legal meaning, and, some hope, to an objective 
standard. Whether or not that framing is objective or not isnÕt the core issue; how that framing 
takes place, the intricate and often subtle dynamics of that categorisation, is where this research 
finds it locus.  
 
4. Precedent as a Scale 
 
Where the first priciple of the universal category is its ability to frame cases, the second is how to 
test the boundaries of those framings to see whether the universal or particular holds more weight 
than the other regarding the correct decision in a given case.  As Aleksander Peczenik notes in his 
response to MacCormick, when considering the judgeÕs ability to weigh the particulars of a case 
against the legal principle at hand, two questions still remain to be answered: 
 
¥!what is the ultimate justifier Ð universal propositions or particular 
judgments? and 
¥!what is the justificatory force of weighing?39  
 
He, like MacCormick, situates the justificatory force of weighing reasons in their defeasibility. He 
states,  
A given norm may be both defeasible and outweighable: it is defeasible in the 
sense that it can be defeated, meaning that we can set it aside in exceptional 
cases; it is outweighable in the sense that the justification of these exceptions 
requires a weighing and balancing of reasons. 
From a logical point of view, a norm may be defeasible but not outweighable.  
That is, it may be set aside by a process other than weighing; for example, by 
arbitrary fiat of a sovereign lawgiver.40 
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Peczenik would feel that the second circumstance would not be as justifiable as the first, in that it 
does not provide (or allow for the provision of) a reasoning based on a coherent system of 
interpretation. It is the weighing of a norm (a universal against a particular) that allows for a normÕs 
defeasibility, giving it its justificatory power. Coherence, in this regard, does not mean that there is 
one correct reading, but rather that each reading affects the coherence of an overall structure: it is 
coherent Òwith the background system of acceptances, reasonings and preferences, conceived as 
an all-embracing theory.Ó41 
 
Coherence as a legal concept that aims to provide a Òconsistency in adjudicationÓ42. Coherence, in 
this sense, is considered for its normative force. A judgment, if coherent to its larger whole and 
consistent with its background assumptions and precepts, provides a judge, law maker, and/or 
citizen a knowability about the law and its likely outcomes. Peczenik considers coherence to be 
Òone of the most influential movements in recent philosophy of science.Ó43  
 
For Ken Kress, coherence has of seven properties: ÒconsistencyÓ, ÒcomprehensivenessÓ, 
ÒcompletenessÓ, ÒmonismÓ, ÒunityÓ, ÒarticulatenessÓ, and a requirement to be ÒjustifiedÓ. These 
properties are not necessary collectively but, according to Kress, Òthe more of that property a 
theory manifests, the more coherent that theory is.Ó44 Peczenik and Alexy, compile their list of 
coherenceÕs properties as a measure of support given to a theory; that, Òthe more the statements 
belonging to a given theory approximate a perfect supportive structure, the more coherent the 
theory.Ó45 Those properties are: 
 
(1)the greatest possible number of supported statements belonging to the 
theory in question;  
(2) the greatest possible length of chains of reasons belonging to it;  
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(3)the greatest possible number of strongly supported statements belonging to 
the theory;  
(4) the greatest possible number of connections between various supportive 
chains belonging to the theory;  
(5)the greatest possible number of preference relations between various 
principles belonging to it; (6)the greatest possible number and complexity of 
reciprocal supportive relations between various statements belonging to the 
theory;  
(7)the greatest possible number of universal statements belonging to the theory; 
the greatest possible number of general concepts belonging to it; the highest 
possible degree of generality of concepts implemented within it; the greatest 
possible number of resemblances between concepts used within it;  
(8) the greatest possible number of conceptual cross-connections between 
various theories;  
(9)the greatest possible number of cases covered by the theory; and  
(10)the greatest possible number of fields of life covered by the theory.46 
 
Whether or not either of these examples offer the best concept of coherence is up to the 
philosophers of morality and science to decide. What neither of these theories do is help us to see 
how this plays out in a judgement, or how this relates to applying a universal to a particular. 
Although they do give us an idea about how to judge whether an application holds in the  
retrospective light of other cases, whether or not the greatest number thesis Ð as we might call it - 
is indicative of how the judgement plays out is yet to be seen. It would seem that the greatest 
number thesis is an attempt to answer PeczenikÕs second question: Ôwhat is the justificatory force of 
weighing?Õ. This, however, leaves his first question unanswered (although one could posit that the 
most justifiable theory for him would be the most coherent universal - given the greatest number 
thesis). He instead relegates the problem to a kind of epistemic aporia, 
I guess that the feeling of puzzle and even mystery is the result of a modern 
expectation that all problems are soluble by recourse to empirical data, 
deductive logic and induction. Holistic weighing includes those three 
components but it also includes something more; namely, the insight that the 
system of beliefs, preferences and reasonings which has emerged from weighing 
is to be acceptedÉ we feel that a reflective answer, one based on the 
coherence of several acts of weighing, is superior to a non-reflective, irrational 
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hunch. Can that feeling deceive us? No logic can answer this, yet we trust the 
coherent system: this is the mystery. But the mystery is by no means restricted 
to morality and legal reasoning: it is the mystery of all knowledge.47 
 
PeczenikÕs reluctance to go further than this is representative of a majority of traditional legal 
scholarship. He stops short of asking what the weighing entails except to say it is ÒspontaneousÓ 
and Òresembling moral emotions: a person feels that the system hangs together in rather the same 
way as one feels that an action is good or evil.Ó48 It strikes me that this explanation is lacking the in-
depth examination that Peczenik normally produces. Trust in Òthe coherent systemÓ is a mystery; 
but not an impenetrable one. Scholars have not stopped searching for inroads into moral 
emotions, so why would one hold off on investigating the coherent system? He is not the only one. 
Though there are a good number of different assumptions made about what constitutes weighing 
practices, there is not an overwhelming body of empirical data to back them up.  
 
Even in studies that aim to compare different practices in approaches to precedent, it is often left 
to the moral theorist to decide the best normative framework to justify the practice of weighing, 
and the intricacies of how that weighing takes place are omitted or overlooked.49 They might 
separate out the different ways that precedent can act on a particular circumstance into a matter 
of degrees (e.g. Òformal bindingnessÓ, Òhaving forceÓ, Òproviding further supportÓ and Òillustrative 
valueÓ50), but the mechanism(s) for arriving at this graded degree system is still relegated to a murky 
creative process. This reluctance to investigate that process of weighing, PeczenikÕs aporia, is our 
starting point.  
 
5. Balance and Weight in Legal Reasoning 
 
The previous claim notwithstanding, I do not want to give the impression that no scholar has taken 
on the process of weighing balancing reasons. It is only to say that, with some notable exceptions, 
the aim of these studies has not been to understand the process of weighing but to proscribe a 
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model that would justify it as rational (or in other cases morally desirable) and thus acceptable, 
usually taking a standpoint of universal reasons. Bengoetxea et. al. believe that this type of 
reasoning, the Òidea of Õbalancing reasonsÕ as appraising the weight of each reason according to a 
pre-established metric systemÉshould be abandoned.Ó51 This does not rule out the possibility that 
criteria to aid a judge in balancing could be found, but could come in the form of Ôbalancing 
criteriaÕ, 
Unlike universal rules, which establish a systematic priority among reasons, 
balancing criteria do not rely on the idea of unity. Unlike universal rules, 
balancing criteria do not instruct a judge as to which value or set of values 
should be used to solve a conflict of reasons; rather, they instruct judges on how 
to deal with and solve the conflict. In other words, balancing criteria do not 
provide the answer but they provide tools to find it.52 
 
In the minds of Bengoetxea et. al. the CJEU provides three criteria for this balancing to occur: the 
Òrule of reasonÓ, Òthe test of proportionalityÓ, and the Òtest of non-discriminationÓ which 
collectively provide coherence within European Law.53 The authors rely on an analysis of Ôstructural 
supportÕ when the Court justifies its reasoning citing either Òauthority reasons Ð legal norms, 
precedents, and legal doctrineÓ or Òsubstantive reasons Ð values and principles.Ó54  
 
The first criterion set out in the authorsÕ analysis is the Ôrule of reasonÕ. This criterion has two 
underlying provisions: one, that fundamental rights cannot be understood as Òall-or-nothing 
commands,Ó55; and two, that Ôcommon interestsÕ are what are weighed against those fundamental 
rights. The criterionÕs main function is to Ò[strike] a balance between rights and goalsÓ56 by Òcreating 
a general framework in which the balancing exercise will take place.Ó57 These reasons must connect 
in such a way that the reasoning creates a coherent whole.58 The second criterion is that of the 
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Òcriterion of proportionality.Ó59 This is commonly stated in judgements as, proportional to the aim of 
a rule. In other words, Òa measure is proportional if it is the less restrictive option among all 
possible means,Ó60 and if the measure is ÒnecessaryÓ and ÒdesirableÓ.61 The proportionality is 
measured via its Òcausal linkÉbetweenÉa particular state of affairs which is considered as 
valuableÉandÉan action.Ó62 The third criterion is the Òcriterion of non-discriminationÓ.63 Non-
discrimination here should be understood as a Òtest [that]Édemands an appropriate justification of 
the violation of equality.Ó64 Non-discrimination differs from proportionality in that, 
the test of proportionality focuses on the efficient promotion of colliding values 
(it is a Ômore or lessÕ criterion), the test of non-discrimination focuses on 
whether or not the principle of equality is undermined (it is an all or nothing 
criterion).65 
 
Although non-discrimination can be characterised as an all or nothing criterion, in practice, the 
Court has used a more degree-attributive model to decide hard cases, where Òa certain degree of 
discrimination is acceptable if justified by other reasons.Ó66 These criteria, when taken together, 
provide the Court with the framework to weigh competing interests from universal principles to 
particular circumstances. Although a number of questions remain which, for Bengoetxea et. al., are 
left open to a judge to decide from Òthe perspective of the morality of the law,Ó67  based upon its 
supporting connections to legal, moral and political theory already enshrined in the legal apparatus. 
This approach aims to provide Òan optimalÓ68 solution, not a simple heuristic to solve all cases, but 
an appropriately effective solution to create coherence.  
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A similar attempt for balancing criteria that stands out is Robert AlexyÕs ÒWeight FormulaÓ.69 Alexy 
attempts to give criteria for the balancing of competing or colliding rights through the use of 
mathematical maxims, such as his first and second ÔRule of BalancingÓ; respectively: 
The greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, the 
greater must be the importance of satisfying the other.70 
and,  
The more heavily an interference with a constitutional right weighs, the greater 
must be the certainty of its underlying premises.71 
 
These maxims can be used in AlexyÕs ÔWeight FormulaÕ to operationalise the ascription of weight 
and balance: 
By means of the Weight Formula, it is possible to determine the concrete weight 
of a principle Pi, which is expressed by Wi,j , relative to a competing principle Pj . 






The variables Wi and Wj stand for the abstract weight of the two principles Pi 
and Pj; ÉIi and Ij stand for the respective intensity of interference by non-
satisfaction of the principles; Ri and Rj, stand for the reliability of the respective 
empirical assumptions.72 
 
In order to make this a working formula, AlexyÕs ascription of weight quantifies the intensity by 
means of a graded system in which the intensity of interference can be measured as Òlight (l), 
moderate (m) and serious (s) interferencesÓ73 and where those values are quantified by Òl = 20, m 
= 21, s = 22.74 The reliability variable is quantified by a value that Òdecreases exponentially when 
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uncertainty increases according to the numerical series 20, 2−1 and 2−2Ó75 under the criteria of Ò(r) 
reliable or certain [20], (p) plausible or defensible [2-1], and (e) not evidently false [2-2].Ó76 As for the 
abstract weight variable, according to Alexy, it too can be quantified using the grading of light, 
moderate, and serious, 
The abstract weight of Pi is the weight which Pi has relative to other principles 
independently of the circumstances of any casesÉMany constitutional principles 
do not differ in their abstract weight. Some, however, do. The right to life, for 
instance, has a higher abstract weight than the general freedom of action.77 
 
For Alexy, the formula serves to take the relational qualities of the weights in competition and turn 
that into a concrete measure. It is not an objective measure of the weight of a principle, but a 
quantification which gives each one a value relative to its competing counterpart. The result being 
that,  
If a quotient Wi,j is greater than [one]1, Pi takes precedence. In cases in which a 
quotient is below [one]1, Pj takes precedence. If the quotient amounts to [one] 
1, a stalemate occurs.78 
 
It is a methodology not devoid of its criticisms,79 and, like Bengoetxea et. al.Õs attempt, investigates 
the structure of the balancing rather than the make-up of the qualifications that can be reviewed 
independently. It is an effort to bolster the exercise of balancing in criteria to justify the reasoning 
of the application of general principles. It is, however, devoid of criteria which would allow an 
observer to classify such judgments in their respective degree of severity. This isnÕt AlexyÕs fault. It is 
a symptom of a reductionist application of legality. The qualities of defeasibility and coherence 
make more sense here if  the reality of a fool-proof structural system is understood to be tentative 
at best. A concession Alexy and Bengoetxea et. al.  readily make. Their focus on the aspects of the 
framework of weighing as a solving mechanism (of which these studies are but two examples) is 
one approach. Another, and perhaps more compelling theory, if what we are interested in is the 
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coherence of the system, is to look at the aspects of classification. This is a lonelier road to travel in 
legal theory. 
 
6. Interpretation and Cognitive Theory 
 
Luckily, wading into the deep doesnÕt have to be done completely alone. There are a few legal 
theorists (and cognitive scientists, linguists, and psychologists alike - as the next chapter will cover) 
who are willing to delve headfirst into classification and, by proxy, PeczenikÕs murky aporia of all 
knowledge. One of those who dares to launch himself into this morass is Steven Winter.80 Like 
Alexy, in his formulas of balancing and justifiable criteria of their application, or the quandary over 
universal principles and their particular application, or PeczenikÕs greatest number thesis, the 
emphasis is (mostly) reserved for the hard cases. The presumption is an oft-repeated one. It is 
based in the fallacious notion that the rules and principles in law adhere to an objectivity that can 
be found about a given situation, even when scholars admit their approaches are aimed at 
optimisation. The previous approaches obscure the easy cases by way of assuming that their ease is 
related to their objective empirical status; that if we all agree, that if the outcome is obvious, it 
therefore means it is more easily justified. It is a reliance on the static conception of the law, where 
principles are to be found, not created, hence the overwhelming obsession with treating judicial 
discretion with such animosity. While judicial discretion must be examined in the optimised system, 
it is as important to explore it within the non-optimised framework; in ÔhardÕ cases as well as ÔeasyÕ 
ones. Winter, is not so constrained by the easy case. 
 
Winter draws from Karl Llewellyn and his appreciation of the Òprofoundly human dimension of 
law,Ó echoing the latterÕs belief that Òlegal meaning, like all linguistic meaning, changes with the 
emergence of new social conditions.Ó81 For Llewellyn, the application of the universal to the 
particular relies on a judgeÕs ability to Òmake the direction and degree of semantic change in a legal 
ruleÉkeep up with the corresponding change in the real-life situation.Ó82 There is a dynamism to 
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law that Llewellyn and Winter both recognise. Theirs is a different model which is less troubled by 
the issues of objectivity and subsequent indeterminacy than the frameworks of optimisation of the 
previous authors. As noted at the beginning of the chapter, it isnÕt lawÕs optimised framework that 
guarantees legal certainty, it is its continual change through the discretion and categorisation of 
competing interests that keeps it up to date and knowable.  
 
However laudable his efforts were, Llewellyn also fell short of breaching PeczenikÕs aporia, a 
drawback that did not go unnoticed by his many critics.83 He explained the reasoning that led 
judges to make semantic changes to the law as a Òsituational senseÓ which could act as Òa 
normative ideal,Ó thus allowing the activity of law to rid itself of what would be undesirable in an 
objectively justified theory of legal reasoning.84 Winter picks up LlewellynÕs concept of situational 
sense and its weaknesses by moving into the aporia with the aid of cognitive science.  
 
WinterÕs basic premise examines the role of the human mind as understood by cognitive science in 
the interpretations that are made in judicial reasoning. While the basics of cognitive linguistics will 
be covered in the next chapter, it is important here to point out WinterÕs contribution to the legal 
ramifications of applying it to law and legal theory. Firstly, Winter agrees with the premise of the 
function and importance of understanding categorisationÕs role in legal thought and adjudication. 
However, he takes issue with the conventional view that categories can have an Ôall-or-nothingÕ 
nature to them: 
The conventional view treats the notions of a category as an a priori conceptual 
structure thatÉis homogeneous in contentÉ[they are] descriptive, definitional 
and rigidly bounded. The empirical evidence, in contrast, presents a picture of 
categorisation as an imaginative and dynamic process that is flexible in its 
application and scope.85 
 
The role of cognitive theory in understanding legal reasoning is that it, Òtransforms everything that 
depends on categories Ð including phenomena as prosaic as rules and as obscure as judgement.Ó86 
Legal reasoning is only possible Òbecause we have assimilated the tacit knowledge that makes the 
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rules comprehensible, defines patterns of legal inference, and enables the productivity of crucial 
legal categories.Ó87 He opposes the intuition to let hard cases be the defining factor in drawing out 
an optimised system of justified legal reasoning. Hard cases exist when the background knowledge 
does not meet an expectation of where the border exists in relation to category membership or 
the perception of the ÔtypicalÕ member of that category is challenged. However, this does not mean 
that the easy cases are any less incumbent on the cultural contingency of category understanding. 
As Winter states, Òeven the ÔsimplestÕ rule makes sense only against the backdrop of a massive 
cultural tableau that provides the tacit background assumptions that render it intelligible.Ó88 
 
WinterÕs theory hinges on the idea of the Ôideali[s]ed cognitive modelÕ or ICM. The function of the 
idealised cognitive model is much akin to the coherent framework of the aforementioned authors. 
Like understanding the death of Cleopatra, Òa cognitive model [that] typically includes among its 
features representations of relations between entities and events,Ó89 that make up a coherent 
whole must already exist. What differs in WinterÕs approach is his exploration of this idea in terms 
of what cognitive science understands about how ICMs are formed and how they act in reasoning, 
a subject outlined in the next chapter.  
 
For our current pursuit of understanding the relationships between universals and particular 
circumstances, and crucially the balancing of competing interests, cognitive science has an important 
role to play. With regard to the first question we posited about how a case gets framed as x 
through the use of precedent, the understanding of classification is an invaluable tool to understand 
how this takes place: 
A cognitive account of [a rule application] makes it possible to specify precisely 
why a rule Ôseems utterly obviousÕ and Ôutterly appropriateÕ at its ÔcoreÕ. One 
would first reconstruct the cognitive model at work...the normative 
understandings and assumptions that it encodes, and the social practices that 
motivate itÉOne would then be in a position toÉmake predictions about the 
nature of the arguments for and against extension of the rule.90 
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The second question concerning the balancing of competing reasons, and how we might quantify 
(or at least make comparative judgments) about weight, can also be addressed in a similar manner. 
In a traditional test of balance (such as AlexyÕs formula), competing weights are treated as equal 
entities to be compared in isolation with one against the other. This is to rip them from their social 
context and treat them as a priori categories, in the conventional sense. A cognitive account of the 
comparison of competing principles on the other hand, can take into account the Òrelative 
importance or...the role that any particular factor [plays] in the analysisÓ as those factors can 
Òframe[...] the value and meaning ofÉotherÉfactors,Ó relative to a ICM. 91 Chapter 3 goes over the 
basic tenets of this framing, and Chapter 4 explains the method of applying this to case law. It is a 
way to probe whether or not the attribution of relative weight is coherent with the dominant 
framing of the rule or general principle at hand.  
 
The merits and applications of WinterÕs approach have not been empirically tested to a thourough 
extent. There are some examples of applying WinterÕs approach (as indicated in Chapter 3), but so 
far they have taken a largely general approach to cognitive theory and law. This is similar to the 
earlier critique levelled at WinterÕs approach in that he uses examples to make his point but stops 
short of a deeper investigation into how the mechanisms of ICMs play over a body of case law.  
 
After the publication of A Clearing in The Forest, Brooklyn Law School held a symposium discussing 
WinterÕs outstretched hand to cognitive theory. The resulting publication92 discussed the merits of 
WinterÕs assertion that reasoning Òis imaginative, and relies heavily on metaphorical structure and 
cognitive models developed from experience.Ó93 The criticisms and extrapolations of the authors in 
the volume reflect the enormous impact his approach has on legal theory. They range from 
explorations of public reason, legal education, and race in the law, to the metaphorical structure of 
criminal law and the 2000 US presidential election. As Lawrence Solan points out in his 
introduction: 
[WinterÕs ideas are] provocative, and perhaps controversial. In fact, there is not 
complete consensus among the authors on significant issues. But the breadth of 
subject matter and richness of analysis must inevitably lead one to respect the 
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endeavor and recognize its explanatory power. At the end of the day, the issue 
is really a simple one: WonÕt we learn more about how law functions if we take 
more seriously the ways in which its players understand their world?94  
 
It is perhaps most informative here is to examine the response of Dan Simon, a theorist whose 
work lies at the intersection of law and psychology, to WinterÕs proposal. His primary praise of 
WinterÕs work is much akin to the leading purpose in the current project. That, 
To better understand the legal system, we are advised to relax the conventional 
fascination with what the law is or should be, and start examining more seriously 
(inter alia, empirically) how we do what we do when we engage in legal 
thinking.95 
 
Simon explains that by rejecting the traditional model of legal reasoning leads to a quagmire of 
indeterminacy, it might Òfree legal scholarship from the deadlock of objectivist and subjectivist 
claims, striving instead towards an understanding of law as a relatively regular, systematic and, in 
some senses, predictable social practice.Ó96 Like the thinking outlined so far, Simon takes the view 
that judicial reasoning is concerned with providing coherence. Using empirical studies, Simon posits, 
The most notable phenomenon is that during the process [of adjudication], the 
cognitive system dynamically changes the evaluations of the arguments leading 
towards a strong endorsement of one set of arguments and a rejection of the 
competing set.97 
 
Through an explanation of the process of adjudication, Simon uses the concept of neural networks 
to examine the cross-activations of certain elements of an argument that result in the active 
elements suppressing the non-active as the pattern-supportive elements reinforces themselves. This 
pattern of constitutive elements Òimpose[s] a coherence-maximizing order on the setsÓ98 and forces 
the individual elements into the coherent whole, giving a judge confidence in the ÔfitÕ when justifying 
their own reasoning.99 This argumentation offers both a degree of confirmation and a challenge to 
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WinterÕs basic theory, and there is clearly still much research to be done on whether the aim 
towards coherence is an ex post exercise or a justificatory one, at least based on the current 
empirical evidence. What can be said is that the importance of this type of work lies in its potential 
to find the compass needle that points to how a method of cognitive science and law could be 





Literature Review: Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
 
 
ÒWe sort the mail, build sand castles, solve jigsaw 
puzzles, separate wheat from chaff, rearrange chess 
pieces, collect stamps, alphabetize books, create 
symmetry, compose sonnets and sonatas, and put our 
rooms in order ÉWe propagate structure ÉWe 
disturb the tendency toward equilibriumÉNot only 
do living things lessen the disorder in their 
environments; they are in themselves, their skeletons 
and their flesh, vesicles and membranes, shells and 
carapaces, leaves and blossoms, circulatory systems 
and metabolic pathways - miracles of pattern and 
structure. It sometimes seems as if curbing entropy is 






What if we had a way to look at categories and concepts that skipped over the essentialism that 
seems so intuitive to reach for, and instead drilled down to the different aspects of how a concept 
is structured? As shown in the previous chapter, legal theory is often so concerned with the large 
task - the overarching what should be questions - that it misses the processes and aspects that build 
the concepts it is asking about. So, it is important to escape the legal myopia, and look elsewhere 
for guidance. Given lawÕs reliance on language, linguistics- and more specifically conceptual 
semantics, the field dedicated to investigating how language construction facilitates meaning 
construction- is the perfect place to look. 
 
Steven Pinker, first in Learnability and Cognition: The Acquisition of Argument Structure and 
subsequently expanded upon in The Stuff of Thought, outlines the basic facets of conceptual 
structure. Stemming from Kant, he looks at the dimensions of time, space, causality, substance, and 
agency and their use in language to form the categories that, 
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determine the kinds of entities we count and keep track of, the compartments 
into which we sort people and things, the way we manipulate the physical 
environment to our advantage, and the way we ascribe moral responsibility to 
people for their actions.2 
 
These are not just arbitrary distinctions of the facets of concepts, but given their role in reflecting 
the ways in which we sort the world, they are corrupting to Òour commerce, our politics, our legal 
disputes, even our humor.Ó3 PinkerÕs work on the structure of concepts, which mostly looks at verb 
use, is acutely interesting for the law, and particularly so for those categories and concepts that 
escape even the most rigorous of generalisations. Conceptual structure for Pinker has a few salient 
characteristics. Drawing on the work of other linguists,4 he contends that Òthe human mind contains 
a level of representation that interfaces between language and inference.Ó5 This interface 
Òunderlines many high level cognitive processes, including inference, intuitive physics, 
argumentation, and shared social and moral normsÓ.6 
 
By grounding even the most complex of concepts in concrete notions of space, time, agency, and 
causation, language reflects the ways in which they can be translated from one family of concepts 
(to use the Wittgensteinian term) to another. We do this by importing the conceptual structure 
from one domain to another using metaphorical extensions.7 Differing conceptions of movement 
through space and/or time can have profound consequences not just for the grammar of 
sentences, but, more importantly, also influences the ways in which we infer meaning. For now, we 
can understand this as a way to grasp the structure of concepts which reveals that deriving 
meaning via essentialism is indeed misplaced. This is to say, if meaning is relational to different 
temporal, spatial and causal dimensions, then pinning down any generalisable meaning is quite 
erroneous, and one must instead look to map out the ways these constructions are formed in the 
law. The tools provided by cognitive linguists allow us to look at the ways in which these structures 
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are built in language when applicable to defining meaning, and certainly offer options for piercing 
ambiguity in the law. 
 
As Steven Pinker notes, Òmany disagreements in human affairs turn not on differences in data or 
logic but on how a problem is framed.Ó8  This framing takes place by understanding abstract 
concepts in terms of the knowable, concrete aspects of their metaphorical counterparts. Since 
George Lakoff and Mark JohnsonÕs seminal work, Metaphors We Live By,9 the importance of 
metaphor has enjoyed a privileged place in language research. The publication highlighted the 
importance of the work of linguists and cognitive scientists alike, and prompted further investigation 
into the link between metaphor, conceptual framing, and behaviour.10  No longer just the baby of 
rhetoric and literary analysis, the examination of metaphor has evolved to include disciplines such 
as: political science11, psychology12, economics13, foreign policy analysis14, and legal theory (to some 
extent). We will address the legal approach to metaphor in a moment, but for now it is necessary 
to cover the basics of cognitive linguistics. 
 
1. Conceptual Metaphor Theory, the Basics: 
 
Here is how linguist Vyvyan Evans describes Conceptual Metaphor Theory (hereafter CMT): 
The basic premise of Conceptual Metaphor Theory is that metaphor is not 
simply a stylistic feature of language but that thought itself is fundamentally 
metaphorical in nature. According to this view, conceptual structure is organised 
by cross-domain mappings or correspondences between conceptual domains. 
Some of these mappings are due to pre-conceptual embodied experiences while 
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others build on these experiences in order to form more complex conceptual 
structures. For instance, we can think and talk about the concept of quantity in 
terms of the concept of vertical elevation, as in She got a really high mark in the 
test, where high relates not literally to physical height but to a good mark. 15 
 
Thought structures language use in the form of abstractions shaped by certain characteristics of 
time, space, substance, etc. We then take these very basic forms and extrapolate them to new 
circumstances (though it should be noted that there is an ongoing debate regarding how much the 
old structures inform the new context semantically). In short, it is not wholly clear whether or not 
meaning is dependent on these structures or whether it only helps to make sense of them. One 
could imagine it as a spectrum, with the hardliners who believe that thought itself is metaphorical16 
on one side, and those who believe metaphor to be superfluous rhetoric on the other. Most 
linguists fall somewhere in the middle as there is an exorbitant amount of reliable evidence to 
suggest that metaphor does indeed shape our thought. How strongly it does so is debated and 
dependent on experimental context.17 What is clear, and what is important for the discussion here, 
is that there certainly is a relationship between metaphor and thought in the conceptual translation 
process; that, thinking in terms of one conceptual structure affects the meaning(s) derived in the 
second.  
 
This results from the systematicity of metaphor. Concepts are not simply Ôone offsÕ, they fall into a 
systematic frame that helps categorise and give meaning to abstract concepts through a reliance on 
embodied experience: the idea that the abstract concepts are based in the more tactile realm and 
gained through bodily experiences, such as those of Òspace (up-down, front-back, left-right, near-
far, centre-periphery, contact, straight, verticality)Ó, Òcontainment (in-out, surface, full-empty)Ó, 
Òlocomotion (momentum, source-path-goal)Ó, Òbalance (axis balance, twin-pan balance, point 
balance, equilibrium)Ó, Òforce (compulsion, blockage, counterforce, diversion, removal of restraint, 
enablement, attraction, resistance)Ó, Òunity (merging, collection, splitting, iteration, multiplicity, part-
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whole, count-mass, link(age))Ó, etc.18 These form systematic image schemas that Òrecur[É] as a 
source domain (or a structuring part of a source domain) for different target domains,Ó19  such as in 
Vyvyan EvansÕ above example GOOD IS UP. 
 
This is how CMT research formulises metaphors, such as LOVE IS A JOURNEY in Ôour relationship 
has come to a crossroadsÕ, or ARGUMENT IS WAR in Ôhe couldnÕt defend his argumentÕ; where 
LOVE and ARGUMENT are the target domains and JOURNEY and WAR are the source domains, 
respectively. The ÔtargetÕ concepts are typically abstract, less well understood, and harder to 
delineate in comparison with the latter, ÔsourceÕ concepts, which are usually more concrete, better 
understood and easier to specify.Ó20 There is a vocabulary in CMT that is important to understand 
as we go forward, and so it is necessary to clarify a few key terms, namely: image schemas, frames, 
mental spaces, and idealised cognitive models (ICMs).21 
 




Conceptual metaphors allow for an abstract thought to be built on concrete image schemas 
which give it grounding. An image schema can be understood as an Òabstract conceptual 
representation that arises directly from our everyday interaction with and observation of the 
world around us,Ó where ÔimageÕ refers to Òthe use of this term in psychology, where ÔimagisticÕ 
experience relates to and derives from our experience of the external world,Ó and ÔschemaÕ to 
Òabstract concepts consisting of patterns emerging from repeated instances of embodied 
experience.Ó22 We can understand this as the way in which we chop concepts into the aspects 
of time, space, agency, substance and causality that are based on non-abstract, sensory, lived 
experience, such as in/out, up/down, on/under, etc. 
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These image schemas help concretise abstract concepts, and, in turn, bring their own inferences 
along. It is important to note that, despite what some cognitive linguists purport, this is not a 
claim about the whole of reasoning and thought. What matters is the ways in which schemas 
can frame a concept and structure the intuitive physics that it entails. For instance, if we were to 
look at verb use and its relation to causality, we could look at simple causal verbs such as Òbegin, 
bring about, cause, force, get, make, produce, set, and start,Ó those that convey prevention such 
as, Òavoid, block, check, hinder, hold, impede, keep, prevent, save, stop, and thwart,Ó or verbs 
suggesting enabling like, Òaid, allow, assist, enable, help, leave, let, permit, and support.Ó23 
Depending on the verb choice, there are different image schematic abstractions one might make 
entailing different levels of, what Len Talmy refers to as, Òforce dynamicsÓ24 that constrain or 
allow for the easier understanding of an abstract concept based on our tactile experience with 
the world. 
 
Take, for instance, the example used by Gibbs et al. with the image schema of balance.25  
We come to know the meaning of balance through the closely related 
experiences of bodily equilibrium or loss of equilibrium. For example, a baby 
stands, wobbles, and drops to the floor. It tries again and again, as it learns how 
to maintain a balanced erect posture. A young boy struggles to stay up on a 
two-wheeled bicycle as he learns to keep his balance while riding down the 
street. Each of us has experienced occasions when we have too much acid in 
our stomachs, when our hands get cold, our heads feel too hot, our bladders 
feel distended, our sinuses become swollen, and our mouths feel dry. In these 
and numerous other ways we learn the meanings of lack of balance or 
equilibrium.26 
 
This idea of balance can then be metaphorically abstracted to understand further notions of 
balance. 
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In the cases of bodily and visual balance, there seems to be one basic scheme 
consisting of a point or axis around which forces and weights must be 
distributed so that they counteract or balance off one another. Our experience 
of bodily balance and the perception of balance is connected to our 
understanding of balanced personalities, balanced views, balanced systems, 
balanced equilibrium, the balance of power, the balance of justice, and so on.27  
 
One of the strengths of CMT is the wealth of experimental evidence that supports its claims. 
For example, in one study into the claims for the psychological reality of image schemas, Gibbs 
and others conducted a series of experiments28 to test if ÒpeopleÕs understandings of the 
meanings of stand are partly motivated by image schemas that arise from their bodily 
experiences of standing.Ó29 While image schemas may not be at play in every single facet of 
meaning creation, the conclusions reached by Gibbs et. al. showed a large amount of evidence 
to suggest that image schemas are an integral part of reasoning about abstract concepts from 




The concept of the image schema is much like the idea of Charles FillmoreÕs Òframes.Ó30 Where 
image schemas can be understood as the organising image to link the embodied to the abstract 
to understand the latter in the tangible sense, a frame is the operationalising of that schematic. 
As Fillmore states, 
Éframe semantic research can be thought of as the effort to understand what 
reason a speech community might have found for creating the category 
represented by the word, and to explain the wordÕs meaning by presenting and 
clarifying that reason.31 
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31 Fillmore, Charles; 2006 at 374. 
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Frame semantics deals with the frame understood as a Òsystem of concepts related in such a way 
that to understand any one of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits.Ó32 
This is very close (and often used synonymously) to the term schema. The main difference is the 
motivating factor behind its use; simply put, framing involves the motivation to use a certain 
structure of word-meaning. To use FillmoreÕs own analogy, the schema might be to understand the 
structure of a hammer, where a frame is to understand who uses it and how it is used.33 For 
Fillmore, we have both Òcognitive framesÓ and Òinteractional frames.Ó34 Cognitive frames are those 
that are independent of the Òcommunicational context,Ó and interactional frames, those that arise 
in actual communication situations: 
When we understand a piece of language, we bring to the task both our ability 
to assign schematizations of the phases or components of the ÔworldÕ that the 
text somehow characterizes, and our ability to schematize the situation in which 
this piece of language is being produced.35 
 
Interactional frames combine our knowledge of cognitive frames to create expectations about the 
nature of relationships arising within each one, during either authorship, interpretation, or both: 
It is frequently the case that such expectations combine with the actual material 
of the text to lead to the textÕs correct interpretation. And once again this is 
accomplished by having in mind an abstract structure of expectations which 
brings with it roles, purposes, natural or conventionalized sequences of event 
types, and all the rest of the apparatus that we wish to associate with the notion 
of ÔframeÕ.36  
 
These frames, much like the venom theory of death in CleopatraÕs case in the previous chapter, are 
used to create a coherent system of meaning for a given context. This framing is made to make 
meaning intelligible and conveyable through its background assumptions. When we say ÔmotivatingÕ, 
doesnÕt necessarily mean consciously explicit (though it certainly could be). It is to say that the use 
of a frame allows the speaker to use certain relationships between word meanings, and to lay a 
foundation of tacit, shared background understanding with an audience. That being said, it is not 
                                            
32 id at 373. 
33 ibid 
34 id at 379. 
35 id at 378-9. 
36 id at 379. 
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just in the intention of an author where a frame exists. There are two distinct directions in which 
framing can take place, both from author to interpreter, and vise-versa: 
On the one hand, we have cases in which the lexical and grammatical material 
observable in the text ÔevokesÕ the relevant frames in the mind of the interpreter 
by virtue of the fact that these lexical forms or these grammatical structures or 
categories exist as indices of these frames; on the other hand, we have cases in 
which the interpreter assigns coherence to a text by ÔinvokingÕ a particular 
interpretive frame.37 
 
As Steven Winter has pointed out, the framing of a given text is important to the understanding of 
judicial behaviour.38 He argues not only that the law as a whole, and legal theorists - like Hart or 
Dworkin - concerned with the Ôwhat the law isÕ, often use this type of framing,39 but that it is also 
employed at the more individual level when a judge and/or a lawyer argue or understand a certain 
situation against the backdrop of a particular set of background assumptions that are called for 
when using precedent as a framing tool (as already discussed).  An important feature of frames is 
that they create a category without necessarily having shared feature sets among members and, in 
this way, run contrary to the traditional legal doctrinal notion of a legal category being made of 




If frames and image schemas are the more constructed and refined systems for grouping concepts 
into categories, mental spaces41 are the bottom level, the undifferentiated collections of the 
                                            
37 id at 385. 
38 Winter, Steven L.; 2013. ÔFrame Semantics and The Internal Point of ViewÕ in Current Legal Issues: Law and Language. 
Micheal Freeman & Fiona Smith (Eds.). Oxford University Press. 115. 
39 He offers a non-exhaustive list of six frames with which to understand Òlaw asÓ: ÒLaw as authorityÓ, ÒLaw as social 
obligationÓ, ÒLaw as moral imperativeÓ, ÒLaw as social mechanismÓ, ÒLaw as strategic toolÓ, and ÒLaw as social identityÓ, 
see, Winter, Steven L.; 2013 at 125. 
40 See Lakoff, George; 2008. Women, Fire, And Dangerous Things. University of Chicago press at 21. See also, Barsalou, 
Lawrence; 1983. 'Ad-Hoc Categories,' 11(3) Memory & cognition 211; Barsalou, Lawrence; 1985. 'Ideals, Central 
Tendency, And Frequency Of Instantiation As Determinants Of Graded Structure In Categories.,' 11(4) Journal of 
experimental psychology: learning, memory, and cognition 629. 
41 See, Fauconnier, Gilles; 1994. Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language. Cambridge 
University Press; Fauconnier, Gilles & Turner, Mark; 2006. ÔMental Spaces: Conceptual Integration NetworksÕ in 
Cognitive linguistics: Basic readings. Geeraerts, Dirk, Rene ́ Dirven and John R. Taylor (Eds.). Mouton de Gruyter. 303; 
Fauconnier, Gilles; 2007. ÔMental SpacesÕ in Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics. Geeraerts, Dirk, and Hubert 
Cuyckens (Eds.). Oxford University Press. 351; Fauconnier, Gilles & Turner, Mark; 2008. The Way We Think: Conceptual 
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concepts of thought. The theory of mental spaces was developed by Gilles Fauconnier and are, at 
the base level, Òvery partial assemblies constructed as we think and talk for purposes of local 
understanding and actionÉÓ containing the basic Òelements [of concepts] and are structured by 
frames and cognitive models.Ó42 FauconnierÕs work has had a major influence on varied aspects of 
cognitive linguistics, from ÔConstruction GrammarÕ to metaphor and narrative theory.43 An integral 
component of mental space theory is the ÒAccess Principle.Ó44 The Access Principle (also referred to 
as the Identification Principle) states that Òan expression which names or describes an element in 
one mental space can be used to access a counterpart of that element in another mental space.Ó45 
Fauconnier uses the example of the sentence ÒMaybe Romeo is in love with JulietÓ to describe 
how this principle works across mental spaces.46 
The English sentence brings in a frame from our pre-structured background 
cultural knowledge, x in love with y, with two roles highlighted (the lover x and 
the loved one y)É The word maybe is a space builder; it sets up a Possibility 
space relative to the discourse Base space at that point. The Base space contains 
elements a and b associated with the names Romeo and Juliet, and presumably 
those elements have been linked to other frames by background knowledge and 
previous meaning construction in the conversation. The new sentence sets up 
the Possibility space and creates counterparts a' and b' for a and b, which can be 
identified by the names Romeo and Juliet, in virtue of the Access Principle. The 
new space is structured internally by the frame X IN LOVE WITH Y, whose roles 
are filled by the elements a' and b'.47  
 
This formalised process can be visualised in the following way: 
 
                                                                                                                                             
Blending and The Mind's Hidden Complexities. Basic Books; Dancygier, Barbara and Sweetser, Eve; 2005. Mental Spaces 
in Grammar. Conditional Constructions. Cambridge University Press. 
42 Fauconnier, Gilles; 2007 at 351. 
43 See among many others, Fauconnier, Gilles and Sweetser, Eve; 1996. Spaces, Worlds, And Grammar. University of 
Chicago Press; Turner, Mark; 1996. The Literary Mind. Oxford University Press; Lakoff, George; 2008. Women, Fire, And 
Dangerous Things. University of Chicago press. 
44 Fauconnier, Gilles; 2007 at 353. 
45 id at 353. This is more formally expressed by ÒIf two elements a and b are linked by a connector 
F(b = F(a)), then element b can be identified by naming, describing, or pointing to its counterpart a.Ó Id. 
46 id at 355. 
47 id at 355, original emphasis. 
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Fig 3.1 Basic mental space model48 
 
The corollary spaces allocate the internal structure from one space to another in a way that 
creates coherence between the two spaces and their background structures, so long as the spaces 
do not contradict each other.49 The concept of mental spaces is used to indicate the process by 
which frames can interact and create coherence among themselves. This example is certainly not 
the only way in which this happens50 (conceptual blending Ð a key concept for the present study - 
will be taken up further in Chapter 6), but it is illustrative of the basic tenets of mental space 
theory. It is important to note that mental spaces should not be completely thought of as unique 
to the language capacity of thought but how thought itself is organised. It is not the expression of 
language that typifies mental spaces, but the conceptual structure that underlies its use.  
 
                                            
48 id at 356, where, ÒThe dotted line from B to M indicates that M is set up relative to its Parent space B (it is 
subordinate to B in the lattice of discourse spaces). In the present example, the Base space is the Parent space for M. I 
is the connector (in this case identity) linking a and b in space B to a' and b' in space M. The boxes represent internal 
structure of the spaces next to them.Ó 
49 For instance, if we imagined that Òthe conversation participants are talking about RomeoÕs hostile behavior toward 
Juliet. In B, this has the consequence that Romeo does not like Juliet. But this background structure will not transfer to 
the new space M, because it contradicts the explicit structure love a' b'.Ó id at 356. 
50 For just a few more examples of language ÔdevicesÕ for the interaction and creation of mental spaces see Fauconnier, 
Gilles; 2007 at 371. 
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Idealised Cognitive Models: 
 
The fourth basic concept integral to this project is the concept of the Idealised Cognitive Model (or 
hereafter, ICMs). The importance of the concept of the ICM is twofold: firstly, it integrates the 
previous concepts into a coherent system, and secondly, it creates categories of a graded quality 
rather than a binary system of Ôfit. ÔThe classic example (taken here from Charles Fillmore51) is the 
concept of a bachelor. The classic definition holds that a bachelor is an Òunmarried adult manÓ.52 
But, this definition belies the mental spaces and image schemas (as described above) in locating this 
term. The definition only makes sense in an existing background schema of a society where framed 
spaces such as marriage, adulthood, a gendered role of masculinity, and their respective 
background suppositions and expectations have been established. So, within this interwoven model 
of framed spaces, the pope - though technically meeting the basic, classic definition - would not be 
properly thought of as Ôa bachelorÕ. As Lakoff states, 
In other words, bachelor is defined with respect to an ICM in which there is a 
human society with (typically monogamous) marriage, and a typical marriageable 
age. The idealized (sic) model says nothing about the existence of priests, Ôlong-
term unmarried couplingsÕ, homosexuality, Moslems who are permitted four 
wives and only have three, etc. With respect to this idealized (sic) cognitive 
model, a bachelor is simply and unmarried adult man.53 
 
The ICM allows the interpreter to compare the framed mental spaces of bachelorhood and find 
the level of coherence displayed when one considers the categorisation of the Pope (for one). In 
this way, coherence is made by comparing the elements of mental spaces, and the framing and 
schematic structures within them, not by a feature set of necessary and sufficient conditions like 
those that law theorists are quite used to in legal tests, for example. Of particular importance here 
is that ICMs set up a graded category where some elements can be considered to be more key to 
the frame than others (explaining the want to categorise by necessary and sufficient conditions), 
but do not make up a binary set in some universal way. These effects are noted as prototype 
effects, to be explored more closely in the following chapter. 
                                            
51 Fillmore, Charles; 1982. ÔTowards A Descriptive Framework For Spatial DeixisÕ, in Speech, Place and Action. Jarvella, R. 
and Klien, W. (Eds.). John Wiley. 31. 
52 Fillmore, Charles; 1982. as quoted in Lakoff, George; 2008. Women, Fire, And Dangerous Things. University of 
Chicago press at 70. 
53 Lakoff, George; 2008 at 70, original emphasis.  
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Putting these concepts together, letÕs revisit the conceptual metaphor with all of this in mind. The 
formula of a conceptual metaphor, with its target and source domains, is an expression of the 
framed mental spaces that compare and use constitutive elements from those spaces to construct 
a coherent linkage between their idealised models. Coherence here can be understood not as the 
comparison of the definitions of different categories, but as the interaction between the make-up 
and background schemas of complex constitutive spaces that depends significantly on the two 
categories being compared. The conceptual metaphor bridges the connection made by (typically) 
two framed spaces that allows the conceptual transfer of its formative elements and ICMs in such a 
way that metaphors may be judged on fitting an interpreterÕs own model in varying degrees. 
 
3. Some Criticisms of CMT: 
 
Like any good theory, conceptual metaphor theory has been critiqued by theorist in the field and 
external commenters. The most common criticism, perhaps, is CMTÕs difficulty in pinpointing the 
explicit (and some have sought for it to be foolproof) method or criteria by which to define 
speech that is metaphorical and speech that is not. These are typified by the criticisms of the 
ÒdeadÓ metaphor.54 The usual gist of this type of criticism is that the studies of metaphor in CMT 
are calling things metaphorical that arenÕt. However, as Gibbs points out,  
Ésimply calling something literal or polysemyÉ does not explain why there is 
systematicity in conventional expressions and why individual linguistic 
expressions appear to reflect the detailed correspondences that arise from the 
metaphorical mapping of source onto target domains in talking about abstract 
concepts.55 
 
Critics also make this assertion without providing any counter hypothesis of why this might be the 
case.56 Critics will then take aim at the systematicity thesis of CMT; if these mental spaces and 
schemas are mapped onto each other, why doesnÕt it map the entire feature set? To illustrate this 
                                            
54 See for instance, Jackendoff, Ray; 1983. Semantics and Cognition. MIT press; Glucksburg, Sam; 2001. Understanding 
Figurative Language: From Metaphors to Idioms. Oxford University Press. McGlone, Matthew; 2007. 'What is the 
Explanatory Value of a Conceptual Metaphor?,' 27 Language & Communication 109. 
55 Gibbs Jr, Raymond W.; 2011. 'Evaluating Conceptual Metaphor Theory,' 48(8) Discourse Processes 529 at 534. 
56 ibid. 
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type of criticism, take for instance the version articulated by Matthew McGlone which zeros in on 
the metaphor construction THEORIES ARE BUILIDINGS, as in ÒShe constructed a theory to explain the 
incident, That theory is on shaky ground, etc.Ó57 McGloneÕs argument is based on the strong version of 
CMT that Òsuggests that we donÕt understand theories in any real sense; we can only understand 
buildings, and must piggy- back the ÔÔtheoryÕÕ concept on this understanding.Ó58 He makes this 
assertion even though he readily admits that ÒLakoff and his colleagues do not explicitly endorse 
this version,Ó but, he continues,  Òthey have made several claims consistent with it.Ó59 In the 
Ôconsistent claimsÕ McGlone simply takes the conclusive statement rather than the nuanced 
argument.  
 
His main premise concerns the systematicity of metaphor; he asks if one concept translates to 
another, why do we not Òoccasionally make erroneous inferences about the applicability of building 
properties to the abstract concept.Ó60 (Such as: ÒTheories not only can have foundations 
(assumptions), architects (formulators), and blueprints (origins), but also stairwells (?), hallways (?), 
sprinkler systems (?), etc.Ó)?61 This is another instance of McGlone attacking a claim that CMT 
doesnÕt make. As Gibbs deftly points out, ÒCMT does not maintain that all aspects of the source 
domain are mapped onto the target domain in metaphorical expressions or conceptual 
metaphors.Ó62 As discussed in the section on mental spaces, coherence and finding fit does not 
have to be an all or nothing game, and the experimental evidence would support that this is 
indeed the case.63 McGloneÕs other criticisms are similarly bereft of a deep reading of the literature 
- had he included this he might have found the evidence he would need to support CMTs stronger 
tenets.64 
 
Another criticism levelled at CMT is the embodiment thesis. As Atilla Cserep describes this, 
ÒCritics responded to the strong emphasis on the embodiment principle by citing evidence that 
metaphors are not all based on universal aspects of human experience and consequently exhibit 
                                            
57 McGlone, Matthew; 2007 at 113. Original emphasis. 
58 ibid. 
59 ibid. 
60 id at 114. 
61 ibid. 
62 Gibbs Jr, Raymond W.; 2011 at 535. Original emphasis. 
63 See for instance, Getner, Diedre & Kurtz, Kenneth; 2006. 'Relations, Objects, And The Composition Of Analogies,' 
30 Cognitive science 609. 
64 Gibbs Jr, Raymond W.; 2011 at 538-543. 
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variation cross-culturally.Ó65 This (the cultural aspect of embodiment) is something that theorists in 
CMT have acknowledged and continue to focus on by widening their studies. Rather than seeing it 
as a crack in the foundation of CMT it is merely an area open for further construction to better 
sturdy the building. Further criticisms (and supplementary evidence) aside, one of the main 
strengths of CMT is its sheer multitude of levels (in various disciplines) relating to human 
understanding that provide evidence of the impact of conceptual metaphors: 
 
1. Cultural models of many abstract concepts. 
2. The evolution of language. 
3. Contemporary language (e.g., conventional expressions, novel extensions, 
and polysemy). 
4. Aspects of contemporary speakersÕ nonlinguistic thinking and communi- 
cation. 
5. Contemporary speakersÕ entrenched knowledge structuring many abstract 
concepts that motivate peopleÕs tacit understandings of why various words, 
phrases, and texts convey the figurative meanings they do. 
6. Contemporary speakersÕ entrenched knowledge that is immediately re- 
cruited (i.e., accessed or activated) during online metaphorical language 
use. 
7. Neural and computational processing underlying certain abstract thought 
and language use.66 
 
While some critics may disagree on the extent of how ÔdeepÕ metaphor may go, the impact of 
even just a few of these levels (and many critics accept at least a few) on the construction of 
human thought is considerable. Given CMTs criticisms, there have been a number of attempts to 
try and systematise metaphor identification (one such approach is outlined in the following chapter 
and other attempts at automatic processing are discussed in Chapter 9). 
 
4. Metaphor and Law:  
 
Law isnÕt without its scholars who have attempted to use metaphor to explain certain facets of 
legal thought. However, the studies that have been produced neglect to examine the deep 
structure of metaphor use or to operationalise how their conceptual structures get built in a 
rigorous fashion. There are four main strains of previous work on metaphor and law that work 
                                            
65 Cserep, Attila; 2014. 'Conceptual Metaphor Theory: In Defense Or On The Fence,' 10 Argumentum 261, at 268. 
66 Gibbs Jr, Raymond W.; 2011 at 552. 
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over three levels. The first is the meta-level, which focuses on the over-arching effect of language 
and conceptual structure on the legal enterprise67 and their effect on legal reasoning generally.68 The 
next is the set of studies that take up metaphors on a more domain specific level. These studies 
cover various sections of social life, but for the purposes of this study, the focus is on those that 
relate to the internet and digital information and lawÕs responses to them.69 The final level is case 
specific studies on the uses of metaphor.70 These studies cover various jurisdictions and 
methodological approaches. Working up these levels will situate this project by seeing what the 
literature has to say about metaphor and the law. 
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The case studies, from disparate backgrounds and covering a multitude of approaches, often leave 
the legal language analyst hoping for something a bit more robust. For instance, Miriam Jacks 
Achtenberg looks at the use of the metaphor of Òthe Ôslap in the faceÕ standardÓ in Ash v. Tyson 
Foods, Inc., a US Supreme Court (USSC) case involving racial discrimination in employment. In 
deciding whether or not there had been discrimination towards certain candidates for 
employment, Òa disparity in qualificationsÓ amongst applicants was found as signaled by the judge as 
Òso apparent as virtually to jump off the page and slap you in the face.Ó71  
 
In AchtenbergÕs view (and the CourtÕs view in this instance), this standard is imprecise given its 
reliance on a metaphor that is completely within the judgeÕs purview of how and when it can be 
applied based on Òdifferent acts of imagination.Ó72 This basic reading of the act of metaphor is fairly 
indicative of legal research into the use of judicial metaphor. It focuses on the overt and apparent 
metaphors invoked in rhetorical speech. Given this chapterÕs foray into the intricacies of the use of 
metaphor, analyses like these do not do much more than say: metaphors are sometimes used and 
they are hard to interpret and shouldnÕt be used as a standard. What, if anything, this adds to legal 
scholarship is unclear, other than pointing out that legal theorists should take metaphor seriously. 
There are numerous articles that display this type of analysis are usually be identifiiable by their use 
of Benjamin CardozoÕs warning about metaphor73, without mentioning Lakoff (or anyone after) 
who have spent thirty plus years analysing its use. 
 
To avoid being accused of picking low hanging fruit, letÕs take another example. Linda Berger, 
engaging with the enterprise a bit more seriously, uses metaphor and metonymy to examine the 
language surrounding campaign finance reform in the USSC. She studies the use of the source 
domain of a free person and their attributes being transferred to a corporation, 
                                            
71 Achtenberg, Miriam Jacks; 2006 at 502. 
72 id at 504. 
73 Òmetaphors had Ôto be narrowly watched, for starting out as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving 
it.ÕÓ id at 503. The irony, of course, being that in his warning, Cardozo himself is invoking a slavery metaphor. 
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Transforming corporate money into protected speech is metaphorical; it 
requires three metaphors acting together to compose the full picture - (1) the 
corporation must be viewed as a person, (2) spending money must be viewed 
as speech, and (3) the free market must be viewed as the appropriate model for 
analyzing free speech issues. With those metaphors mapping the way, corporate 
money talks, and it is protected as speech.74 
 
Berger does a wonderful job in analysing the use of metaphor and metonymy to structure the 
ICMs associated with campaign finance. However, though she highlights that, Òmetaphor derives 
some of its persuasive power from its ability to be present without calling attention to itselfÓ75, her 
analysis still relies on the major attributes of the explicit CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE or MONEY IS 
SPEECH metaphors, rather than the more embedded spatial and embodied schemas that allow for 
the subtle inferences to take hold. This is true of a number of legal analyses that take CMT into 
account showing that there is a major gap in the research which would explain how these 
processes function on a level that is on par with their cognitive grounding.  
 
The LawÕs Conception of Digital Information: 
 
Much like the gap of the case specific studies, some of the studies that look at the legal regulation 
of information (particularly digital information) focus on the broad generalisations made about the 
internet and, as recourse, ask normative questions about how the internet should be regulated. For 
instance, Jane BaileyÕs analysis of the legal construction of the internet looks at the US Supreme 
CourtÕs and Canadian Human Rights TribunalÕs approaches to it that both Òmythologize the 
"Internet" as necessarily being a certain wayÓ which then Òprecludes explicit consideration of factors 
that may affect the veracity of commonly accepted ideas about the nature of the Internet.Ó76 
Instead of tracing the linguistic factors in an explicit way to see how these generalisations are built, 
she argues for a competing metaphor that would fit the nature of the internet in a way that is 
more conducive to regulation. While a laudable effort and a fine example of a nuanced approach 
to legal scholarship,  aiming the analysis at this meta-language level neglects other, and perhaps 
even more apt, metaphors for internet regulation that she might adopt to better describe the 
elusive ÔnatureÕ of the internet and to reach her own ends of providing a Òmore explicit 
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examination of the elements that affect what Internet communication is, was and can be--elements 
that may be material to maintaining existing public and constitutional values.Ó77 
 
This stance on investigating the normative aspects of regulating digital information is not shared by 
all authors. For instance, Jonathan Blavin analyses conceptualisations of the internet in the USSC to 
investigate the Òvarious sociological, technological, and ideological conceptions of the world that 
supportÓ the courtÕs Òdifferent conceptions of the internet.Ó78 Blavin identifies three major 
metaphorical constructions that he feels regulate court rulings in cases relating to the internet: ÒThe 
internet as conduitÓ, ÒThe internet as a novel spaceÓ, and ÓThe internet as real space.Ó79 Identifying 
these metaphors, he structures his analysis with evidence from the jurisprudence of the USSC and 
the its consequences. Again, this is a noble effort to identify salient metaphor constructions in legal 
discourse, but his methodology leaves something wanting in the analysis. His starting point and p 
top-down model, within which metaphors are identified prior to the analysis of text, doesnÕt 
provide a thorough analysis of the metaphors that are dominant in a given decision. It provides no 
explanation of how these ideas transfer, just that they do. Without a method to explore 
conceptual transfer, it is still only a study of explicit metaphors that, while common and interesting, 
doesnÕt tell us much about how the law works in relation to using metaphor. 
 
Focusing on the explicit metaphors of digital information and the internet is a common theme in 
both the case studies and the domain specific accounts reviewed. Whether it is an argument for a 
different type of metaphor,80 or an examination of leading metaphors without a normative 
argument, the research still contains an obvious space that could be filled by bringing in the 
nuanced features of CMTÕs conceptual analysis. 
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Metaphor and Legal Reasoning: 
 
Outside of WinterÕs discussion of metaphor and legal reasoning, there are a few examples of 
studies on the application of CMT in legal reasoning literature. These studies often, if not always, 
look at lawÕs metaphors at the meta-level Ð the understanding of law as represented by common 
metaphors. Take, for a singular example of this type, Bernard HibbittsÕ study of the metaphors of 
visual and aural representation in legal discourse. On visual metaphors he notes,  
We frequently consider law as a matter of looking: we ÒobserveÓ it; we evaluate 
claims Òin the eye of the lawÓÉwe speak of law as something one would usually 
look at: it is a ÒbodyÓ, a ÒtextÓ, a Òstructure,Ó a Òbulwark of freedom,Ó a seamless 
webÓ and even a Òmagic mirror.ÓÉWe associate legal reasoning with the 
manipulation of visible geometric forms: we try to ÒsquareÓ precedents with one 
anotherÉwe repeatedly agonize over Òwhere the line [between different 
doctirines and situations] can be drawn.ÓÉwe discuss legality in terms of light 
and darkenessÉ81 
 
He contrasts this with the writing of critical legal scholars who, by changing the language from the 
visual to aural metaphors, provide Òa significant-if still nascent-reconfiguration of American legal 
discourse.Ó82 The aim of this type of analysis is to look at law and its metaphors as a reflection of 
the society that generates them and for Hibbits,  
Éit seems reasonable to suggest that the traditional popularity of visual 
metaphors in American legal language has much to do with the bias towards 
visual expression and experience that has traditionally characterized American 
culture and, inevitably, American law.83 
 
Legal language scholarship of this kind is often focused on the grand narratives and discussions 
within the law which cast a reflection on the society over which it yields power. However, many of 
these studies, like the studies cited in previous sections, often concentrate their gaze on 
preselected metaphors. They pick their metaphors before their data. Whether or not the 
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conclusions bear out (even though Hibbits makes a valid point) they arenÕt often supported by a 
rigourous analysis of just what metaphors are in play. This drawback can (and does) lead to many 
of these studies being criticised for not providing ample enough evidence of the power of 
metaphor, precisely on these grounds. And, in that, I concur with those criticisms regardless of 
whether or not the conclusions of the studies may be sound. The validity of this methodology 
should be called into question. That being said, I think it is vital in legal scholarship to find evidence 
of dominant strands of legal usage and its effects.  
 
The Next Step: 
 
Methodology-wise, there is a consistent gap in the application of a specific and generalised model 
for understanding legal metaphor. Nevertheless, that seems to be changing. As more scholars are 
looking further into the work in cognitive linguistics, the methodology has started to adopt the 
tools of linguists to make analysis more robust. One scholar who is significant in this regard is legal 
sociologist Stefan Larrson. His Conceptions in the Code is indicative of a novel turn in the 
relationship between law and cognitive linguistics. It makes a number of major contributions that 
are important to review. 
  
First, it sits in between the three levels we have outlined so far. It is focused on the case specific, 
the internet and digital information as a domain, and the meta-narratives of law and discourse. 
Second, it looks at the law from a point of view of conceptual change and attempts to provide 
mechanisms to explain that change using metaphor theory, which represents a large step in the 
right direction from the point of view this project . His analysis, 
demonstrates how legislative statutes express significant aspects of our social 
reality that cannot be devalued by reductive approaches to legal reasoning. 
Although the meaning is very much bound to specific patterns, these patterns 
can, and probably often do, differ from the ÔobjectivelyÕ defined patterns of 
meaning.84 
Using examples from digital copyright law, Larsson examines the underlying structures in the lawÕs 
attempt to conceptualise ownership and control. He tracks the conceptual change and posits that,  
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Having concluded that legislation which emerged largely in a pre-digital era is 
encountering difficulties in regulating primarily digitally mediated phenomena 
satisfactorily, it would seem reasonable to seek the explanation from a 
chronological perspectiveÑi.e. that the thought structures that underlie a specific 
law or paragraph are quite simply anachronistic in a changing world.85 
 
This explanation, in LarssonÕs mind, calls for an investigation into what he terms ÒConceptual Path 
DependenceÓ: ÒÉwhen different ways of understanding certain phenomena become subject to 
Ôlock-in effectsÕ.Ó86 What is missing in LarssonÕs method is a detailing of the linguistic mechanism by 
which this path dependence works. This is due to a reliance on a locus of research that is situated 
between law and society and their different approaches. Although this remains an invaluable effort 
of scholarship, by not choosing the linguistic practices of one field exclusively, the analysis suffers 
from a lack of exposition concerning the intricacies of how conceptual path dependence works on 
a more subtle level, an flaw he readily admits: ÒI seek to problematise cases where the conceptual 
lock-in and path dependence becomes overly conservative and retrospective, and lead in a 
direction that frustrates lawÕs relation to society.Ó87 Nevertheless, it is a magnificent step in the right 
direction. The next stage for this study is to examine how this mechanism might play out, and to 
sketch what a method for doing so might look like. 
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No manÕs error becomes his own Law nor obliges 







This study isnÕt the first attempt to examine legal scholarship through the lens of cognitive 
linguistics, but, as noted in Chapters 2 and 3, it does add to existing efforts to bring legal research 
up to speed with current practices. Metaphor research often suffers from a lack of definition in 
saying precisely what is metaphorical and what is not, especially in the borderline cases. This 
problem is currently being addressed by cognitive linguists, and legal analysis would do well to 
incorporate these efforts into their own field. It is often the case that even when a scholar is 
familiar with the work of Lakoff and Johnson, they tend to stick to the original methodology, 
ignoring about 30 years of further work on the subject. Of course, this is not always the case. But, 
it is clear that the field could use a helping hand from approaches in cognitive linguistics that might 
rectify any deficiencies in their approach. They stick to the idea of overarching metaphors but, in 
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the process, miss all of the subtleties of conceptual structure and how it can lead to a metaphor 
being invoked in the first place: the process that underlies the metaphorical extension.  
 
This is not true of the whole field of legal metaphor analysis; Steven Winter, for one, stands out as 
an example of a scholar who goes beyond the work of Lakoff and Johnson. But even the best 
approaches still lack a robust method to incorporate technical advances into the analysis of 
figurative language, which could then be allied with an outlook towards the future to plan a 
method that anticipates future capabilities. 
 
Within the context of the applications of principles to unique circumstances as outlined in Chapter 
2, our question is: how are general concepts structured and then translated into new, particular 
cases? It is not just the obvious metaphors that are important, also the small metaphors that 
construct images and ideas, often in obscured ways, must also be taken into account. This inquiry 
raises a pressing issue: how can we be sure that the preposition or the verb that we are analysing is 
being used metaphorically? How can we ensure that the linguistic data we pull out is not just a 
subjective reading of a text, but a method that can be reapplied? 
 
When going back to the bare basics of verb and preposition use (as this is where most conceptual 
metaphors are found2), separating the literal from the metaphorical is a task wrought with difficulty. 
Luckily, we donÕt have to reinvent the wheel. Cognitive linguists (taking the Pragglejaz Group3 and 
Michael Kimmel as exemplars4) have developed methods to design and implement this type of 
research. But, there are still kinks to work out, and it must be said that this approach hasnÕt been 
specifically adapted for use in legal theory.  
 
Applying their respective frameworks in this project ensures that it doesnÕt fall prey to the pitfalls of 
other metaphor research in law and, at the same time safeguard that it is as state of the art as 
possible. In the least, it is academically honest in stating that the method is a work in progress. A 
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proof of concept for a much larger field of inquiry. So, to ask the same question posed by Michael 
Kimmel, Ò[w]here do we presently stand in the methodology debate?Ó5 
 
1. The Approach to Coding: 
 
Gerard Steen has outlined the general approach to identifying metaphors.6 This method has been 
used and subsequently modified for over thirty years to create an Òinstrument for capturing the 
bulk of the linguistic expressions of metaphor.Ó7 The method aims to delineate the Òcontrast 
between the contextual meaning of a lexical unit and its more basic meaning.Ó8 For instance, if we 
use the verb Òattack or defendÉin a context of argumentation [he couldnÕt defend his argument], 
its contextual meaning has to do with verbal exchange,Ó9 which is something quite different from 
the wordÕs more basic meaning of engaging in a physical confrontation.  
 
This is a non-literal comparison. How do we know we are right in what we say? The long and short 
of it is; we donÕt. As Rudolph Schmitt says, Òthe systematic analysis of metaphor, as a hermeneutic 
process, remains an applied art. The reconstruction of metaphorical models cannot be automated; 
the process can only be learned.Ó10 There is no way to objectively ground the hierarchy between 
literal and indirect meanings. What we can do, however, is to use a method that makes the 
hierarchy that develops as transparent and repeatable as possible. 
 
The Metaphor Identification Procedure VU University Amsterdam (MIPVU): 
 
The basic principles of this method are outlined by Steen: 
 
1.   Read the entire text to establish a general understanding of the meaning. 
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2.   Determine the lexical units in the text. 
3.    
a. For each lexical unit in the text, establish its meaning in context, i.e. 
how it applies to an entity, relation, or attribute in the situation evoked by 
the text (contextual meaning). Take into account what comes before and 
after the lexical unit.  
b. For each lexical unit, determine if it has a more basic contemporary 
meaning in other contexts than the one in the given context. For our 
purposes, basic meanings tend to be: 
- more concrete; what they evoke is easier to imagine, see, hear, 
feel, smell, and taste; 
- related to bodily action; 
- more precise (as opposed to vague); 
- historically older 
 
Basic meanings are not necessarily the most frequent meanings of the 
lexical unit. 
 
c. If the lexical unit has more basic/contemporary meaning in other 
contexts than the given context, decide whether the contextual meaning 
contrasts with the basic meaning but can be understood in comparison 
with it. 
 
4.   If yes, mark the lexical unit as metaphorical.11 
 
 
This method allows researchers to identify and document even the most subtle of metaphors 
which may be obscured by the large over-arching images an author uses to frame an abstract idea. 
This study uses the same approach, with minor adjustments to account for the nature of legal 
language. This method has been tested for reliability (concordance of metaphorical marking by a 
number of assessors) in a variety of discourse types. This solves our first problem of how to deal 
with identifying metaphors. But, how does one go forward to then analyse the metaphors and 
extract information about the construction of certain concepts? Here, Michael Kimmel has 
expanded on SteenÕs work. 
 
                                            





                          Kimmel focuses on the next aspect of metaphor studies, namely the use of computer software 
(Atlas.ti) to collect and analyse data. Atlas.ti is a program that allows the user to take on projects 
including Òtext annotation, retrieval, filtering, data searches, [and] perhaps some basic number-
crunching.Ó12 There are a number of similar programs, but given that the this work relies on the 
expanding of an existing methodology created with Atlas.ti, it will use the same and the approach 
already developed. The use of software has a few notable benefits. It Òallows complex taggingÓ 
which facilitates research that Òprovides tabulated or filtered data and complex search queries.Ó13  
Using software also allows for the creation of ÒÔaudit trailsÕ for tracing where scholars categorize 
[sic], select, discard, arrange, or combine data,Ó14 to give complete transparency in the choice and 
categorisation of metaphors. Kimmel outlines his approach for moving from the identification of 
metaphors to their grouping, as well as outlining procedures for best practice in research design. 
His model does a number of things: 
 
- guide[s] scholars through a project step-by-step in their endeavor to reconstruct 
(a) conceptual models, or 
(b) discourse dynamics through a collection, categorization [sic], and 
analysis of metaphors in a corpus, 
Ð provide[s] checks and keep the moorings of the analysis in the data backwards 
traceable, and 




After metaphors have been identified in a text, the next task is to Ògroup metaphors into sets of 
conceptually similar tokens.Ó16 This means mapping the various ÔtargetÕ and ÔsourceÕ domains into 
metaphor formulas, like GOOD IS UP or ARGUMENT IS WAR. In law, (particularly in privacy law), 
image schemas are built in so many different ways that it is unsurprising the concept is so hard to 
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pin down to one essential feature. The answer is likely that it is not a concept that can be 
essentialised down to any necessary and sufficient components.  
 
Constructing the salient metaphor formulas for different contextual conceptual structures allows 
for an understanding of the growth, evolution and application of the abstract concept of privacy. 
This project has not solely relied on trying to extract a general rule from a field where 
interpretation can be as binding as statute. As metaphor formulas vary from sentence to sentence 
(even those written by the same author), it was important for the research to collect as many as 
possible to see how certain constructions influenced the inference a judge might make on 
rendering spatial, temporal, or causal issues. Taking all of these elements into account, it is evident 
that KimmelÕs approach has added a rigour to the investigation of metaphorical construction in 
texts. 
 
His method aims to identify which formula best fits a specific metaphor construction. As Kimmel 
states, Ò[f]inding such a summarizing [sic] formula is, for better or for worse, guided by an intuition 
of what counts as conceptually similar.Ó17  How general or how specific should we be? Kimmel 
suggests a Òtwo-tier[ed]Ó approach.18 The idea is that this will cover both the broad image schemas 
that domains may share and the specific, more conceptually committed schemas that are just as 
important for analysis. 
 
É[E]ach metaphor can be described from two viewpoints, with two cognitive 
ÒlayersÓ that inform metaphor processing. The expression Òthe state ship 
confronted an icebergÓ invites both path and collision image schemas that are 
shared with non-nautical metaphors such as Òrunning into a wall of silenceÓ. 
Parallel to that, our example calls up knowledge about ship navigation, crews, and 
captains shared with any ship metaphor, but quite independently of collisions or 
paths. One layer is the image-schematic core representation that ÒcarriesÓ the 
ontology of a mapping, É while the other layer, É[adds] richer knowledge and 
inferential entailments.  As a matter of principle, metaphors should be coded at 
both levels, as different similarities with other metaphors are brought out by each 
layer.19 
 
                                            
17 id at 8. 





Two-tier coding requires keeping separate lists of image-schematic tags (which are more concrete 
and sensory) and rich tags (which are more specific). This method has both benefits and 
drawbacks. The main drawback is that after coding, we are left with no metaphor formulas and 
only a number of separate lists of target and source domains in both the image schematic and rich 
types. However, instead of making the analysis portion a bit lengthier, this turns out to be beneficial 
for deeper analysis. It allows for metaphorical mappings (formulas) to Òarise in a combinatory 
fashion via code co-occurrences.Ó20  This means that rather than hoping to get it right every time 
that LOVE IS A JOURNEY appears during coding, one can simply query the software to produce co-
occurrences between target = love and any of the image schematic or rich tags in the sources that, 
if not explicitly tagged ÒjourneyÓ, nonetheless cover the same conceptual domain. These could be 
found in the more image schematic realm (such as, path, movement, etc.), or as much more 
explicit references, like vehicle, car, boat, transit, etc. Using software, and a method which allows 
for back-tracking to find the relevant co-occurrences, is the only way for the research to have a 
reliable prospect of seeing what the prominent conceptual structures are. As we will see in the 
construction of privacy, this is extremely important. It is not only important for understanding the 
meanings given to privacy and data in different contexts but, more crucially, is necessary for 
developing a method that may be used to tackle the translation problem in any area of law. 
 
Chapter 5 goes into detail and shows the result of this process in coding the Schrems case, with 
analysis of the precedent cases in Chapters 6 and 7, but for the sake of clarity it is briefly outlined 
here. Building on the approaches of Steen and Kimmel, Schrems was first read through to get an 
overview of the context of the case. Then, line-by-line, the case was separated into lexical units.21 
The units were then coded in keeping with the two-tier process outlined above. For example, Òin 
the light of that requirement,Ó22 would be attributed the initial code ÔmetaphorÕ to include it in 
analysis for a set of all coding co-occurrence{s} named ÔmetaphorÕ. Next, it was coded with the 
source domains Ôlight/darkÕ, ÔlightÕ, vision/visible/invisibleÕ,ÔvisibleÕ, and the target domains ÔLaw isÉÕ, 
Directive 95/46 isÉÕ and ÔAdequate Protection isÉÕ.23 When analysing for co-occurrences, the 
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metaphor formulas would be flexible enough to have a wider range of groupings that can 
accommodate numerous constructions rather than for formulas to be determined before-hand. 
The results of this data are discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
 




The above example, Òin light of that requirement,Ó may not seem particularly metaphorical to 
some readers and, in fact, there is ongoing and constant debate about how to deal with the 
distinction between a literal meaning and a metaphorical one. As computational linguist Ekaterina 
Shuktova remarks,  
 
the distinction between metaphorical and literal meanings is not always clear-cut. 
A large number of metaphorical expressions are conventionalised to the extent 
that they are perceived as literal by most native speakers (e.g. ÒHe found out the 
truthÓ).24 
 
This problem is manifest in several different sectors. Krishnakumaran and Zhu identify a number of 
issues in the handling of metaphors by computers in place of human annotators. Prime among 
these factors is the notion of conventionality in metaphor usage. Based on their choice, 
Krishnakumaran and ZhuÕs research only focuses on metaphors they describe as novel. Given that 
the present study has been done by hand, many of the issues they highlight did not present as 
much of a problem. That notwithstanding, if this method were to be used for further research that 
would, and should, include automatic processing, these problems should be noted.25 In particular 
we must take account of the problem posed by conventional metaphors versus dead metaphors. 
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Conventional metaphors are those phrases that are used so often as to lose their metaphorical 
quality in the minds of the listener, and there is a substantial amount of literature on this topic.26 
The point is taken up by Steen in the development of MIPVU; by focusing on the context of the 
sentence construction and the subject of discussion, the problem of dead metaphors and 
conventionality isnÕt as injurious as it might be with regard to automatic processing. He takes the 
view Òthat metaphor is always a relational term, and is short for Ômetaphorical to some language 
userÕ.Ó27 Whether a judge has chosen a term specifically for its quality of being a metaphor that is 
conventionalised or, on the other hand, whether she reads a statement that may or may not be 
understood as metaphorical by the listener, is a central concern of this research. To follow Steen et 
alÕs lead, the idea that something could be read as metaphorical is the very reason it is important to 
point it out,  
 
literal and figurative meanings are situated at the ends of a single continuum, along 
which metaphoricity and idiomaticity are spread. This makes demarcation of 
metaphorical and literal language fuzzy.28 
 
The approach taken in this work makes note of anything and everything along that continuum 
towards metaphoricity. If our goal is to find the most salient metaphors, it is better to err on the 
side of caution than to rule out something that could be valid data. It would be better practice to 
include as much data as possible, and then document subsequent idioms as and when they come 




Given the relative nature of demarcating metaphor in text, there is a danger that the selection of 
metaphors may not be grounded on some objective standpoint. To safeguard against that risk, I 
have relied on the work of other linguists who have run measures that test the reliability of 
approaches across different methods and coders. To guard against introducing a significant level of 
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subjectivity, linguists test their approach through interannotator agreement, to see whether a 
majority of annotators agree on the literalness/metaphoricity of a lexical unit.29 The method used in 
this project (MIPVU) has been put through similar testing. 
 
Unfortunately, given that this study has been done by a single coder and that the text is a singular 
and not a commonly used corpus, there is no opportunity to verify the choices made through a 
comparison with another coder(s) reading of the same text. That being said, with the high level of 
inter-annotator agreement using MIPVU, the work should be viewed with an understanding that 
the subjective nature of metaphor coding is as minimal as it can be. However, future projects 
would benefit from taking this into account and would ideally use a team of coders to ensure that 
this is the case. 
 
3. Network Analysis: 
 
Previous Approaches to Citation Networks 
 
Law is no stranger to network analysis.30 Although it is a fairly recent development in legal 
scholarship, network analysis is certainly expanding into a common practice in North American 
courts,31 as well as in individual European countries32 and their regional courts.33 The main objective 
                                            
29 id at 13; see also, Landis, J. & G. Koch; 1997. 'The Measurement of Observer Agreement for Categorical Data,' 33 
Biometrics 159. 
30 See for instance, Smith, T.A.; 2007. 'The Web of Law,' 44 San Diego L. Rev 309; Chandler, S.J.; 2005. 'The Network 
Structure of Supreme Court Jurisprudence,' 10 The Mathematica Journal 501 Fowler, H. & Jeon, S.; 2008. 'The 
Authority of Supreme Court Precedent,' 30 Social Networks 16; Whalen, R; 2013. 'Modeling Annual Supreme Court 
Influence: The Role of Citation Practices and Judicial Tenure in Determining Precedent Network Growth,' 424 
Complex Networks 169.͒ 
31 Neale, T.; 2013. 'Citation Analysis of Canadian Case Law,' 1 Journal of Open Access to Law 1. 
32 Agnoloni, T. & Pagallo, U.; 2014. 'The Case Law of The Italian Constitutional Court Between Network Theory and 
Philosophy of Information,' Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Network Analysis in Law (NAIL 
2014) 26.; Winkels, R., de Ruyter, J.  & H. Kroese; 2011. 'Determining Authority of Dutch Case Law,' 235 Legal 
Knowledge and Information Systems (JURIX) 103.; Bourcier, D.  & P. Mazzega; 2007. 'Codification, Law Article and 
Graphs,' 165 Legal Knowledge and Information Systems (JURIX) 29; Boulet, R., P. Mazzega, & D. Bourcier; 2011. 'A 
Network Approach to The French System of Legal Codes - Part I: Analysis of A Dense Network,' 19 Artificial 
Intelligence and Law 333. 
33 Koniaris, M., I. Anagnostopoulos, & Y. Vassiliou; 2015. 'Network Analysis in The Legal Domain: A Complex Model for 
European Union Legal Sources,' CoRR; Derlen, M., & J. Lindholm; 2014. 'Goodbye Van Gend En Loos, Hello Bosman? 
Using Network Analysis to Measure the Importance of Individual CJEU Judgments,' 20 European Law Journal 667; 




of many (if not all) of these analyses, is to measure the strength or importance of a given case in 
the citation network of their particular jurisprudence. In order to accomplish this, they often use 
the notion of an authority or hub case34 as a unit of measurement to infer the reasoning of judges 
and assess why they have or have not cited a specific case. In terms of finding these important 
hubs, earlier works on citation networks have done a commendable job, albeit without looking into 
the inner workings of how concepts travel through these citation networks. The idea that there are 
cases that hold more authority than others is an interesting result, but unfortunately it tells us 
nothing about legal reasoning. In fact, a focus on the prevalence of landmark cases tempts 
researchers to suggest that the existence of a landmark ruling is the reason that a judge cites it. 
 
For example, in Lupu and VoetenÕs work on the citation network of the ECtHR, the political 
reasons why a judge might use citations from a particular case are investigated.35 They go through 
the possible theoretical approaches to precedent that could explain the choice of a citation. 
However insightful, this undermines the idea of a judge using reasons outside of political 
motivations, such as conceptual coherence, to shape decisions. Without veering towards the 
proverbial, it is like a situation of having a hammer and seeing every problem as a nail. Their work, 
though admirable, misses an understanding of the human mind in the way we organise and 
combine concepts, and certainly if we are trying to have a full understanding of a judgeÕs reasoning 
in any small sense, in addition to the citations, the text itself should be investigated for its reasoning. 
 
A Different Approach 
 
Recognising the contributions of this earlier work, the attempt made here has focused on 
conceptual change to see if it can give either an alternative - or more likely supplementary - view of 
judicial reasoning. Rather than identifying hubs and authority cases from the entire body of case 
law, I have identified the intertextual links within a particular case to explore the links themselves at 
a deeper level. Where past networks have succeeded in covering the breadth of a body of law, this 
study has prioritised depth.  
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This impetus stems directly from Lupu and VoetenÕs work; 
 
In order to advance this study, we need a better understanding not just of how 
courts develop precedent but also how to measure attributes of precedent, such 
as its relative importance or centrality. In accordance with recent developments in 
the study of domestic courts, we argue that network analysis is the most 
appropriate tool for providing such measures.36  
 
To hone in on those attributes, it is paramount to look at the internal structure of the networks. By 
focusing on the internal structure, the temptation to attribute political reasons to a judgeÕs decision 
to cite a previous case is reduced. It is the assumption of this work that though the political reasons 
are arguably a factor, they should not serve as the only proxy for understanding judicial reasoning. 
This is a notion that is backed up by the extensive literature on cognitive science outlined in 
Chapter 3.  
 
Legal scholars who have undertaken research in this specific domain can attest to the need for an 
alternative approach that takes other relevant data into account. Tarissan and Panagis added a time 
value to their data to take the respective influence of older vs newer cases into account, and then 
assessed all the available metadata on cases to expand the analysis beyond political-theoretical 
commitments, thereby highlighting the need for this direction to be pursued,  
 
É we believe our methodology provides É a useful framework to study the 
importance of case-law by leveraging the citation network and the available 
metadata on the case. We seek to extend our methods by defining new metrics 
or combinations of the existing ones and by extending our studyÉ37 
 
And yet, this approach still makes the assumption that the relevant measure of the importance of a 
case is how ÔlandmarkÕ it is to the detriment of content and the concepts cited within its network.  
The approach here is different and executed with the aid of software to organise and examine the 
network. 
 
                                            
36 id at 439 
37 Sadl, Urska, Fabien Tarissan & Yannis Panagis; 2016. 'Selecting the Cases That Defined Europe: Complementary 
Metrics for a Network Analysis,' proceedings of The 2016 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances in Social 
Networks Analysis and Mining (ASONAM), at 8. 
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Precedent Process Atlas.ti 
 
Michael KimmelÕs description of his own methodology was extremely helpful in designing this 
analysis. To make this approach replicable for future work, I will outline the step by step approach 
taken in Atlas.ti.  
 
The Schrems case was annotated for its citation network by rigorously marking the relevant 
citations in each section, keeping a master list of cited sections and a master list of cases developing 
from sections 78 and 91. Organisation was essential in managing the data. These master lists were 
used to double-check and develop the network views in Atlas.ti as there is no automated feature 
for developing an entire network in one or two clicks.  
 
The first step was to drill as far back into the cited literature as possible. The process involved 
reading a section, finding the citation, and linking it in Atlas.ti. The relevant cases were downloaded 
from their respective online databases, depending on the court where the case was heard; either 
the HUDOC database for the ECtHR cases or CURIA database for CJEU cases. As the Schrems 
case dealt with the interpretation of the right to privacy most of the cases came from the ECtHR 
as the CJEU referred to the interpretation of privacy in the ECHR. Once downloaded, the text was 
incorporated into Atlas.ti and linked using the softwareÕs ÔrelationsÕ function. This allows the 
researcher to pin relationships between quotations in one text and/or between documents.38 This 
tool has many options to describe relationships between quotes. The two types of relations used 
most frequently were the ÔsupportsÕ and ÔcontinuesÕ functions. Others were used, but were not 
ultimately included in the final network for reasons explained in the next sub-section.  
 
The support relation was used to link a descendant quote to its origin quote. For example, Schrems 
¤78 cited Digital Rights Ireland ¤47-8, so the support relation was drawn from the two-paragraph 
quotation in Digital Rights Ireland to Schrems ¤78. This process was repeated with each citation in 
the network until all the citations were uploaded and connected. The continues relation was used 
in circumstances where the necessary quotation extended over multiple pages and metadata from 
the PDF of the document would be included inside it. This was not a desirable outcome for the 
                                            
38 See Atlas.ti user manual for more information. 
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purpose of text retrieval once reports were generated for analysis, so the continues function was 
used to create a gap that would exclude the unwanted metadata text. For future research, it would 
be better to convert the text to (or download it as) HTML to avoid this problem altogether, as the 
continues relation does clog up the network building efforts.  
 
The next step was to build the network itself in Atlas.tiÕs network view. After importing the original 
quotation from Schrems, the Ôimport neighbor>import quotationsÕ function was used to find all 
supports and continues links associated with that quote. Here I used the master list developed by 
the reporting feature in the relations manager in Atlas.ti to organise the network and make sure 
that every node was checked for linked quotations. The master list was used to systematically 
check off every relation stemming from a given node, so as to ensure that all relevant data was 
included in the process of network building. Once all the nodes were included in the network, it 
then needed to be displayed in an organised fashion. Unfortunately, Atlas.tiÕs automatic organisation 
features arenÕt particularly helpful with this type of network, so it was preferable to sort through 
the data and map the network manually. Future research requiring the use of Atlas.tiÕs network 




There were a number of exceptions for the inclusion or exclusion of information in the network. 
The first was the (un)availability of certain cases in English. These cases (of which there were only 
two) were cases at the extreme edges of the network and had no forward citations, which is to 
say that the network terminated at their node. Given the outlying nature of these citations, and the 
fact that their texts would not be analysed in the same way as the other more prominent cases in 
the network anyway, they were discarded from the network. 
 
The second type of exceptions were those documents that referred to national court opinions. 
These were omitted for the reasons that either,  
 
a. the documents were in the language of the respective national court and were consequently not 
included for the same reason as the first group of exceptions, or 
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b. this study was concerned with international decisions and if those cases went on to cite their 
own national jurisprudence, this would water-down the content of the international citations with 
data that was erroneous to the projectÕs target of international decisions. Although it should be 
said, that this would be an extremely interesting avenue for further research. 
 
As with the first category exception, there were very few texts of this kind. 
 
The third exception dealt with those passages that were overly general or procedural in nature. 
This is a harder exception to make an objective decision about. Almost all of the citations relating 
to procedural aspects of European Law were kept in the network, in so far as they had some 
minor relevance to the construction of privacy law. There was no concrete rule for this choice and, 
like the other exceptions, these decisions were rare occurrences pertaining to documents at the 
outer limits of relevance to the whole of the network.  
 
The greatest exception for inclusion into the network was a methodological choice about my 
ability to parse through the data. While looking at the reasoning of the Court, it is common to 
come across internal citations, such as, ÔAs noted in paragraph 44 of the present opinionÕ or similar. 
These inner citations were included as they are often followed by a chain of reasoning that covers 
a few paragraphs linked to the citation that does not explicitly cite anything internally but, from the 
point of view of reasoning and sentence structure, is justifying a claim or expanding on an earlier 
point.  
 
In an earlier phase of the research, these links were mapped out using the relation function to 
make them explicit and to show their importance in the network. This was manageable for smaller 
networks with only a few nodes, but once the networks grew in size, it was no longer a feasible 
amount of data for this project to process as a single, manual coder. Furthermore, this project was 
more concerned with external relationships between cases rather than with the internal reasoning 
of decisions. For these reasons, I feel my decision to ultimately exclude this data was legitimate. 
However, future research in this field would do well to take this extra-network into account and 
reflect it in the method. Exactly how this would be possible is not clear at this time, though some 




4. Gephi and Network Metrics 
 
Once the networks (particularly those of ¤78 & ¤91) had been built, the next step was to analyse 
the importance and weight of certain nodes, as previous work on citation network analysis has 
done. Unfortunately, Atlas.tiÕs capability in network analysis is limited to the building function and it 
cannot complete running metrics. Consequently, the open-source software Gephi39 was employed 
to run a number of metrics on the large networks. The purpose of this phase was to add an 
empirical grounding to the selection of important cases. This could have been done through textual 
analysis alone, but it was decided that using a proven method would be more appropriate and 
informative for the research design. In this regard, the project used the approach of network 
theorists who use Gephi and Atlas.ti in conjunction for a similar reason. As noted by Brailas, 
 
the researcher, who has been immersed in the field systematically studying the 
phenomenon and acquiring a deep knowledge of the empirical data, develops the 
fundamental blocks of a theory, making every effort to ensure that the concepts 
are based solely on the empirical data and not on his/her own personal beliefs, 
preconceived views, or stereotypes. Today, we can take advantage of the 
methodological advances in the study of networks in order to analyze the 
network graph and determine the possible latent conceptual structure.40  
 
Gephi was used to analyse the network for measures of centrality and to organise the network 
into clusters based on those measures. The data was exported from Atlas.ti and entered into 
Gephi manually, node by node, and edge by edge, as Atlas.tiÕs exporting tool is, at present, not 
perfectly compatible with Gephi.  
 
The data was then analysed using GephiÕs algorithms for computing measures of Eigenvector 
Centrality, Betweeness Centrality, Closeness Centrality, Distance from the Parent case, and 
Eccentricity.41 Using these metrics, the ForceAtlas2 algorithm was then applied to organise the 
                                            
39 Bastian, M., Heymann, S., & Jacomy, M; 2009. 'Gephi: An Open Source Software for Exploring and Manipulating 
Networks,' the International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media. Retrieved from 
http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSM/09/paper/view/154 
40 Brailas, A. v.; 2014. 'Networked Grounded Theory,' 19 The Qualitative Report 1, at 7. 
41 For a thorough understanding of these metrics see Newman, Mark; 2010. Networks: An Introduction. Oxford Univ 
Press. Also, see the discussion in Chapter 6 on the relevance of these metrics of centrality. 
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structure of the network into clusters that could be analysed.42 ForceAtlas2 Òbelongs to a class of 
imaging algorithms that operate through attraction-repulsion forces. The core principle of these 
algorithms is that the densely interconnected nodes are attracted to each other more and the less 
interconnected ones are repelled.Ó43 In this way the network could be separated into distinct 
groups based on how connected the nodes were. The resultant clusters, and the main hubs of 
those clusters are discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
5. Issues with Network Analysis 
 
Network analysis was a wonderful tool for analysing the data in the present case but, as with all 




The first issue concerns the use of multiple metrics to build the networks into clusters. Each metric 
has its own strengths and weaknesses but, as yet, there is no established or reliable model for 
combing these metrics in a directed and constructive way. Given this circumstance, the choice was 
made to consider each cluster separately and to consolidate the findings through textual analysis of 
the coding of metaphor itself. This approach does have its drawbacks, such as weakening the 
capacity of using network metrics to provide an empirical safeguard. However, as a first attempt at 
applying this method in legal theory, the analysis is substantive enough to produce a significant 
amount of reliability despite the subjective nature of metaphor coding.  
 
Breadth of Coverage 
 
Perhaps the most noticeable drawback of the approach is the lack of breadth in the treatment of 
precedent. Given the immense amount of data that required hand coding, it was not feasible for 
one coder to tackle any more than the networks stemming from a single case. Though the project 
                                            
42 See, Jacomy, M., Heymann, S., Venturini, T., & Bastian, M.; 2014. 'Forceatlas2, A Continuous Graph Layout Algorithm 
for Handy Network Visualization,' 9 PloS one e98679. 
43 Brailas 2014, at 10. 
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would be a lengthy one, it would be valuable to expand the data to include all cases relating to 
European privacy law. This idea is discussed in Chapter 9.  
 




Steven Winter calls the Òfundamental problem of law and languageÉthe Ôillusion of 
transparencyÕ.Ó44 The law often takes its own construction for granted and it is only when the 
controversial or the misunderstood aspects of interpretation arise that the law asks its questions. 
However, this situation obfuscates the underlying functioning of categorisation that all language 
entails. Law does not sit on some separate and distinct pedestal, away from the natural 
construction of language. In fact, it is likely the domain most susceptible to the vagaries of language, 
given its reliance on the written word. One of these symptoms (as Winter points out) is the 
strength of prototype effects on the law and its interpretation(s).  
 
Prototype effects are properties in language categorisation where belonging to a category can be 
understood as having a tighter or looser fit for different members. It is a graded construction that 
allows comparison of a feature set to a prototypical member, often times sublimating unique and 
important features of the object being graded. In the law this can take many forms, but it is their 
effect on the nature of rules and rule following that is of particular consequence. Winter uses the 
example of a hypothetical rule dictating that Òrunning in the hallÓ is forbidden, 
 
"Running" is a graded category that extends from a sprint to a jog, with no clear 
boundary to demarcate a run from a fast walk. Application of the "no running" 
rule necessarily involves consideration of its purposes, for it is only in light of 
those purposes that a decision-maker can determine the degree of category- 
extension appropriate to the rule. This consideration of purpose is evident in the 
marginal case, as when the decision-maker must determine whether to apply the 
                                            
44 Winter, Steven L.; 2013. ÔFrame Semantics and The Internal Point of View,Õ in Current Legal Issues: Law and 
Language. Micheal Freeman & Fiona Smith (Eds.). Oxford University Press. 115, at 117 
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rule to a fast walk in a crowded corridor or a slow trot in an empty one. But it is 
also evident in the case of a student sprinting down the hall.45 
 
The rule is easily applicable and makes sense to most observers, as their silent understanding of the 
concept of running would easily rule out instances of barring Òa candidate for student counsel from 
campaigning in the halls,Ó46 or similar metaphorical extensions of the rule prohibiting running. This is 
due to the fact that the implicit understanding of the category ÒrunningÓ has more true and less 
true members, and the metaphorical extension to the candidate would be against the purpose or 
meaning of the rule. This, as Winter skilfully points out, is at odds with the lawÕs understanding of 
itself, as an exposition of language that can easily sort out what is clear and what is not,47 and that 
the law should realise the Òinherent inadequacy of categorical structures such as formal rules.Ó48  
 
This is how the Court approached Schrems whether they realise it explicitly or not, when they 
invoked taking Òall of the circumstancesÓ into account. It is an approach that recognises that 
purpose and context matter, but it is not explicitly justified when announcing imperative 
interpretations of cited precedent. The balancing of all the circumstances through a legal test such 
as the one defined in the next chapter is, as Winter states, Òa decidedly second-best solution.Ó49 It 
is better to simply recognise the nature of rulemaking explicitly, for, 
 
Éonce we understand how rules work, everything about our concept of law 
changes: Rules operate with the flexibility of standards; standards operate with 
the clarity of rules; and both forms of legal directives depend upon shared tacit 
understandings of their motivating contexts just to operate at all. More 
profoundly, one cannot give a meaningful account of legal rules (including 
standards) without according a fundamental, constitutional role to the world of 
social practice that the rules supposedly govern. Indeed, the concept of a formal 
rule is but a special case of the more general process of institutionalization by 
which social practice comes to be seen as normative and binding.50 
 
                                            
45 Winter, Steven L.; 2001. A Clearing in The Forest: Law, Life, And Mind. University of Chicago Press, at 187. 
46 ibid. 
47 id at 188. 
48 id at 190. 
49 id at 191. 
50 id at 210. 
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Methodologically, there is a choice here. If, as Winter posits, law can only be understood by the 
constitutive role of social practice and the law does a lacklustre job of explicitly explaining its 
reasoning in those terms, then to understand how and to what extent those social practices make 
up legal categories one must find a way to either investigate those larger social categories by 
themselves or a way of investigating the decisions themselves to bring out the categorical 
distinctions made and prototypes identified, whether explicit or not. Winter is quite right here.  
 
There have been attempts to look at how metaphors understood outside of law conflict or 
coincide with their legal counterparts, most of which come from the field of socio-legal theory. 
Stefan LarssonÕs book, Conception in the Code is a strong example of this type of effort.51 However, 
the ability of a search algorithm like GoogleÕs n-gram viewer, or of survey data (no matter how 
vast), to analyse and ultimately explain the complexities and power of a certain conception on 
society as a whole, is limited at best. Given the absence of a functional or apt method to 
understand these categories in any meaningful way on an entire societal level, the latter approach 
to excavate legal decisions directly for their underlying conceptual commitments can produce the 
data necessary for investigated the use of metaphors within the law. 
 
Prototypes here have a significant role to play. If what is at issue is the building of graded 
categories, the process by which these are built must be understood, not just at the theoretical 
level drawing on hypothetical examples or those drawn out in exclusion, but by analysing the 
process as it takes place in the wild; namely, to operationalise the position that Winter takes. 
 
Chapter 5 covers the first step in the approach to identifying salient metaphors; what to look for 
and where to look for it. As we shall see, the analysis indicates that spatial configuration, the 
orientational metaphor, was the most dominant form in the construction of the notion of privacy 
protection in the Schrems case. It goes on to stipulate the necessary and sufficient conditions 
required to analyse the case from a legal standpoint, the standards by which to test whether a case 
falls into the category of privacy protection, and whether or not the circumstance is deemed to 
infringe an articleÕs protection. Chapters 6 and 7 take the next step in identifying the prominent 
prototypical cases as found within the network structures, digging into the metaphors represented 
                                            




in those cases, and subsequently comparing them to the arguments used by the Court to satisfy 
the use of the imperative Ômust be understood to mean.Õ  
 
Chapter 5 found that even by going backwards through the chain of cases, that it wasnÕt altogether 
clear how the precedents were related to each other. The precedents donÕt explicitly state how 
the derived notion of privacy entailed can be analogous between the invasion of a home or 
intimate life, and the situation relating to the protection transferred data in Schrems. To try to 
answer the question of why this might be the case, the investigation turned to analysing the 
networks stemming from specific sections of the Schrems decision.  
 
In order to do this, it was necessary to develop a method by which the networks could be parsed, 
created, and selected for analysis.  
 
Selecting for the Relevant Data 
 
In Chapter 5, the precedent network stemming from section 78 of Schrems is laid out. This, of 
course, is not the only network in Schrems, but it serves as a useful selection for the purpose of the 
chapter. Given the excessive amount of data that these networks generated, choices had to be 
made to identify the salient information; the signals from the noise. There were 29 sections that 
had citations to other cases, to the opinion of the Advocate General, or internal citations to 
another section. Of those 29, only 11 had networks that extended beyond the first citation, clearly, 
these werenÕt prime candidates for analysis.52 Figure 4.1 shows of the amount of nodes stemming 








                                            
















Figure 4.1 Nodes to section ratio in Schrems 
 
Originally these numbers were much higher, but there was an issue with the way that Atlas.ti 
compiled neighbouring citations. One of the strategies employed was to cut the links between 
cases that went upward with no other connection to the network.  
 
This resulted in only focusing on cases that derived from a parent case, and omitting those that had 
no other derivative link to the network. For instance, if case A ¤1 cites case B ¤1and subsequently B 
¤1 cites case C ¤1, the fact that case B ¤1 is also cited by case D ¤1 is not relevant unless case D¤1 
is cited by another case or section in the whole of the network (see figure 4.2). Case D ¤1 and its 
descendants were eliminated if their only connections to the network were an upward support 
relation from a case within the network. This also holds true with references to sections within the 





Fig. 4.2 Network pruning 
 
 
The most important measure was direction, therefore these outlying cases were eliminated for 
their arbitrariness, To choose to include them in the network because they happen to fall within 
the Ôcommon neighborsÕ tool in Atlas.ti and, in essence, to then expand the analysis to cover the 
whole of every cited paragraph in every direction, would mean analysing the entirety of European 
jurisprudence. This would undoubtedly be a worthwhile project to be undertaken with the aid of 
automated processing (as discussed in the final chapter), but one which is currently quite out of the 
realm of possibility for a hand-coded approach. 
 
Given this reduction, the resulting networks were mapped out using the process described in 
section 3. With the drastic difference in size between sections 78 and 91 in comparison to the nine 
others, and similarly in their relevance to the legal test that was decisive in the Schrems case, they 
were singled out for analysis. Not only did sections 78 and 91 produce the largest networks, they 
were also intrinsic to understanding why the Schrems case was extended to cover a privacy 
violation based on the large number of people affected by a propertied intrusion of privacy. I donÕt 













part of the decision is also the one that has the largest citation network is evidence of the 
vagueness of the category of privacy, and moveable nature of its boundaries. 
 
As we shall see in Chapter 5, the infringement of privacy in Schrems is not about the depth at 
which an interference occurred, nor is it described or analysed in terms of a breachÕs effect on the 
enjoyment of ÔintimateÕ key rights; it is primarily discussed in terms of the breadth of its application, 
which is quite different from the cases within the network that are cited as precedent. Like the 
running in the halls of WinterÕs example, we are presented with a situation in which it is obvious to 
one interpreter where the separations between categories in the broad collection of data and the 
depth of what it describes (whether or not it is intimate) can be drawn, whereas this might not be 
remotely the case for another. And yet, these distinctions or categorical decisions arenÕt made clear 
at all. Therefore, it is critical to look at those sections which deal directly with these deliniations: 
¤78 and ¤91. 
 
Section 78 concerns the discretion afforded to the Commission in their review of the adequacy of 
third country protection. In this the Court found that the review should be strict given two 
considerations, 
 
1.! ÒÉthe important role played by the protection of personal data in the light of the 
fundamental right to respect for private lifeÓ, and 
2.! ÒÉthe large number of persons whose fundamental rights are liable to be infringedÓ53 
 
 
The Court stipulates these conditions by referring to the decision in Digital Rights Ireland by 
analogy, where the second condition was specified as Òthe extent and seriousness of the 
interferenceÓ54 not the large number of persons as a matter of principle.  
 
Section 91 adds to these stipulations with a third condition in that Ò[t]he need for such safeguards 
is all the greater where personal data is subjected to automatic processing and where there is a 
                                            
53 Schrems ¤78 
54 Digital Rights Ireland ¤48 
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significant risk of unlawful access to that data,Ó55 again echoing to Digital Rights Ireland where, in this 
instance, the wording is near identical. Given the importance of these two sections into 
interrogating the meaning of adequate protection and, how Òa large number of personsÓ is 
considered as a serious instance of interference and, the large amount of data of their given 
networks, these two sections were selected for their ability to produce salient results. The 
reworked networks can be seen below. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Schrems ¤78 
 
                                            




Figure 4.4. Schrems ¤91 
 
 
With that knowledge, the networks of sections 78 and 91 are explored in Chapters 6 and 7 using 
a number of metrics from graph theory to provide an empirical justification for the selections of 
prototype precedents outside of linguistic theory. This reinforces the analysis using means outside 
of the theoretical commitments of conceptual metaphor theory to give it a more consolidated 
grounding. This includes a network analysis using factors such as Eigenvector Centrality, Betweeness 
Centrality, Closeness Centrality, Distance from the Parent case, and Eccentricity. These metrics are 
used to define clusters of conceptual similarity among precedent cases to compare with the 
conceptual clusters found in the network analysis.  
 
Finally, the analysis looks at the specific metaphors in the prototype cases, edge cases (those 
outside the network clusters), and the construction of certain categorical distinctions. It explores 
how some precedent cases come to exemplify prototypes when invoked by the Court through 
the use of principle and purpose rather than the more nuanced approach of an actual, detailed 




Network Metrics and Clusters 
 
As suggested by Fowler et. al., 
 
A network analytic approach É comports with how scholars generally think of 
law as an interconnected set of legal rules resulting from the repeated use and 
interpretation of those rules in different cases over time É. It therefore seems 
reasonable to determine how relevant a particular opinion is by considering how 
it is embedded in the broader network of opinions comprising the law.56 
 
However, these network analyses are not weighted equally. They show the relevance of case 
citations on the whole but they neglect to address the intersectional nature of legal reasoning. 
Without an understanding of where the citations come from in the text of the decisions, the 
relevance of the linkages is only a surface attribute of the reliance on precedent. This 
notwithstanding, the method employed in network theory, in this regard is still highly useful if done 
at the correct level. The approach taken by Fowler et. al. and similar precedent analyses are still 
informative namely, for the metrics used to discuss the relevance of certain nodes. These nodes 
(the cases themselves vs sections of cases in previous approaches vs this approach, respectively) 
are measured for centrality. 
 
In network theory, there are different measures of centrality that each have their strengths and 
weaknesses. The most basic type of centrality is degree centrality. This is measured by calculating 
the degree of a node by its incoming and outgoing citations (named in-degree and out-degree).57 
While this is helpful in identifying the most powerful or significant nodes, its drawback is that Òit 
does not fully use information in the precedent network because it treats all inward citations in 
exactly the same way.Ó58 Degree centrality treats all neighbours with equal import and does not 
make any differentiation between a given nodeÕs links to well-connected or poorly-connected 
neighbours. One way around this is to use the metric of Eigenvector centrality.  
                                            
56 Fowler, H., Johnson, T., Spriggs, J., Jeon, S., & Wahlbeck, P.; 2007. 'Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal 
Importance of Precedents at the U.S. Supreme Court,' 15 Political Analysis 324, at 326. 
57 See for reference, Newman, Mark; 2010. Networks: An Introduction. Oxford Univ Press. 




Eigenvector centrality not only measures the amount of neighbours a node has, but also the 
relative importance of those neighbours. This means that a section of text can be seen as significant 
if it is connected to a substantial number of other sections or if it has a few key neighbours, or a 
combination of these factors. In the analysis here, this kind of metric is instrumental to measuring 
the prospects of prototypical cases of privacy. The sections that have the higher results after 
measuring for Eigenvector centrality are the sections that are the most well-connected in the 
network. This gauge is a good substitute for the subjective reasoning that might come from 
assuming prototypical membership without objective grounding (which canÕt be done for an 
abstract notion), and more time-effective than searching for the notion by analysing all of European 
jurisprudence.  
 
Eigenvector centrality allows us to examine the structure of the relationships between citations as a 
measure of their connectedness to the network. Not only does this give us a rough score for 
potential value of information but, more importantly, it also allows us to build clusters of related 
ideas. These clusters represent different types of prototypes of privacy which are dependent on 
the context of the case.  
 
Before discussing how this relates to the concept of privacy, it will help to work from a tangible 
example. We can explain this idea by examining the category of birds, an often used example in 
the study of prototypes.  
 
If we wanted to find out what the prototypical member of the category bird was, then we would 
have to make a number of choices. One of the ways we might begin is to ask a representative 
group of people to describe a bird, then compare their responses to each other, and finally, mark 
down the category birdÕs necessary and sufficient conditions. How would we do that? We could 
say: feature A appears in all examples, so it should be included as a necessary component of the 
category bird. Then we could rank the occurrences of other features (B, C, D, etc.) and proceed to 
list the features that are most common as more central to the category.  
 
A second approach might be to note the sequence in which the features were listed; has feathers, 
flies, lays eggs, has a nest, etc. and label them as feature one, two, three, four, etc. We could then 
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rank the conditions by taking their cumulative score from all respondents. Both of these 
approaches might be indicative of how people rank category membership on the whole. It would 
give us a good approximation of the average set of conditions on which category membership is 
judged. However, it wouldnÕt tell us anything about the structure of that membership.  
 
To find out about structure, we might build a network to trace the responses in a way that shows 
what features followed others and how often these combinations were expressed. As in, if 
someone said has feathers first, would they say lays eggs next? Or flies? If you mapped all of these 
responses, you would start to have an idea of the answer the question as the relative importance 
of certain features to make a good case defining the category bird. More importantly, what you 
would also have discovered is the existence of clusters of certain types/sets of answers. You would 
be able to identify the cluster of interviewees who were picturing a robin vs. those who were 
picturing an eagle (perhaps measured by the relative importance given to features like colourful 
feathers vs. talons). With this information it would be possible to run community detection 
algorithms to determine Òthe natural fault lines along which a network separates.Ó59 This process 
not only allows for an understanding of prototypes in the entire network, but also the prototypes 
in specific clusters, or communities of nodes. Prototypes are not single images in the middle of a 
complex Venn diagram listing common and uncommon feature sets, but clusters of features that 
interact with each other and form independent relationships. Measuring Eigenvector centrality and 
other metrics will help expose exactly this type structure. 
 
The aim of the approach is to identify and explore clusters and their prototypes. 
 
Once the clusters, their prototypes, and their hubs were identified, the approach outlined in 
section 1 was used to identify and understand the salient metaphors within the different clusters. 
The results of this analysis (explored in Chapters 6 and 7) were then compared to the legal 
category distinctions made in the cited cases, and ultimately to those found in Schrems, to 
understand how a judge conceived of, and expressed, the notion of privacy and data protection.  
 
                                            
59 Newman, Mark 2010, at 357. 
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By the end of the project, I will have mapped out the metaphors that are being used to construct a 
concept of privacy, and compared them to the traditional legal determination in Schrems.  This 
allows for a review of the method to extend it to other notions of information and information 
law.  If we are to find a solution to the translation problem, rigour may be our only escape from an 
endless morass of competing concepts, ambiguous language, and the requirement to adapt to an 
ever-shifting landscape.
 Chapter 5:  





ÒThe uncontrolled character of meaning exercises a 
destabilizing influence upon power. Precepts must "have 
meaning," but they necessarily borrow it from materials 
created by social activity that is not subject to the strictures 






ÒIf linguistics can be said to be any one thing it is the study of 
categories: that is, the study of how language translates 
meaning into sound through the categorization of reality into 
discrete units and sets of units.Ó 
 





Dan Hunter, a legal theorist who recognises lawÕs need for a theory like cognitive linguistics, paints 
a simple picture to highlight the issues raised through the ambiguity of concepts in the law. He 
begins by describing a situation where a judge must decide on an arguably undefined rule in a case 
that only has two precedents.  Imagine a man who is on an overnight ferry. During the course of 
his trip, his luggage is lost. Feeling that the ferry company should be held responsible, the man sues 
them. The judge now has a decision to make about whether or not the company is liable, which is 
complicated by the fact that there are only two precedents in this case for reference. Hunter lays 
out the precedent: 
                                            
1 Cover, Robert M.; 1983. 'The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,' 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, at 
18. 
2 Labov, William; 1973. ÔThe Boundaries of Words and their Meanings,Õ in New ways of analyzing variation in English. 




The first precedent involved a hotel proprietor who was found liable for a guestÕs 
stolen luggage, since it was held that part of the contract of hospitality involved 
reasonably safe storage of the guestÕs belongings. The second precedent involved a 
railroad company, which was found not liable for the loss of the luggage of a 
passenger who traveled in a sleeper berth, on account of the contract being 
primarily for travel and not for lodging.3 
 
So, it falls to the judge to figure out whether the ferry is more reasonably conceived of as a 
"floating hotel" or a "seagoing train".4 There are many similarities between the case at hand and the 
precedent examples that could be applied either way. What tools does this judge have at his or 
her disposal to inform the decision in a case like this? Moreover, how is a judge to decide when the 
terms in play are even more ambiguous? Take, for instance, concepts like "adequate protection", or 
"essential equivalence"; what is a judge to do in a situation where the concepts are so abstract that 
his or her only recourse or satisfactory solution is to find the "essence" of a law?  
 
Judges usually do note that these concepts, these vague terms, are inaccurate and devoid of 
meaning in themselves. However, the justification for their interpretations are found in phrases 
such as, "must be understood as" or "must be read to mean." How they arrive at these interpretive 
imperatives is anybody's guess. They are at once acknowledging a termÕs ambiguity while 
simultaneously connoting its concrete meaning. To put this another way, 
 
Typically, interpretations should not fill the law with that which it does not already 
contain, but should uncover what is already there. The text should separate 
permissible from impermissible interpretations. The myth that sustains this view is 
the idea that legal provisions come with meanings attached to them. If one had 
access to the underlying meaning, then the law could be found, correct applications 
could be distinguished from incorrect readings, and development could be 
distinguished from a mere statement of what the law really is. Alas, this premise 
crumbles under a little closer reflection and with a little distance from the legal 
enterprise.5 
 
                                            
3 Hunter, Dan; 2001. 'Reason is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law,' 50 Emory LJ 1197, at 2000 
4 ibid. 
5 Venzke, Ingo; 2011. 'The Role of International Courts as Interpreters and Developers of the Law: Working out the 
Jurisgenerative Practice of Interpretation,' 34 Loy. LA Int'l & Comp. L. Rev 99. 
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The law traditionally treats its categories as containers to be filled with criteria for tests of necessity 
and sufficiency to enable them to apply precedent based on an idea that there is meaning to be 
found in the categories in and of themselves. But, as we have seen, categories are not built like this. 
As Lakoff and Johnson note,  
 
Éabstract concepts are not defined by necessary and sufficient conditions. Instead 
they are defined by clusters of metaphors. Each metaphor gives a partial definition. 
These partial definitions overlap in certain ways, but in general they are inconsistent, 
and typically have inconsistent ontologies.6  
 
If distance is required from traditional legal scholarship, then a generous step back is what we will 
now take. The problem of legal ambiguity isnÕt less obscured when judges empty their lexical 
repositories of phrases like ÔapparentlyÕ or Ômust be understood to meanÕ without giving any 
qualification of their reasoning. In fact, it is often the case that when a jurist is faced with dispelling 
the inner workings of meaning constructions, they inevitably reach for an emotive or rhetorical 
crutch by referencing the ÔnatureÕ or ÔessenceÕ of a law, right, or liberty. It is certainly not new to 
suggest that the law doesnÕt contain all its inherent meaning within itself, but the ambit of law 
requires a conceptual construction that often goes overlooked: the use of space built by spatial 
metaphor. The law attempts to squeeze ideas through the sieve of analogical precedents, building 
up essential components to qualify everything from jurisdiction to practical action by building 
notions on spatial premises. Though rule-generative law has its function, it doesnÕt contribute in a 
substantive way when it comes to exploring the meaning of its edicts. This investigation is best 
performed by analysing conceptual metaphors in the law.  
 
This chapter investigates the spatial metaphors in Schrems to give an idea of the research's starting 
point, before the following chapter traces the precedent chain of the Schrems caseÕs consideration 
of adequate protection, the margin of appreciation given to the Data Protection Commissioner, 




                                            
6 Lakoff, George & Johnson, Mark; 1986. ÔThe Metaphorical Structure of The Human Conceptual System,Õ in 
Perspectives on Cognitive Science. D. Norman (ed.). Ablex Publishing Company 198 at 206. 
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¥! the use of spatial metaphors in the reasoning of the Court 
¥! metaphor processing to identify salient image schemas, and 
¥! introducing the idea of the force of prototype to allow for a more in-depth 
consideration in later chapters 
 
The next chapters will continue this project by using other concepts found in the precedent 
network in Schrems. They will look at the force of prototypes in the precedent chain to identify 
stronger vs weaker examples of a given principle, assess how those influence the construction of a 
legal category (like the right to privacy), and how this relates to data protection.  
 
1. Max Schrems v the Data Protection Commissioner 
 
Background and Framework 
 
Éthe referring court asks, in essence, whether and to what extent Article 25(6) of 
Directive 95/46, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter, must be 
interpreted as meaning that a decision adopted pursuant to that provision, such as 
Decision 2000/520, by which the Commission finds that a third country ensures an 
adequate level of protection, prevents a supervisory authority of a Member State, 
within the meaning of Article 28 of that directive, from being able to examine the claim 
of a person concerning the protection of his rights and freedoms in regard to the 
processing of personal data relating to him which has been transferred from a Member 
State to that third country when that person contends that the law and practices in 
force in the third country do not ensure an adequate level of protection.7  
 
Throughout the process of Maximillian SchremsÕ challenge to the European privacy framework, the 
emphasis has been on the dismantling of Commission Decision 2000/520/EC outlining the 
infamous Safe Harbour principles for overseas data transfers to countries outside the European 
Union. The case does not hinge solely on the question of whether the United States provided an 
adequate level of protection against surveillance in content, but ultimately asks whether the Data 
Protection Commissioner had a legal duty and the requisite authority to investigate whether the 
United States provided an adequate level of protection beyond the CommissionÕs previous 
                                            
7 Schrems ¤37. 
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appraisal of those protections. This is to say, the content of the data surveilled in the United States 
was not the criterion used to measure the safeguarding of Mr. SchremsÕ data/privacy; the case's 
central concern was to determine whether the principles outlined in the Safe Habour agreement 
provided an adequate level of protection regardless of the material reality of surveillance of Mr. 
SchremsÕ data in the United States. Yet, to apply the legal test they developed, the Court relied on 
analogy to previous cases to justify the seriousness of the purported interference with Mr. SchremsÕ 
right to privacy. 
 
Mr. Schrems brought the case to the High Court of Ireland, submitting that,  
 
the law and practice in force in that country [the US] did not ensure adequate 
protection of the personal data held in its territory against the surveillance activities that 
were engaged in there by the public authorities. Mr Schrems referred in this regard to 
the revelations made by Edward Snowden concerning the activities of the United States 
intelligence services, in particular those of the National Security Agency (Ôthe NSAÕ).8 
 
The High Court agreed that the mass surveillance conducted in the United States did, in fact, 
violate the principles of privacy set out in the Irish constitution and,  
 
if the main proceedings were to be disposed of on the basis of Irish law alone, it would 
then have to be found that, given the existence of a serious doubt as to whether the 
United States ensures an adequate level of protection of personal data, the 
Commissioner should have proceeded to investigate the matters raised by Mr Schrems 
in his complaint and that the Commissioner was wrong in rejecting the complaint.9 
 
The High Court then felt it necessary to send the claim to the CJEU to ask whether or not the 
Safe Harbour decision, which outlines the guarantees for the protection of data between the EU 
and the United States, is in violation of EU law; in particular, whether Articles 7 and 8 of the 
Charter Òauthorized the Commissioner to break freeÓ10 of the Safe Harbour decision.  
 
What is interesting about this case for this project is its heavy reliance on concepts built on notions 
of ÔessentialÕ, 'adequate', and ÔproportionalÕ; measures which are fairly devoid of meaning in and of 
                                            
8 Schrems ¤28. 
9 Schrems ¤33. 
10 Schrems ¤35. 
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themselves. What follows is an investigation into how the concepts used by the Court were 
constructed so as to fill the semantic void of vague language. Subsequent sections will then 
interpret the spatial metaphors used and ask what conceptual picture the Court paints in relation 
to the processing of personal data and its relation to private life; in the grander scheme, the 
difference between the universal and the particular. 
 
Building the Legal Concepts: Adequate Protection 
 
The pertinent legislation for the assessment of adequate protection for the transfer of personal 
data is Article 25(2) of Directive 95/46, known as the Data Protection Directive.11 The Commission 
is given power through Articles 25(5) and 25(6) to enter into negotiations with third countries to 
rectify any deficiencies of protection. These negotiations resulted in the ratification of the Safe 
Harbour agreement under review by the Court. The Court notes in paragraph 70 of the Schrems 
judgment that Òneither Article 25(2) of Directive 95/46 nor any other provision of the directive 
contains a definition of the concept of an adequate level of protection.Ó12 The only semblance of a 
definition is given as, 
 
The adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third country shall be assessed in 
the light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation or set of data 
transfer operations; particular consideration shall be given to the nature of the data, the 
purpose and duration of the proposed processing operation or operations, the country 
of origin and country of final destination, the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in 
force in the third country in question and the professional rules and security measures 
which are complied within that country.13 
 
This non-exhaustive list outlines the first frameworks of the legal test of adequacy. Though the 
Court doesnÕt follow this reasoning in this particular order in the judgment, all the points are non-
sequentially covered and can be recompiled as,  
 
 
                                            
11 The Data Protection Directive was replaced by Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Of 27 April 2016. 
12 Schrems ¤70. 
13 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data Official Journal L 
281. 23/11/1995 P. 0031 - 0050. 
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1. Under the heading of ÔALL of the circumstancesÕ: 
! 1.1 The nature of the data 
! 1.2 Purpose and duration of the operations 
! 1.3 The sending country and the receiving country 
!  1.3.1 Essential Equivalence of laws 
! 1.4 Effective Compliance 
 
Condition 1.1: The Nature of the Data 
 
In looking at the nature of the data, the Court never attempts to distinguish between the data in 
question (Mr. Schrems Facebook data) and other types of data, save for defining it as personal data 
within the meaning of the directive.14 Although it is termed personal data, the Court never goes 
into an explanation or exploration of if or why the data qualifies as ÔpersonalÕ. The test for this 
categorisation [of data and information] is the following:  
 
Éany information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (Òdata 
subjectÓ); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, 
in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors 
specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.15  
 
That the Court doesnÕt qualify Mr. SchremsÕ data as personal is perhaps a moot point, as the 
definition cited above seems to cover nearly all data regarding just about any individual. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, in the European framework, and to use the words of Paul Schwartz and 
Daniel Solove, Ò[t]he definition [of personal identifying information] turns on whether a natural 
person is capable, directly or indirectly, of identification through a linkage or some other reference 
to available dataÉinformation that is identified or identifiable receives an equivalent level of legal 
protection.Ó16 The point here is that the ÒnatureÓ of the data doesnÕt seem to matter much and 
what should concern us is its uses; an ontological (and teleological) assumption not clearly 
reasoned out by the Court, but one which we will see is intricately linked to the way the Court has 
set up the structure of its concepts in point 1.2. 
                                            
14 id Art 2(a)  
15 ibid. 
16 Schwartz, Paul M. & Solove, Daniel J.; 2013. 'Reconciling Personal Information in the United States and European 




We can add to the criteria to be tested in point 1.1 so that it now reads: 
 
1.1.!The nature of the data 
1.1.1.!Is the data of a ÔpersonalÕ nature? Does it relate to an identified or identifiable person? 
 
Condition 1.2: Proportionality 
 
The Court, in paragraph 34 of the judgment, lays down two initial conditions by which to evaluate 
the purposive component of data privacy. The first stipulates that data must not be collected on a 
Òcasual and generalised basis without any objective justification based on considerations of national 
security or the prevention of crime that are specific to the individual concerned.Ó17 The Court 
continues in paragraph 90, supported by Commission communications 846 and 84718, that the 
processing of data in the US must respect the Òpurposes for which it was transferred,Ó and that any 
processing beyond that purpose was Òbeyond what was strictly necessary and proportionate to the 
protection of national security.Ó19 This is a call for an assessment of the proportionality of the 
intrusion into privacy, a topic explored in a wealth of scholarship on the subject.20 The second 
condition is that this justification is paired with Òappropriate and verifiable safeguards.Ó21 This 
requirement can be subsumed under requirement 1.4. In the case of the duration condition, the 
Court references the decision in Digital Rights Ireland and Others, making the point that the duration 
of the retention of data must relate to the specificity and purpose of the intercepted or collected 
data, and that it must be objectively ÒtargetedÓ, ÒspecificÓ, and ÒjustifiedÓ. In this way it is subject to 
the same proportionality assessment as the initial teleological test.22 The Court refers to the Irish 
High CourtÕs analysis according to the Irish constitution, in that, 
 
                                            
17 Schrems ¤34 
18 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Rebuilding Trust in EU-US 
Data Flows, COM(2013) 846 final, 27.11.2013; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU Citizens and Companies Established in 
the EU, COM(2013) 847 final, 27.11.2013. 
19 Schrems ¤90 
20 See Chapter 2Õs review of proportionality. 
21 Schrems ¤34 
22 Schrems ¤93 and Digital Rights Ireland ¤57-61. 
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it would be necessary to demonstrate that the interception is targeted, that the 
surveillance of certain persons or groups of persons is objectively justified in the 
interests of national security or the suppression of crime and that there are 
appropriate and verifiable safeguards.23 
 
However, the Court doesnÕt go through an analysis of the content of, or reasoning behind, the 
interception, as the US intelligence services' lack of transparency made this information unavailable. 
We can add these stipulations to point 1.2: 
 
1.2 Purpose and duration of the operations must be proportional to a legitimate aim 
1.2.1 Is the interception or processing targeted and specific? 
1.2.2 Is the interception or processing legitimate for national security? 
1.2.3 Has the data been retained beyond the duration needed to achieve that aim? 
 
Condition1.3: Essential Equivalence 
 
In paragraphs 70-72 the Court states, Òas is apparent from the very wording of Article 25(6) of 
Directive 95/46,Ó a third country must ÒensureÓ adequate protection. The Court reasons that it is 
the Òlegal orderÓ24 of the third country that is responsible for ensuring protection, and that 
adequacy does not have to come from an identical framework but from a system which shares 
Òessential equivalenceÓ.25  
 
In this case, the Court initially marks out what is to be considered as part of a third countryÕs 
Òdomestic lawÉor international commitmentsÓ26 and then weighs it against the protection 
enshrined in EU law. Their conclusion, in essence, is that it is not necessary for a protection to be 
the domestic law of a third country or an international commitment, as long as it, 
 
Éis founded essentially on the establishment of effective detection and supervision 
mechanisms enabling any infringements of the rules ensuring the protection of 
fundamental rights, in particular the right to respect for private lifeÉ27 
 
                                            
23 Schrems ¤33. 
24 id at ¤74. 
25 id at ¤73. 




The system by which data is protected must be capable of detecting, identifying, and punishing 
infringements of the rules. The Court goes on to specify that having non-specific or unmonitored 
access to Òthe content of electronic communicationsÓ is a breach of Òthe essence of the 
fundamental right to respect for private life, as guaranteed by Article 7 of the CharterÓ28. The Court 
supports this by referring to the case law cited in the judgment of Digital Rights Ireland and Others,29 
where even though the directive in question in that case did constitute an interference with the 
right to privacy, it didnÕt deal with the content of electronic communication. The Court further 
stipulates that the legislation did not give any legal remedy for someone Òto have access to 
personal data relating to him, or to obtain the rectification or erasure of such data,Ó30 thus violating 
a condition of the essence of privacy protection. Consequently, point 1.3 can be stated as: 
 
    1.3. The sending country and the receiving country 
1.3.1.! Essential Equivalence: Do the rules of law in the receiving country have mechanisms 
that; 
1.3.1.1.! Have independent authority? 
1.3.1.2.! Can identify breaches of privacy? 
1.3.1.3.! Contain judicial mechanisms to provide recourse? 
 
Condition 1.4: Effective Compliance 
 
The laws of the receiving country must comport purposively (they must share the same intentions, 
i.e. point 1.2) AND those laws must set up a mechanism which shares the same essence of privacy 
refelected through protection and recourse requirements. Even with those mechanisms in place,  
Òthose means must nevertheless prove, in practice, effective in order to ensure protection 
essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the European Union,Ó the remit of point 1.4.31 Not 
only is there a duty to enshrine equivalent law, but that law must bear fruit by complying with 
those mechanisms and providing the Commission with Òthe content of the applicable rulesÉand 
the practice designed to ensure compliance with those rules.Ó32 Point 1.4 can be understood as: 
                                            
28 id at ¤94. 
29 Digital Rights Ireland ¤34 
30 Schrems ¤95 
31 id at ¤74. 




1.4 Effective Compliance 
 1.4.1. Are the established mechanisms effective at providing (point 1.3)? 
1.4.2. Are the mechanisms transparent in their means and reality of compliance? 
 
 
Furthermore, given the heading Òunder all the circumstancesÓ (one of which is the amount of time 
which has passed since an adequacy decision has been made), the Commission is obliged to review 
those mechanisms Òwhen evidence gives rise to a doubt in that regard.Ó33 The Court argued that 
the Commission must go beyond the mere purpose of the third countryÕs legislation and 
commitments to look at all of the circumstances (both when it makes its assessment and at any 
time after to include new situations as they arise), one of which would necessarily be the utter 
breadth of people who may be affected. Therefore, as the Court states, Òthe CommissionÕs 
discretionÉis reducedÉ[and] reviewÉshould be strict.Ó34 We can summarise point 1.5 as the 
obligation to review in light of new evidence. 
 
The fully elaborated test is now more rigorous and categorically stated: 
 
1.! Under the heading of ÔALL of the circumstancesÕ, chiefly: 
1.1.!The nature of the data 
1.1.1.!Is the data of a ÔpersonalÕ nature? Does it relate to an identified or identifiable person? 
1.2.!Purpose and duration of the operations must be proportional to a legitimate aim 
1.2.1.! Is the interception or processing targeted and specific? 
1.2.2.! Is the interception or processing legitimate for national security? 
1.2.3.! Has the data been retained beyond the duration needed to achieve that aim? 
1.3.!The sending country and the receiving country 
1.3.1.! Essential Equivalence: Do the rules of law in the receiving country have mechanisms 
that; 
1.3.1.1.! Have independent authority? 
1.3.1.2.! Can identify breaches of privacy? 
                                            
33 id at ¤76. 
34 id at ¤78. 
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1.3.1.3.! Contain judicial mechanisms to provide recourse? 
1.4.!Effective Compliance 
1.4.1.! Are the established mechanisms effective at providing (point 1.3)? 
1.4.2.! Are the mechanisms transparent in their means and reality of compliance? 
1.5.!Review of the adequacy 
1.5.1.! Has evidence arisen that questions the reality of (1.3) or (1.4)? 
1.5.2.! Is the harm in question enough to warrant a strict review?  
 
As the Commission doesnÕt Òstate, in Decision 2000/520, that the United States in fact ÔensuresÕ an 
adequate level of protectionÓ by fulfilling these conditions, and as a result of their finding that the 
US' self-certification principles were not passable (particularly on condition 1.5.1), the Court 
invalidated the Safe Harbour agreement and concluded that the Data protection authorities had a 
duty to revisit the substantive merits of Mr. SchremsÕ claim. 
 
Legal Categories  
 
Adequate level, essential equivalence, effective legal order, reduced discretionÉ 
 
To call these terms vague would be a wild understatement. Jargon, legalese, however else one may 
label them, they leave something to be desired when it comes to explication. Even though the 
terms they use are informed by a long litany of cited case law that helps to draw the boundaries of 
each concept's construction, the ambiguity is still pernicious. The danger is to allow these 
ambiguous terms to serve as a scaffolding for big concepts whose finer details can be blurred out 
as and when new circumstances demand it, creating a situation which depends less on the subtlety 
of the inner structure of a concept and more on finding comparable precedents that share some of 
the necessary conditions. A situation which depends more on principle and edict than it does on 
an expertise of Ôall the circumstancesÕ and knowledge of the way legal concepts may be built.  
Concept construction, in this regard, can be understood to mean formation of categories with 
boundaries demarcated by a chain of justification; a networked chain of justification to mark out 
necessary and sufficient conditions by which a legal category, or generalised principle, can be 




We begin to see the Court spelling out the conditions by which the essence of privacy, adequate 
protection, and essential equivalence should be measured, citing previous case law to justify their 
reasoning. But even though the case law is cited, it is often just a restatement of principles or a 
replacement of one ambiguity with another. Take, for instance, the chain of justification stemming 
from adequate protection in paragraph 78, requiring that the CommissionÕs discretion in measuring 
adequate protection is reduced on the basis of, Òthe important role played by the protection of 
personal dataÓ in the protection of privacy and Òthe large number of persons whose fundamental 
rights are liable to be infringed.Ó35 Here the Court again bases its reasoning on the Digital Rights 
Ireland and Others case, in which paragraphs 47 and 48 state, 
 
With regard to judicial review of compliance with those conditions, where interferences 
with fundamental rights are at issue, the extent of the EU legislatureÕs discretion may 
prove to be limited, depending on a number of factors, including, in particular, the area 
concerned, the nature of the right at issue guaranteed by the Charter, the 
nature and seriousness of the interference and the object pursued by 
the interference. (see, by analogy, as regards Article 8 of the ECHR, Eur. Court 
H.R., S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, ¤ 102, 
ECHR 2008-V).36 
 
It is not entirely clear what the duty is; we are told the factors that must be considered but not 
how to consider them. One must again look back at the referrenced precedent. In the cited section 
of S. and Marper37 refers by analogy to the margin of appreciation given to the Commission in its 
review by way of the analogous margin of appreciation given to national authorities. In this case, 
the Court is more explicit in explaining the conditions of examples where a narrow margin is 
required,  
 
where the right at stake is crucial to the individual's effective enjoyment of intimate or 




                                            
35 id at ¤78 
36 Digital Rights Ireland ¤47, emphasis added 
37 S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom, Judgement of the Court of 4 December 2008. 
CE:ECHR:2008:1204JUD003056204. (S and Marper). 





Where a particularly important facet of an individual's existence or identity is at 
stakeÉ(see Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 6339/05, ¤ 77, ECHR 2007-...).39 
 
To be contrasted with circumstances where a wide margin of appreciation must be given,  
 
WhereÉthere is no consensus within the Member States of the Council of Europe, 
either as to the relative importance of the interest at stake or as to how best to protect 
itÉ(see Dickson v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 44362/04, ¤ 78, ECHR 2007-...).40 
 
 
As discussed in point 1.5 above, part of the essence of adequate protection is consideration for the 
seriousness of the infringed right in question. The court uses this metric to determine how narrow 
or wide the margin of appreciation will be. Whether something is ÒcrucialÓ, affects Òintimate or key 
rightsÓ, or whether a Òfacet of an individual's existence or identity is at stakeÓ, is what the Court 
must first establish and we are given indications on where to look to decode those criteria.  
 
The first is the effective enjoyment of key rights; as laid out in Connors paragraph 82: 
 
In this regard, a margin of appreciation must, inevitably, be left to the national 
authorities, who by reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces 
of their countries are in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate 
local needs and conditions. This margin will vary according to the nature of the 
Convention right in issue, its importance for the individual and the nature of the 
activities restricted, as well as the nature of the aim pursued by the restrictions. The 
margin will tend to be narrower where the right at stake is crucial to the individualÕs 
effective enjoyment of intimate or key rights (see, for example, Dudgeon v. the United 
Kingdom, judgment of 22 October 1981, Series A no. 45, p. 21, ¤ 52; Gillow v. the United 
Kingdom, judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A, no. 104, ¤ 55). 
 
The Court attributes the power to decide how key rights are to be understood in national 
contexts to national authorities, given that their proximity to a national understanding of these 
principles is closer to the truth than an international body. In cases where the court finds that the 
rights in question pertain to a fundamental sphere of intimacy and have been infringed upon in a 





serious way, the Court can act as an arbiter of the violations and as an authority on the 
understanding of those rights. 
 
The court continues by citing Dudgeon ¤52 (in part): 
 
As was illustrated by the Sunday Times judgment, the scope of the margin of 
appreciation is not identical in respect of each of the aims justifying restrictions on a 
right (p. 36, par. 59). The Government inferred from the Handyside judgment that the 
margin of appreciation will be more extensive where the protection of morals is in 
issue. It is an indisputable fact, as the Court stated in the Handyside judgment, that "the 
view taken ... of the requirements of morals varies from time to time and from place to 
place, especially in our era," and that "by reason of their direct and continuous contact 
with the vital forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better 
position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of those 
requirements" (p. 22, par. 48). 
 
However, not only the nature of the aim of the restriction but also the nature of the 
activities involved will affect the scope of the margin of appreciation. The present case 
concerns a most intimate aspect of private life. Accordingly, there must exist particularly 
serious reasons before interferences on the part of the public authorities can be 
legitimate for the purposes of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8­2).41 
 
The Court weighs the legitimacy of interference by looking at whether a situation involves an issue 
of morality and if, as in Connors, the proximity of national authorities to the communal 
understanding of a right supercedes the general principle, unless Òthe activities involvedÓ in that 
interference with a right existed in the Òmost intimateÓ of ways. The court is attempting to qualify 
the margin of appreciation being reduced in its current case by reaching to analogous case law in 
which the court weighed in on the contents of the right to privacy citing infractions that are of the 
most intimate kind. It further supports this action with another case in Gillow ¤55: 
 
As to the principles relevant to the assessment of the "necessity" of a given measure "in 
a democratic society", reference should be made to the Court's case-law (see, notably, 
the Lingens judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103, pp. 25-26, paras. 39-40). The 
notion of necessity implies a pressing social need; in particular, the measure employed 
must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. In addition, the scope of the 
                                            
41 Dudgeon v. The United Kingdom, Judgement of the Court of 22 October 1981. CE:ECHR:1983:0224JUD000752576 
(Dudgeon) at ¤52. 
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margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national authorities will depend not only on the 
nature of the aim of the restriction but also on the nature of the right involved. In the 
instant case, the economic well-being of Guernsey must be balanced against the 
applicants' right to respect for their "home", a right which is pertinent to their own 
personal security and well-being. The importance of such a right to the individual must 
be taken into account in determining the scope of the margin of appreciation allowed 
to the Government.42 
 
 
Is this a defensible 'extension'? The Dudgeon case was concerned with a law outlawing homosexual 
acts, Gillow asked whether a breach in privacy allowed the Commission to make a decision that 
would lead to an individual being deprived of their home. These two cases fit, quite evidently, into 
the category of private life, particularly in regards to the seriousness of an enjoyment of rights in the 
Òmost intimate aspectsÓ of privacy. However, exactly how this same reasoning can be extended to 
a case that does not relate to the intimate privacy of one (or two) individual(s), but to a less 
intrusive violation of the privacy of a large number of people, is a valid question. The interference 
of privacy in Schrems is not a question of the depth at which it occurred, or how it is described and 
analysed in terms of the breachÕs effect on the enjoyment of ÔintimateÕ key rights; the central 
problem is the breadth of the intrusion's application. In light of this, we might be compelled to ask 
if this case is actually about privacy, in its traditional legal sense? The Court never states how 
Schrems qualifies as the same level of seriousness as the aforementioned cases, at least not in an 
explicit manner. Their opinion hinges instead on whether Schrems meets the conditions set out by 
case law; conditions which are not reasoned out with any sort of transparency.   
 
Taking a little distance from traditional justificatory reasoning, to push our understanding further, 
we can investigate the extension process from precedent cases to their peripheral arms. 
 
2. Networks of precedent 
 
One way to look at networks of precedent is through the ideas of proximity, weight, and vision, 
which inform the spatial metaphorical scaffolds set up in the Schrems judgment. With these 
                                            




frameworks laid out,  we can then work back to uncover the original interpretations cited in the 
CourtÕs reasoning in this case. Looking at the force of precedent is not an entirely new 
phenomenon, particularly utilising the strength of network analysis.43 As noted in Chapter 4, most 
network analysis focuses on the connections as a unit of measure in and of themselves, as though 
all connections have equal weight behind them. Urska Sadl and Sigrid Hink characterise these 
studies by noting that they, 
 
can successfully map the structure of the case-law, but they are not able to say 
anything about the Ôlegal qualityÕ of case to case citations, the dynamics behind 
citation patterns and their precise interconnectedness to specific outcomes.44  
 
Yet, even their analysis falls prey to an over-generalisation about the force of precedent as it relies 
on an analysis devoid of the content of the cited paragraph, and only notes the fact that each one 
has a citation.45 They found that the strength of case citations (how interconnected the citations are 
to eachother) wasnÕt terribly indicative of how the rationalisation was made to categorically use 
citizenship law to decide the relevant precedent. They found it difficult to ascertain underlying 
principles in the citation chains: 
 
The cases are held together by specific repeated formulations, meaning judicial 
rhetoric, rather than the rationale of cases. Sometimes, the principles that underlie 
the concept of EU citizenship (most prominently non- discrimination) are 
mentioned as keywords and case classifications, accompanying the judgments, but 
not in the text of the judgments (or even not mentioned at all).46  
 
However difficult it may be, there is a way to look into the rhetoric of citation chains and discover 
its underlying properties. By applying conceptual metaphor theory to the work of network theorists 
(and developing the networks by hand rather than by automated analysis in the hope of finding 
keyword similarity), that rhetoric and it's foundational conceptual framework can be exposed. 
 
                                            
43 See for instance, Fowler, H. & Jeon, S.; 2008. 'The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent,' 30 Social Networks 16; 
Lupu, Y., & E. Voeten; 2012. 'Precedent in International Courts: A Network Analysis of Case Citations by the European 
Court of Human Rights,' 42 British Journal of Political Science 214.  
44 Sadl, Urska & Sigrid Hink; 2014. 'Precedent in The Sui Generis Legal Order: A Mine Run Approach,' 20 European 
Law Journal 545. 
45 Something they admit themselves in their discussion. 
46 Sadl, Urska & Sigrid Hink 2014. 
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Before looking at the spatial metaphors set up by Schrems, it is first necessary to consider the 
network which supports them. An example of this is shown below, which represents the citation 
chain in ¤78 of Schrems, and provides us with an opportunity to look at this exact concept. As 
stated earlier in the chapter, ¤78 deals with the margin of appreciation being strict, reasoning that 
the infiltration of privacy was on par with other examples of infringement due to the breadth 




Figure 5.1 Initial network splits 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the first layer of abstraction deriving from the citation chain started in ¤78. Figures 
5.2-3 show that abstraction protracted layer by layer by linking the cited paragraphs to their 
ÔparentÕ paragraph or paragraphs in the referent case. Each case is then linked to create a web 
which terminates when the ÔchildÕ paragraph no longer has a citation to a previous case, as 






Figure 5.2 Network building progression 
 
 




Figure 5.4 shows the final result of that mapping (12 layers of connection).47 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Schrems, ¤78, chain of citations.  
 
 
In the upper right corner of Figure 5.4 (indicated by the arrow), one can see the beginning of the 
original chain starting with Schrems to Digital Rights Ireland and Others to S. and Marper to Connors, 
Evans, and Dickson, and so on. The web reveals a number of clusters that are spread throughout 
the web (for instance, Malone v. UK, ¤67, AIEHR v. Bulgaria, ¤75-77, and Weber and Saravia v 
Germany ¤93-95). Might these be the protoypical conceptual units that will let us zero in on the 
elusive essence of privacy through references to margin of appreciation or principles of 
proportionality? There seems to be a disconnect here between the notion of privacy as a function 
of the personal sphere of space and privacy merely as a relation between a citizen and the 
justification of state action. Though the two ideas are not mutually exclusive, they are certainly 
distinct. Before we continue down that road we have to discuss what one means here by 
prototypical conceptual units. 
 
                                            




Prototype Theory, a Reminder: 
 
As noted in Chapter 4, the development of prototype theory is credited to Eleanor Rosch.48 Her 
work has significantly affected the discipline of cognitive linguistics, amongst others49, and a number 
of legal theorists have used prototype theory to investigate legal category making.50 Prototype 
theory boils down to where Òsome members of a category are regarded as more ÔtrueÕ 
representatives of that category than other members of the same category.Ó51 Rosch gives the 
example of membership to categories of colour, 
 
[c]olor categories are processed by the human mind (learned, remembered, denoted, 
and evolved in languages) in terms of their internal structure; color categories appear to 
be represented in cognition not as a set of criterial features with clear-cut boundaries 
but rather in terms of a prototype (the clearest cases, best examples) of the category, 
surrounded by other colors of decreasing similarity to the prototype and of decreasing 
degree of membership.52 
 
The most succinct and relatable example is given by polymath Douglas Hofstadter, in the process 
by which a child learns the single-member category of ÔMotherÕ, 
 
A mother in a park, a mother in a soap opera, an adoptive mother, a den mother, a 
mother doll, a mother bee, a mother cell, a mother board, a mother drop of water, a 
mother deity, a mother company, the mother lode... Given that some mothers, such as 
TimÕs mommy Sue, are certainly Òreal mothersÓ, while others, like the mother board, 
are just as certainly Òmetaphorical mothersÓ, the goal of drawing a sharp, objective 
boundary between the two distinct subcategories seems as if it might well be within 
                                            
48 For a lengthy discussion on the evidence for and debate over prototype theory see, Taylor, John R.; 2008. 
ÔPrototypes in Cognitive Linguistics,Õ in Handbook of cognitive linguistics and second language acquisition. Robinson, Peter, 
and Nick C. Ellis, (Eds.). Routledge. For RoschÕs work see mainly: Rosch, E.; 1975. 'Cognitive Reference Points,' 7 
Cognitive Psychology 532; Rosch, E.; 1975. 'Cognitive Representations of Semantic Categories,' 104 Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General 192; Rosch, E.; 1977. ÔHuman CategorizationÕ in Studies in cross-cultural psychology. N. 
Warren (Ed.). London: Academic Press. 3; E. Rosch & B. Lloyd (Eds.) 1978. Cognition and Categorization. Lawrence 
Erlbaum; Rosch, E., & Mervis, C. B.; 1975. 'Family Resemblances: Studies in The Internal Structure of Categories,' 7 
Cognitive Psychology 573. 
49 Òprototype categorization is now a locus communis of the cognitive linguistics literature, having found applications, 
not only in the study of categories designated by linguistic expressions but also in the study of the categories of 
language itself. These include the lexical categories (noun, adjective, etc.), clause types, and syntactic constructions, and 
even phonological categories such as the phoneme.Ó Taylor 2008, at 40. 
50 See, Larsson, Stefan; 2013. Conceptions, Categories and Embodiment: Why Metaphors are of Fundamental Importance 
For Understanding Norms. Ashgate Publishing.; Johnson, Mark L.; 2006. 'Mind, Metaphor, Law,' 58 Mercer L. Rev.  845; 
Winter, Steven L.; 2001. A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and Mind. University of Chicago Press. 
51 Larsson 2013, at 121. 
52 Rosch 1975 ÔCognitive representations of semantic categoriesÕ, at 193 as quoted in Taylor 2008, at 40. 
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reach. However, as we have shown with our list of blurry examples, such as the person 
in a novel, the doll mother, and the adoptive mother, that hope is but a beckoning 
mirage. 53 
 
The idea that members of a category fit more or less truly is essential to our enquiry about the 
distinction in the law about the essence of protection. Steven Winter, a legal theorist, looks at how 
the category of chair is changed by the context of a given situation and draws parallels with a 
similar mechanism in law. He explains that the reliance on necessary and sufficient conditions leads 
to a reliance on prototypes for category membership (a reliance that he would call an assumption 
about categories, although I donÕt think one needs to go that far). He makes a distinction between 
two effects:  
 
¥! Òassimilation-to-prototype effectÉwhen all the members of a group are perceived or 
assumed to be like the prototypical memberÓ and  
¥! Òreduction-to-prototype effectÓ, where Òthe variants of the central model are not even 
perceived as instances of the same category. The effect is to reduce the category to its 
central caseÑas when someone insists that modern art is not "ÕrealÕ art.Ó54 
 
The next chapter will dutifully take this concept up in its entirety to demonstrate its relevance to 
the present case; it is merely mentioned here as a signpost. To conduct this full analysis effectively, 
we must first look at both the necessary and sufficient conditions that traditionally make up 
category membership and then compare these to the metaphorical extensions that arise through 
spatial conceptualisation in the parent case. In short, we must understand where weÕve ended up 
to know how we got there. 
 
3. Spatial Metaphor in Schrems  
 
How can we move from embodied meanings tied to our sensory-motor experience all 
the way to abstract concepts like love, justice, mind, knowledge, and freedom? How can 
we move from embodied spatial logic and inferences all the way to abstract logical 
relations and inferences?55 
 
                                            
53 Hofstadter & Sander 2008 at 38.  
54 Winter 2001, at 150-151. 
55 Johnson, Mark 2007, at 857. 
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Mark Johnson, among many others, has investigated this question thoroughly. As explained in 
Chapter 3, his work with the linguist George Lakoff is foundational to the study of cognitive 
linguistics. The importance of spatial metaphor is found in its ability to set up the framework of 
concepts. This framework enables inferences that only arise due to a spatial construct. Take, for 
instance, the CourtÕs supposition regarding the margin of appreciation; Òby reason of their direct 
and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a 
better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of those 
requirementsÓ.56 This application of proximity {contact, position, etc.} gives the State authority to 
know what its citizenry understands as the content of a principle in question. This conventional 
metaphor, understood broadly as CLOSENESS IS STRENGTH OF EFFECT, has been studied 
thoroughly both by Lakoff and Johnson (and subsequently by others after them).57  
 
In their view,  
 
We conceptualize sentences metaphorically in spatial terms, with elements 
of linguistic form bearing spatial properties (like length) and relations (like 
closeness). Therefore, the spatial metaphors inherent in our conceptual 
system (like CLOSENESS IS STRENGTH OF EFFECT) will automatically 
structure relationships between form and content. While some aspects of 
the meaning of a sentence are consequences of certain relatively arbitrary 
conventions of the language, other aspects of meaning arise by virtue of our 
natural attempt to make what we say coherent with our conceptual system. 
This includes the form that we say things in, since that form is 
conceptualized in spatial terms.58 
 
Now we can begin to look at that form in Schrems. The first task, to follow Michael KimmelÕs lead,59 
is to identify the relevant metaphors in the text. It is understandably tempting to look at the 
Schrems case and deduce that the explicit metaphor of Ôsafe harbourÕ (wherein DATA IS CARGO 
ON A JOURNEY and PRIVACY IS A SAFETY) is the most salient. However appealing and straight 
forward this approach might seem, it is likely to overlook many (if not all) of the implicit and 
obscured metaphors pertaining to privacy, margin of appreciation, and other comparable 
                                            
56 Handyside v. The United Kingdom, Judgement of the Court of 7 December 1976. CE:ECHR:1976:1207JUD000549372 
(Handyside) ¤48. 
57 See Lakoff & Johnson 2008, at 132. 
58 id at 137. 
59 See Chapter 4. 
! 
 123 
ideas/concepts. So, following the methodology laid out in Chapter 4, the text of Schrems has been 
coded and quantified to uncover the salient metaphors in the text. 
 
In the analysis of Schrems, the case was coded for target and source words and analysed for co-
occurrences. There were a total of 83 source domains and 41 target domains. The most common 
target domains for each domain are shown in Table 5.1 removing any domains that were n<10. 
Table 5.2 shows the corresponding results for source domains. The prevailing conceptual structure 
was that of up/down space positioning and was used in relation to the law, previous case law, and 
general principles and complaints on infringement, among others in a spatial field of up vs down. 
The second most salient conceptual structure was intimately linked to the up/down model, and 




Law is... 38 
Protection is... 38 
Authority is... 26 
Complaints are... 15 
Safe harbour is... 12 
Rights are... 11 
Surveillance is... 11 
Opinion is... 10 
 





























up/down 13 up/down 9 
up 9 entity 6 
entity 8 up 6 
force 7 foward/back 3 
path 6 structure 3 
structure 6 down 2 
vision/visible 6 path/goal 2 
container 5 buildings 1 
source 4 commodity 1 
held/holding 3 force 1 
 






up/down 10 entity 8 
light 9 up/down 4 
lightness/darkness 9 journey 3 
up 9 animacy 2 
vision/visible 9 path/goal 2 
force 6 structure 2 
structure 6 up 2 
container 5 vision/visible 2 
restraint/tied 5 balance 1 
movement/no 
movement 
4 control 1 
 







up/down 36 entry/access 5 
up 5 container 4 
entity 3 up/down 4 
force 3 structure 3 
journey 2 light 2 
lightness/darkness 2 lightness/darkness 2 
vision/visible 2 up 2 
countable/quantifiable 1 vision/visible 2 
down 1 balance 1 
found 1 down 1 
 








up/down 10 path 7 
spatial 6 entity 6 
up 6 landscape 3 
down 4 obstruction 3 
structure 3 vision/visible 3 
conduit 2 held/holding 2 
force 2 lightness/darkness 2 
over 2 path/goal 2 
restraint/tied 2 animacy 1 
under 2 control 1 
 
Table 5.6: Source-Target Domain Co-occurrences for {Safe Harbour isÉ, Surveillance isÉ} 
 
It does not come as a complete surprise that the spatial construction of an up/down dynamic is by 
far the most common and widely-used given that schemaÕs importance in conceptual thought, 
particularly in its relation to certainty vs. uncertainty. Lakoff and Johnson noted its prevalence as 
early as the 1980Õs. They show that the conventional metaphors of ÒUN-KNOWN IS UP and 
KNOWN IS DOWN,Ó are found in the following examples, 
 
That's still up in the air. 
I'd like to raise some questions about that. That settles the question.  
It's still up for grabs. 
Let's bring it up for discussion.60 
 
These metaphors are similar to the common legalese expressions of looking to the Ôsettled case 
lawÕ or Ôraising an objection or complaintÕ. Given the lawÕs impetus to reach agreement on the truth 
of a matter, this should not come as a surprise. Lakoff and Johnson give this theory further 
grounding by stating that even a person's tone of voice follows this pattern. For instance, when 
asking a question the inflection of the voice rises even if no up/down conceptual metaphors are 
directly used to indicate an unknown. This is further borne out by looking at examples of rhetorical 
questions or statements intended as questions, 
 
questions with falling intonation are understood not as real questions but as 
rhetorical questions indicating statements. For example, "Will you ever 
learn?" said with falling intonation is a way of saying, indirectly, "You'll never 
learn." Similarly, statements with rising intonation indicate uncertainty or 
inability to make sense of something. For example, "Your name's Fred" said 
                                            
60 Lakoff & Johnson 2008, at 138. 
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with rising intonation indicates that you're not sure and want confirmation. 
"The Giants traded Madlock" said with rising intonation indicates an inability 
to make sense of somethingÑthat it doesn't fit with what you know. These 
are all examples of the use of rising and falling intonation coherently with 
the UNKNOWN IS UP, KNOWN IS DOWN metaphor.61 
 
Conceptually, this is also buttressed by the strength of co-occurences with notions of vision, clarity, 
and lightness/darkness. We are primarily concerned with the interpretative strategies used by the 
Court, and therefore asked about the justification of sentences like "it is clear that,Ó or Òit is 
apparentÓ, both of which are visual metaphors. With this as our starting point, we can investigate 
the up/down structure to find out more about the balancing act (note the spatial metaphor) of 
proportionality or margin of appreciation.  
 
Given the use of an up/down structure, the inference made here is that vision is embedded in the 
intuitive physics of the model. Things that are clear are in the KNOWN and vice-versa, meaning 
that uncompromised vision should correlate with down, and obscured vision with UP. However, 
this isn't always corroborated in the data, and intuitively seems to be at odds with our everyday 
experiences. Surely, if one is at the top of a mountain (UP) their vision of the terrain is clearer than 
that of a person at the bottom (DOWN).  
 
In Schrems these diametric senses of the up/down model are distinct. In one, the law, protection, 
and/or authority are viewed as up, in another they are down, and in some instances some there 
isnÕt a clear view of either (as documented in the tables of results). The reason for this is that two 
competing conceptual constructions are at play, and this requires explanation.  
 
Take, for example, the following collection of quotations from ¤39 of the judgment, in which the 
Court details the importance of a respect for private life.  
 
ÒIt is apparent from Article 1 of Directive 95/46 and recitals 2 and 10 in its preambleÓ 
Òin particular the fundamental right to respect for private life with regard to the processing of 
personal data,Ó 




Òa high level of protection of those fundamental rights and freedoms.Ó62 
  
And section 40: 
 
ÒDirective 95/46 requires Member States to set up one or more public authorities responsible for 
monitoringÓ 
ÒIn addition, that requirement derives from the primary law of the European Union,Ó63 
 
We have an up/down model riddled with inconsistencies about where it situates settled law and 
responsible authority. In some cases up and in some cases down. What are we to make of this? 
Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner have done extensive work on these types of metaphors, known 
as Òorientational metaphorsÓ.64 They give many examples of up/down schemas that function in 
everyday language, such as: 
 
HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN[É]CONSCIOUS IS UP; UNCONSCIOUS 
IS DOWN[É]HEALTH AND LIFE ARE UP; SICKNESS AND DEATH ARE 
DOWN[É]HAVING CONTROl. Or FORCE IS UP; BEING SUBJECT TO 
CONTROL Or FORCE IS DOWN[É]MORE IS UP; LESS IS 
DOWN[É]FORESEEABLE FUTURE EVENTS ARE UP (and 
AHEAD)[É]HIGH STATUS IS UP; LOW STATUS IS DOWN[É]GOOD 
IS UP; BAD IS DOWN[É]VIRTUE IS UP; DEPRAVITY IS DOWN 
[É]RATIONAL IS UP; EMOTIONAL IS DOWN65 
 
 
The result in these findings on different senses of the up/down schema may be influenced or 
shaped by the need to generalise and create larger encompassing terms to work with while coding 
target domains. In one circumstance up may refer to the control of the State, and in another it may 
refer to the unknown. However, this doesnÕt pose too much risk to the method of inquiry, as the 
primary function of the coding is to tell us what metaphor structures are salient and in need of 
further analysis.  
 
                                            
62 Schrems ¤39 emphasis added 
63 Schrems ¤40 emphasis added 
64 Fauconnier, Gilles & Turner, Mark; 2008. The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and The MindÕs Hidden Complexities. 




Metaphor processing shows us what to look for and where to look. When a judge searches for the 
ÔessenceÕ or ÔnatureÕ of a law, she is setting up a conceptual framework that colours the eventual 
relationships of coherence between cases. The two networks marked out for analysis (¤78 and 
¤91) deal with the margin of appreciation and effective protection, respectively. Now that we 
know what we are looking for (a spatial model of law), the next two chapters continue the analysis 
to follow the progression of these conceptions in order to answer the question: how does one 





Prototypes through Precedent ¤78 
 
 
In an extreme view, the world can be seen as only 
connections, nothing else. We think of a dictionary as the 
repository of meaning, but it defines words only in terms of 
other words. I liked the idea that a piece of information is 
really defined only by what it's related to, and how it's 







What connects a case involving the retention of DNA records, to one pertaining to forced eviction 
from a residential property, or the parental right to look after their own children, or the outlawing 
of homosexual acts, or the right to be recognised as a transsexual? To answer this question, it is 
not sufficient to simply find out what these things have in common - namely that they all fall under 
Article 8 - we are required to ask how those commonalities are understood. 
 
Section ¤78 in Schrems discusses the test for the margin of appreciation of national authorites. As 
noted in the previous chapter, this test outlines the specific conditions for measuring the 
proportionality of a State action (namely point 1.2 of the legal test): 
 
1.2 Purpose and duration of the operations must be proportional to a legitimate aim 
1.2.1 Is the interception or processing targeted and specific? 
1.2.2 Is the interception or processing legitimate to national security? 
1.2.3 Has the data been retained beyond the duration needed to achieve that aim? 
 
                                            
1 Berners-Lee, Tim; 2000. Weaving the Web: The original design and ultimate destiny of the World Wide Web by its 
inventor. Harper Information at 12. 
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The seemingly logical way to examine these conditions was to find analogies in the precedent case 
law and to assess how in Schrems, with regard to the proportionality of a state action, the breadth 
of an interference can be understood as having equal importance to its depth. The question isnÕt 
whether these conditions are met, but how they are conceptualised in order to be met. 
 
The network of precedent allows us to investigate this question by looking for the authoritave 
conceptions of proportionality within the network. But, as stated in Chapter 4, it is necessary to 
methodologically ground our understanding of the centrality, or relative peripherality, of cases. In 
the last chapter, the branches of the precedent chain were mapped out, and after completing this 
initial step it is imperative to find out which nodes are more central than the others. In order to 
identify the centrality of citations, the network was run for Eigenvector centrality in ¤78 of Schrems. 
As is shown in figure 6.1, the sizes of nodes correspond to the strength of the Eigenvector 
centrality of the given citation. Some cases are clearly larger and evidently more central than 
others. These central nodes are important for the network as a whole but, as already mentioned, 
the different communities within the network must also be identified as different 
clusters/communities indicate the level of connectivity to their neighbours. The modularity feature 
(internode connectivity) in Gephi was used to locate and demarcate these communities and the 
results can be seen in fig. 6.1. The resolution of the modularity function was used to identify five 
distinct communities, and their hubs, based on Eigenvector centrality. This chapter goes through 
the major hubs of those communities to examine their unique features. Figure 6.2 shows the 











Fig. 6.2 - Relative Eigenvector centrality of ¤78 descendent cases 
 
 
1. The Central Cases: 
 
Group 1 was by far the strongest in terms of link centrality. This should not come as a surprise 
given that in an acyclic directed network the nodes nearer to the parent node will have the 
strongest connections. The first, and most central, hub in the network was S. and Marper v. The 
United Kingdom.2 
 
The case of S and Marper concerned two individuals who were arrested and had samples of their 
DNA and fingerprints collected. After their subsequent acquittal and release, this information was 
retained by police. S and MarperÕs complaint was based on a purported interference with their 
private life, as denoted by Article 8. The government replied by saying that Article 8 had not been 
infringed as the retention of the DNA information was related to the specific purpose of 
                                            
2 S. And Marper v. The United Kingdom, Judgement of the Court of 4 December 2008. 
CE:ECHR:2008:1204JUD003056204. (S and Marper) 
Label E_Cent. Label E_Cent. Label E_Cent. Label E_Cent. Label E_Cent.
S and Marper 102 1.0000 Connors v UK 82 0.4852 Kutzner v. Germany 66 0.4430 X,Y and Z v. UK 44 0.2366 Fredin v Swe no1 51 0.2330
Evans v UK 77 0.8753 Olsson v. Swe No1 68 0.2127 Johansen v Nor 64 0.4117 Cossey v. UK 40 0.2066 James and Others 50 0.1939
Dickson v. UK 78 0.4810 Lingens v Austria 39-40 0.1971 Odievre v France 44-49 0.3944 Keegan v. Ire 49 0.1983 Immobiliare 49 0.1890
DRI 47-48 0.4754 Barthold v Germany 55 0.1562 EP v. Italy 62 0.3307 Powell and Raynor v. UK 41 0.1615 AGOSI 52 0.1884
Schrems 78 0.2008 Gillow v UK 55 0.1304 Frette v France 42 0.3234 Rees v. UK 37 0.1611 Mellacher 48 0.1762
Pretty v. UK 71 0.1969 Rasmussen v. Denmark 40 0.1293 Hokkanen v. Finland 55 0.2087 Abdulaziz and others 67 0.1479 Ashingdane 57 0.1444
Dudgeon v UK 52 0.1598 Hatton and others 123 0.1264 Johansen v Nor 78 0.2078 Johnston and Others 55 0.1343 Chassagnou and Others 75 0.1304
ADT v. UK 37 0.1213 Klass and Others 49 0.0940 Olsson v Swe no2 90 0.1043 Rees v. UK 42 0.1093 Sporrong and Lonnroth 73 0.0671
Laskey and Others 36 0.1213 Sunday TImes 59 0.0876 Anderssons v. Swe 91 0.0101 Leander v. Sweden 59 0.0502 Marckx v Belgium 27 0.0623
Goodwin v. UK 90 0.0810 Sunday Times 62 0.0826 Mikulic v. Croatia 64 0.0051 Kosiek v Germany 35 0.0286 Klass and Others 33 0.0386
Pretty v. UK 62 0.0756 James and Others 46 0.0471 Anderssons v. Swe 95 0.0000 Rees v. UK 47 0.0285 Ireland v UK 239 0.0185
Mikulic v. Croatia 53 0.0387 Mellacher 45 0.0421 Eriksson v Swe 71 0.0000 Dudgeon v UK 60 0.0185 James and Others 37 0.0185
Frette v France 41 0.0335 Handyside v UK 48 0.0386 Gaskin v. UK 49 0.0000 Abdulaziz and others 60 0.0051 Winterwerp 60 0.0152
Niemietz v Germany 29 0.0335 Handyside v UK 49 0.0285 K and T v Fin 154 0.0000 Marckx v Belgium 31 0.0051 Golder v. UK 38 0.0051
Huvig v France 25 0.0185 Engels 100 0.0185 Olsson v. Swe no1 81 0.0000 Marckx v. Belgium 41 0.0051 Marckx v Belgium 63 0.0051
Cha'are Shalom v. France 84 0.0134 Belgian Police v. Bel 47 0.0051 X and Y v. NE 24 0.0000 Belgian Linguistic Case 7 0.0000 Sporrong and Lonnroth 69 0.0051
Klass and Others 41 0.0051 Engels 72 0.0051 Belgian Police v Bel 39 0.0000 Swedish Engine Drivers 50 0.0051
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preventing or detecting crime and balanced proportionally against the rights of the applicants. The 
Court, however, found that this was not the case. That,  
the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the powers of retention of the 
fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles of persons suspected but not 
convicted of offences, as applied in the case of the present applicants, fails to 
strike a fair balance between the competing public and private interests and that 
the respondent State has overstepped any acceptable margin of appreciation in 
this regard.3 
 
The relevant cited section (the node corresponding to ¤102) concerns the margin of appreciation 
given to national authorities regarding the interpretation of Article 8. In this case, the ruling of the 
Court stated that the United KingdomÕs margin of appreciation for the interpretation of Article 8 
needed to be very strict, as the common practices of other countries in the convention (and some 
of those outside of it) consider the retention of DNA to be an interference of private life.4  
 
Like Schrems, the salient metaphors here were spatial in nature. Relevant to [the question of how] 
the edict of looking at the breadth of application of data collection rather than its depth in Schrems, 
there are a number of instances where the Court extended the spatialisation of the conceptual 
metaphor of privacy from depth to breadth, particularly with reference to the assessment of the 
proportionality argument. These spatial framings can be broken down into three sub-categories: 
weight, space, and time. 
 
The Court evaluated certain measures in terms of their weight or gravity. This distinction can be 
split into two conceptions: EGREGIOUS OFFENCES ARE HEAVY and GOOD REASONS ARE 
HEAVY/BAD REASONS ARE LIGHT. Take for instance the following passages: 
 
ÒÉdepending on the gravity of the offenceÉÓ5 
ÒÉhaving committed offences of a certain minimum gravityÉÓ6 
ÒÉit attached special weightÉÓ7  
ÒÉWeighty reasons would have to be put forward...Ó8  
                                            
3 id at ¤125. 
4 id at ¤112. 
5 id at ¤34. 
6 id at ¤108. 
7 id at ¤82. 
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ÒÉor gravity of the offenceÉÓ9 
 
The second type of metaphorical frame included a notion of time. Normally, we would consider 
the invocation of time as its own category. However, given the significant literature on the 
consideration of TIME IS SPACE10, the time category here is sublimated into the general category of 
spatial metaphors. The foundational idea is that time is conceptualised as a place or location in an 
expanse. This can be seen in the following examples: 
 
ÒÉcould have been achieved through more limited retention in timeÉÓ11 
ÒÉAt the same timeÉÓ12 
ÒÉat the time the matches were madeÉÓ13 
 
Through these, and other similar forms of language usage, time is spatialised; when the Court 
considers the duration of the retention of data, time is understood in the same context as space. 
This is to say that both 'categories' are relativised by being continuous and expansive versus 
occupying a fixed or marked location. These expanses are used to measure space conceptually so 
that the proportionality of a suspected infringement on Article 8 can be asessed on the basis of: 
PROPORTIONALITY IS A LIMITED SPACE or INFRINGEMENT IS AN ENDLESS EXPANSE. 
 
Subsequently, the invocation of the idea of wealth is an interesting metaphor as, like allusions to 
time, it takes on a spatial nature. For example, 
 
ÒÉgiven the wealth of private information that became permanently available to 
othersÉÓ14 
 
                                                                                                                                             
8 id at ¤123. 
9 id at ¤119. 
10 See among many others, Pinker, Steven; 2007. The Stuff of Thought: Language as a Window into Human Nature. 
Penguin. at 236; Gibbs, Raymond W.; 2008. ÔMetaphor and Thought: The State of the Art,Õ in The Cambridge handbook 
of metaphor and thought. Raymond J. Gibbs (Ed.). Cambridge University Press. 3. 
11 S. and Marper at ¤88. 
12 id at ¤116. 
13 id at ¤15. 
14 id at ¤60. 
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Wealth here can be understood as the notion of abundance, or size, which exerts its influence 
over an expanse permanently, thus creating the image of a block of personal information covering 
the landscape. 
 
The third set uses much more explicit references to the idea of space, as in the following passages: 
 
ÒÉThe applicants further submitted that the retention was disproportionate 
because of its blanket nature irrespective of the offencesÉÓ15 
ÒÉthe Court is struck by the blanket and indiscriminate natureÉÓ16 
 
And, 
ÒIt covers the physical and psychological integrity of a personÓ17 
Òit is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is 
addressedÓ18 
ÒÉAn individual's DNA contains the 'highest level of personal and private 
informationÉÓ19 
 
There are two spatial conceptions here that are interesting. The first is the nature of the 
infringement indiscriminately covering a general and expansive space. The second is the role of law 
to protect (cover) the rights of its citizens. A third dimension must also be noted which is illustrated 
in the UP/DOWN schema of highest level. Combining these two ideas gives an indication that 
protection should be above the blanket coverage of infringement and therefore have the 
ascendancy. If the level of the infringement rises above the cover of law, or attempts to push the 
boundaries of protection , the infringement is considered disproportionate to the coverage of the 
law.  
 
Here the court decided that given this conception of a wide, expansive (viewing time in its 
permanent sense), and heavy coverage of the idea of infringement, the margin of appreciation must 
be set at a similar standard to other cases where it was necessary for review to be strict. 
 
                                            
15 id at ¤89. 
16 id at ¤119. 
17 id at ¤66. 
18 id at ¤96. 




The second hub was the case of Evans v. The United Kingdom.20 Evans v. UK concerned the dispute 
between two parties over IVF treatment and, more specifically, the UK law regulating consent and 
the withdrawal of consent for said treatment to be undertaken. To sum the case up succinctly, Ms. 
Evans had a medical condition which, within a few years, would make her unable to have children. 
Her partner at the time, ÒJÓ,  consented to the use of his sperm which would give Ms. Evans the 
opportunity to go forward with an IVF procedure at a later date. However, as time passed, J 
withdrew his consent for the use of his sperm, and therefore nullified the consensual use of the 
frozen embryo [which his sperm had fertilised]. The Court approached the case by considering the 
obligations of the UK's law under Article 8; essentially, they needed to establish whether the State 
had positive duties above and beyond the negative duties to not infringe on the right to private life, 
and asked Òwhether the legislative provisions as applied in the present case struck a fair balance 
between the competing public and private interests involved.Ó21 The Court decided that Article 8 
was not infringed in this case as, 
 
the Court accepts that it would have been possible for Parliament to regulate 
the situation differently. However, as the Chamber observed, the central 
question under Article 8 is not whether different rules might have been adopted 
by the legislature, but whether, in striking the balance at the point at which it did, 
Parliament exceeded the margin of appreciation afforded to it under that 
Article.22 
 
In comparison to the case of S. and Marper, Evans v. UK  ¤77 calls for a wider version of the margin 
of appreciation. Given that there was no existing consensus on the regulation of IVF treatment and 
that a balance had to be struck between the irreconcilable rights of two competing parties, the 
Court decided that the margin of appreciation would be wide. 
 
We see a few additional spatial metaphors in Evans. The first is the notion of the coverage of law, 
its expansive reach, and its capability to draw a conclusion. Not only is the conception of a 
wideness of space invoked, but also an ability on the part of the law to create certainty by being 
                                            
20 Evans v. The United Kingdom, Judgement of the Court of 10 April 2007. CE:ECHR:2007:0410JUD000633905 
(Evans). 
21 Evans at ¤76 
22 id at ¤91. 
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able to see with clarity over the expanse it surveys. Article 8, if it is premised on this expanse, must 
have coverage over the entire panorama in order to provide a legal interpretation that is clear and 
unambiguous. This is borne out in the following conceptual metaphors in Evans. 
 
The primary metaphorical conception is the notion that the law is built upward above its dominion. 
This idea, like the tangible tower in a field, allows the viewer to have a clear and complete outlook 
over their surroundings. The law must be able to have a similarly unobstructed view. This can be 
seen in metaphors like LEGAL RULES ARE STRUCTURES, 
 
Òstrong policy considerations underlay the decision of the legislatureÓ23 
 
The law viewed as a structure that has strong foundations makes perfect sense when you couple 
this idea with the conception that AMBIGUITY IS WIDE (such as ÒÉÕprivate lifeÕ, which is a broad 
term,Ó24) and you see the need for law to have visual coverage of an area in order to have certainty, 
 
ÒÉThe Grand Chamber considers that this more limited issueÉfalls within the scope 
of Article 8ÉÓ25  
 
This is a derivative of the basic metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING. However, the conception here is 
stretched to include the modal description of whether something might be ÒseeableÓ. It ties 
together a group of metaphors that construct a whole: KNOWING IS CLEAR, CLEAR IS UP, RULE OF 
LAW IS UP, CLEAR LAW IS COVERAGE, PUBLIC INTERESTS ARE WIDE, and LEGAL QUESTIONS ARE UP. 
 
 
Ò...the legislation in question also served a number of wider, public interests, in 
upholding the principle of the primacy of consent and promoting legal clarity and 
certainty..Ó26 
 ÒÉThe extent to which it was permissible under Article 8 for the State to give 
weight to these considerationsÉÓ27 
 ÒÉthere is no uniform European approach in this fieldÉÓ28 
                                            
23 id at ¤60. 
24 id at ¤71. 
25 id at ¤72. 
26 id at ¤74. 
27 id at ¤74. 
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 ÒÉsince the questions raised by the case touch on areas where there is no clear 
common ground amongst the member States, the Court considers that the margin 
of appreciation to be afforded to the respondent State must be a wide oneÉÓ29 
 
The construction of this metaphor (or group of metaphors) is familiar to most. When determining 
whether the UK exceeded its margin of appreciation, the Court used the concept of the coverage 
of law and its ability to have a clear view of where the line is drawn (to use the same conception), 
given that the law could not see where that line may be drawn.  
 
To follow the AMBIGUITY IS WIDE metaphor, the more complex things become, the further away 
from sight they are, and thus the coverage of the margin of appreciation should extend to cover 
the expanse of any grey or undefined areas.  
 
Ò[A] broad margin of appreciation in this field, given the complexity of the moral and 
ethical issues to which IVF treatment gave riseÉÓ30 
 
A legal issue comes up, like an object or a structure - a tower on the horizon - from beyond clear 
view; the territory beyond the reach of clear law. As it grows in height, it becomes noticeable, 
seeable, and more detailed, which increases the probability that any ambiguities will become visible 
to the eyes of clear law. For ÒÉ[i]n addition to the principle at stake, the absolute nature of the 
rule served to promote legal certainty.Ó31 
 
These hub cases (those with the high Eigenvector centrality in the network) in Group 1,  all display 
notions of clarity and expanse, and aim to match the lawÕs coverage to the coverage of the 
infringement in order to make a decision about the balance of proportionality or the scope of a 
margin of appreciation. But if we take one of the non-hub cases from the same group, will this 
observation still hold true? Although all of the cases contain spatial metaphors relating to expanse, 
clarity, and coverage, to some degree, many of the edge cases (the non-hubs, or more explicitly 
                                                                                                                                             
28 id at ¤79. 
29 id at ¤81. 
30 id at ¤69. 
31 id at ¤89. 
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those with an Eigenvector centrality of 0.00) conceptualise space in a different way. Take, for 
instance, the case of X and Y v. The Netherlands.32 
 
In this case the CourtÕs salient metaphors reference the notion of a container, and the actions that 
can be performed within or upon it, or a journey that has been blocked or curtailed:  
 
PRIVATE LIFE IS A CONTAINER, ARTICLE 8 IS THE SEAL ON A CONTAINER, MARGIN OF 
APPRECIATION IS A CONTAINER, 
 
ÒÉthat the right of both his daughter and himself to respect for their private life, 
guaranteed by Article 8 (art. 8), had been infringedÉÓ33 
ÒÉthe object of Article 8ÉÓ34 
ÒÉto secure respect for private life even in the sphereÉÓ35 
ÒÉin the sphere of the relations of individualsÉÓ36 
ÒÉin principle a matter that falls within the Contracting StatesÕ margin of 
appreciationÉÓ37 
  
And, PROTECTION IS A JOURNEY, VILOATION OF ARTICLE 8 IS AN OBSTACLE, LAW IS A PLACE ON 
A JOURNEY, RESPECT FOR PRIVACY IS THE FULFILLMENT OF A JOURNEY, 
 
ÒÉThe only gap, so far as the Commission and the Court have been made aware, 
is as regards persons in the situation of Miss Y; in such cases, this system meets a 
procedural obstacle which the Netherlands legislature had apparently not 
foreseenÉÓ38 
ÒÉit was the exceptional nature of the facts of the case which disclosed the gap in 
the lawÉÓ39 
ÒÉIt is in no way the task of the European Court of Human Rights to take the 
place of the competent national courts in the interpretation of domestic lawÉÓ40 
ÒÉprotecting the individual against arbitrary interferenceÉÓ41 
                                            
32 X and Y v. The Netherlands, Judgement of the Court of 26 March 1985. CE:ECHR:1985:0326JUD000897880. (X 
and Y). 
33 id at ¤18. 
34 id at ¤23. 
35 ibid. 
36 id at ¤24. 
37 ibid. 
38 id at ¤27. 
39 id at ¤28. 




These driving metaphors help to explain the combination of the conception when it comes to the 
proscription of how to interpret wording and understand the perceived interference with Article 8. 
In fact, there is a silent and implicit refusal of the expanse model of protection, ÒÉa gap in the law, 
but it could not be filled by means of a broad interpretation to the detriment of Mr. BÉÓ42 
 
This is not to say that one metaphor is more valuable, accurate, or objectively fits the meaning of 
privacy better than another. It is indicative that the constructions in the cases that are more 
important to the network comport with the conception in the ancestor case, Schrems.   
 
Like the previous cluster, Group 2 deals with tests of proportionality and the margin of 
appreciation given to states in that determination. Unlike the previous cluster, Group 2 doesnÕt 
display a large set of central nodes, but appears to be centered around one case that is an 
apparent authority, Connors v. The United Kingdom.43 
 
The Connors case concerned a family in the UK who identified as Gypsy and were forced to leave 
their property after compliants were made about their behaviour on the site. This was a very 
complex case involving a family who had no redress to falsify the claims made against them, while 
also bringing to bear their minority protected status. The Court found the issue of minority status 
hard to place in the case; evidence showed a shift in the nomadic and lifestyle habits of the Gypsy 
community, and it was deemed necessary to weigh the GovernmentÕs reaction to this reality when 
discussing the implementation of a law that was designed to uphold certain living practices in Gypsy 
communities. The Court had to measure the margin of appreciation given to the UK judiciary as, 
normally, in circumstances involving societal need, national authorities are thought to be better 
placed to decide given Òtheir direct and continuous links with that society.Ó44 However, ultimately 
the Court decided that Òthe authorities must take some responsibility, [it] places considerable 
obstacles in the way of Gypsies pursuing an actively nomadic lifestyle while at the same time 
                                                                                                                                             
41 id at ¤23. 
42 id at ¤12. 
43 Connors v. The United Kingdom, Judgement of the Court of 27 May 2004. CE:ECHR:2004:0527JUD006674601. 
(Connors) 
44 id at ¤91. 
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excluding from procedural protection those who decide to take up a more settled lifestyle.Ó45 As 
the national authorities provided no Òproper justificationÓ46 for the eviction, it was therefore 
concluded that there was a breach of Article 8. 
 
The relevant cited section in the network is ¤82, cited by the S and Marper decision. It is odd, given 
the extended space the Court reserves for the discussion of the qualifying conditions to measure 
the margin of appreciation, that this is the only section cited for that reason.47 Normally, the Court 
considers, Òin spheres involving the application of social or economic policies, there is authority that 
the margin of appreciation is wide.Ó48 However, even in these cases Òthe scope of the margin of 
appreciation depends on the context of the case, with particular significance attaching to the extent 
of the intrusion into the personal sphere of the applicant.Ó49  
 
The Court recites chapter and verse on the many different applications of the margin of 
appreciation given to national authorities, yet claims this particular instance is of a specific nature 
that cannot be subsumed into the same character as earlier instances relating to social and 
economic policies. They later state, 
The central issue in this case is therefore whether, in the circumstances, the legal 
framework applicable to the occupation of pitches on local authority gypsy sites 
provided the applicant with sufficient procedural protection of his rights.50 
 
The Court is deliberating on a situation which has previously been directly adjudicated (in the 
sense that the subject matter was the eviction of Gyspy residents). However, the Court 
differentiated this case from the previous High Court decisions by noting a few key distinctions. For 
instance, they seemed to be swayed by the applicantÕs argument that while a previous case 
Òconcerned a local planning decision grounded in local knowledge and understanding of local 
conditionsÓ51, "this case was a matter of a general policy at national level.Ó52 The Court notes that,  
                                            
45 id at ¤94. 
46 id at ¤95. 
47 The Court does give the caveat Òwith further referencesÓ see S. and Marper at ¤102. Whether this qualifies as an 
explicit chain of reasoning is up to the reader.  
48 Connors at ¤82. 
49 ibid. 
50 id at ¤85. 





In spheres such as housing, which play a central role in the welfare and economic 
policies of modern societies, [the Court] will respect the legislatureÕs judgment as 
to what is in the general interest unless that judgment is manifestly without 
reasonable foundation.53 
 
The Court ultimately found that the legislation made was without any reasonable foundation.  
In S. and Marper, the Court's complex back and forth dynamic from the Connors case is subsumed 
under the terminology: ÒThe margin will tend to be narrower where the right at stake is crucial to 
the individual's effective enjoyment of intimate or key rights.Ó54 We are left to wonder: what process of 
translation occurred between the two cases? How are the intimate and key rights of housing and 
DNA related when it comes to the margin of appreciation in the resolution of disputes? 
 
Unlike the conceptual metaphors in S and Marper, those used in Connors are less focused on 
measuring the coverage of the law, although the spatial aspect of vision and clarity was similar. In 
this regard, the case contained an exceptionally large number of references to weight and impact, 
relying on the idea of LAW IS A STRUCTURE to give them (no pun intended) weight.  
 
Take, for instance, some of the WEIGHT/FORCE metaphors in Connors: 
 
ÒÉOn the other hand, the regime applicable to local authority gypsy sitesÉÓ55 
ÒÉAn interference will be considered Ònecessary in a democratic societyÓ for a 
legitimate aim if it answers a Òpressing social needÉÓ56  
ÒÉthere is thus a positive obligation imposed on the Contracting StatesÉÓ57 
ÒÉThe serious interference with the applicantÕs rights under Article 8 requires, in 
the CourtÕs opinion, particularly weighty reasons of public interest by way of 
justification.Ó58  
ÒÉThere is force in the GovernmentÕs argument that some weight should be attached 
to the views of national judgesÉÓ59 
 
                                            
53 id at ¤82 
54 S. and Marper ¤102. Emphasis added. 
55 Connors ¤80. 
56 id at ¤81. 
57 id at ¤84. 
58 id at ¤86. 
59 id at ¤91. 
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These metaphors construct an image of the weight of the reasons given by both the applicant and 
the government for the Court to balance in their appraisal of the conditions of a margin of 
appreciation. This is in direct opposition to the less frequent examples of competing metaphors 
such as: VISION/CLARITY, UP/DOWN, general spatial, and particularly CONTAINER and JOURNEY 
metaphors, as can be seen in the following examples: 
 
VISION: 
ÒÉno clear national policyÉÓ60  
ÒÉHe saw no reason whyÉÓ61  
ÒÉin light of the evidence submittedÉÓ62  
 
UP/DOWN: 
ÒÉensuring an adequate level of provision for gypsiesÉÓ63 
ÒÉthe issues raised in the recent reportsÉÓ64  
ÒÉthat would overcome the applicantÕs complaintsÉÓ65  
ÒÉpolicy considerations have arisen in the context of Article 8ÉÓ66 82 
ÒÉto require local authorities to justify in court their management decisions in 
relation to individual occupiers would add significantly to their administrative burden, 
increasing costs and licence fees ÉÓ67 
 
Other Space: 
ÒÉin principle better placed than an international courtÉÓ68  
ÒÉthe vulnerable position of gypsiesÉÓ69  
ÒÉwith the much narrower issue of the policy of procedural protectionÉÓ70 
 
CONTAINER: 
 ÒÉparticular significance attaching to the extent of the intrusion into the personal 
sphere of the applicantÉÓ71  
                                            
60 id at ¤74. 
61 id at ¤75. 




66 id at ¤82. 
67 id at ¤79. 
68 id at ¤82. 
69 id at ¤84. 
70 id at ¤86. 
71 id at ¤82. 
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ÒÉremained within its margin of appreciationÉÓ72  
 
JOURNEY 
ÒÉno straightforward answer was possibleÉÓ73  
ÒÉ the domestic courts stopped short of finding any breach of the provisions of the 
ConventionÉÓ74 
 
The guiding metaphor in Connors relies on a conception of the law as a structure on which to 
balance the weight of competing arguments, as in,  
  
ÒÉThe domestic courtsÕ position cannot therefore be analysed as providing strong 
support for the justification of continuing the current regimeÉÓ75 
ÒÉhis principal objection was based.Ó76 
 
 
Without a reasonable foundation that could withstand the stress of the applicantÕs arguments, the 
GovernmentÕs position was rejected and therefore the margin of appreciation needed to be 
narrowed, leading to the ultimate conclusion that there was a violation of Article 8. This 
construction of stress and weight can be bourne out of the precedents stemming from Connors.  
 
To make sense of where these constructions originate, we must contrast them with the dominant 
metaphor forms in the Evans hub case which are built around notions of vision and expanse. By 
comparing the metaphors in cases with wide margins of appreciation stemming from Evans with 
those used in the narrow margin of appreciation cases deriving from Connors, and taking due note 
of those metaphors that Connors and Evans share, we can map out the lineage of the dominant 
constructions.  
 
What we expect to find is: 
 
                                            
72 id at ¤83. 
73 id at ¤91. 
74 ibid. 
75 ibid. 
76 id at ¤92. 
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1.  the wide margin of appreciation cases following from Evans are dominated by 
expanse/area metaphors and, 
2. those from Connors would focus on impact and weight.  
3. The precedents shared by the common citations will combine both without exhibiting a 
predominant metaphor construction.  
 
2. Wide Margins from Evans 
 
Two major hubs precede the citation in Evans; Kutzner v. Germany77, and Johansen v. Norway,78 both 
of which come through Odievre v. France.79 These two cases involve the balance between 
competing public and private interests (as the majority of the cases referenced in this research do). 
What is distinct about them is the manner in which the Court decides to describe that balancing 
act; as a measure of expanse vs as a measure of weight and force. Here we find two significant 
cases in the network that both proscribe that a wide margin of appreciation be given to state 
authorities within that balance. This does not mean that when a court expresses this type of 
conception, the margin will always be and must be wide. It is to say that when the Court, in this 
instance and within the network, describes the margin as wide, metaphors invoking area, vision, and 
direction will tend to be prevalent.  
 
The Kutzner case involved a German couple with certain intellectual deficiencies. The German 
court, on the basis of advice and reports from the state social worker, retracted the couple's 
parental rights to care for their children owing to their inability to ensure the children's safety and 
wellbeing , Ò..not through any fault of their ownÉbut because they did not possess the requisite 
intellectual capacity.Ó80 Through a number of legal appeals, the Kutzners applied for increased 
visiting hours with their children in foster care and for the appointment of a new guardian to the 
                                            
77 Kutzner v. Germany, Judgement of the Court of 26 February 2002. CE:ECHR:2002:0226JUD004654499. (Kutzner). 
78 Johansen v. Norway, Judgement of the Court of 7 August 1996. CE:ECHR:1996:0807JUD001738390. (Johansen). 
79 Odivre v. France, Judgement of the Court of 13 February 2003. CE:ECHR:2003:0213JUD004232698. (Odivre). 
Odivre is a case that does not designate the margin of appreciation as wide but still demonstrates the same 
metaphorical conceptions of expanse and clarity as Kutzner and Johansen but not nearly as strong. Also, given that its 
hub score is lower than the other two cases, the analysis focuses on the other two cases. 
80 Kutzner ¤20. 
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children (ostensibly in the hope that the new guardian would allow increased visitation rights ). 
These requests were denied.  
 
The case was brought before the Court to ascertain whether there had, among other violations, 
been a violation of Article 8. The Court (as in many of the cases this project has looked into) 
unwaveringly recognises the relationship between a parent and child as an integral aspect of private 
life. However, in the Kutzner case, the issue the Court faced was to understand and mediate the 
competing interests of the public authorities, the parents, and the children themselves. What the 
Court needed to decide was how to demarcate Ò...the boundaries between the State's positive 
and negative obligations under this provision,Ó81 which admittedly has no Òprecise definition.Ó82 As in 
Evans, the Court used the imagery of space, vision, and movement/direction, to place this 
boundary. This is not to say other metaphors werenÕt present83, merely that orientational 
metaphors were predominant. 
 
These include the metaphors of clear vision: 
 
ÒÉit has to consider whether, in the light of the case as a wholeÉÓ84  
ÒÉit will also have regard to the obligationÉÓ85 
ÒÉperceptions as to the appropriateness of intervention by public authoritiesÉÓ86 
ÒÉwhen care measures are being envisagedÉÓ87  
ÒÉto review under the ConventionÉÓ88  
ÒÉthe evidence in the case file showsÉÓ89 
 
And movement or direction through space: 
 
ÒÉsuch further limitations entail the danger that family relations between the 
parents and a young child are effectively curtailedÉÓ90 
                                            
81 id at ¤62. 
82 ibid. 
83 For instance, arguments as force metaphors: ÒÉthe first of whom stressed the applicants' intellectual deficienciesÉÓ 
id at ¤68, or ÒÉas soon as reasonably feasible will begin to weigh on the responsible authorities with progressively 
increasing forceÉÓ id at ¤76. 
84 id at ¤65. 
85 ibid. 
86 id at ¤66. 
87 ibid. 
88 ibid. 
89 id at ¤78. 
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ÒÉthere must exist other circumstances pointing to the ÒnecessityÓ for such an 
interference with the parents' right under Article 8ÉÓ91 
ÒÉunlike the position in other cases of the same typeÉÓ92  
ÒÉshould be consistent with the ultimate aimÉÓ93 
 
It is Interesting, though not distinctly metaphorical, to note the instances where the Court 
describes the matter at hand in terms of spatial separation of the children from the parents. As 
seen in ¤77, 
 
However, in the instant case, not only have the children been separated from their 
family of origin, they have also been placed in separate, unidentified, foster homes 
and all contact with their parents was severed for the first six months. In addition, 
the children themselves have at no stage been heard by the judges.94 
 
Whether this is integral to the Court's decision, or decisive in the choice of their conceptualisation, 
canÕt reasonably be deduced, but should be pointed out nonetheless. 
 
Johansen v. Norway, in a very similar manner, was concerned with the StateÕs obligation with regards 
to public policy, a citizenÕs right to private life, and the specific right to parental care within it. Like in 
Kutzner, the Court relied on a spatial conception of balance, with a particular emphasis on vision, to 
consider the applicantÕs ability to show their reasons in a clear manner. This conception is 
particularly strong in the cited node in the network ¤64, 
 
Éthe Court will consider whether, in the light of the case as a whole, the reasons 
adduced to justify them were relevant and sufficientÉin so doing, the Court will 
have regard to the fact thatÉperceptions as to the appropriateness of intervention 
by public authorities in the care of children varyÉthe margin of appreciation so to 
be accorded to the competent national authorities will vary in the light of the nature 
                                                                                                                                             
90 id at ¤67. It should be noted here that this particular conception of movement through space is also cahracterised as 
part of a PATH-GOAL schema. However, as it is part of the larger orientational metaphor schema it is included here. 
91 id at ¤69. 
92 id at ¤74. 
93 id at ¤76. 
94 id at ¤77. 
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of the issuesÉÉthe Court recognises that the authorities enjoy a wide margin of 
appreciationÉit is against this background that the Court will examineÉ95 
 
Even though the proceedings ÒÉhad adversely affected the applicant's possibility of presenting her 
viewsÉÓ96, ultimately the Court decided that the decision-making process had given the applicant a 
clear opportunity to present those views ÒÉto a degree sufficient to provide her with the requisite 
protection of her interests.Ó97 
 
In both cases, the Court uses the conception of competing visions and ruled on the side of the 
State on the basis that enough room had been afforded for the applicantsÕ views to be clear. In this 
way, the balancing test is decided on the metric of a fairness in opportunities for clarity. The 
ÔseriousnessÕ of an interference is sublimated into an idea of legitimacy, as the fairness rather than 
the weightiness of the reasons, as was the case in the previous section. 
 
3. Narrow Margins Stemming from Connors 
 
Following from Connors, the condition of necessity was deliberated in Gillow v. The United Kingdom.98 
Of the cases directly cited by Connors that do not share a citation with Evans, Gillow had the highest 
Eigenvector centrality (.1304) of the remaining group.99  
 
Like the rest of the network, the key feature in the cited section of Gillow was the question of the 
interpretation of ÔnecessityÕ and ÔlegitimacyÕ of interference in a suspected infraction of Article 8 as it 
relates to the margin of appreciation given to states. Gillow questioned the legitimacy of the 
applicant's deprivation of the housing rights. The Court asked whether or not the applicantÕs 
                                            
95 Johansen at ¤64. 
96 id at ¤65. 
97 id at ¤66. 
98 Gillow v. The United Kingdom, Judgement of the Court of 24 November 1986. CE:ECHR:1987:0914JUD000906380. 
(Gillow). 
99 The group of citations and their respective Eigenvector centrality were Dudgeon v. The United Kingdom, Judgement of 
the Court of 22 October 1981. CE:ECHR:1983:0224JUD000752576 at ¤52  (.1598), Gillow ¤55 (.1304), Mellacher And 
Others v. Austria, Judgement of the Court of 19 December 1989. CE:ECHR:1989:1219JUD001052283 at ¤45 (.0421), 
Christine Goodwin v. The United Kingdom, Judgement of the Court of 11 July 2002. CE:ECHR:2002:0711JUD002895795 
at ¤90 (.0910), Hatton and Others v. The United Kingdom, Judgement of the Court of 8 July 2003. 
CE:ECHR:2003:0708JUD003602297 at ¤103 (.0000)and at ¤123 (.1213), where both Dudgeon ¤52 and Goodwin ¤90 
are shared citations of Connors and Evans to be explored in the next section. 
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residence should be considered as ÒhomeÓ, within the strict meaning of the convention, and 
whether there was an interference on the Government's part in not allowing the Gillows to take 
up residence in the house. The government argued that the family were not entitled to reside in 
the house, citing their ineligibility for Ôresidence qualificationsÕ for a property owned by Mr Gillow, 
yet still regulated as Òcontrolled housingÓ administered by the States of Guernsey.  
 
Like Connors, Gillow contains a high number of spatial metaphors which make reference to weight, 
force, and structure. This can be seen in the initial part of the CourtÕs reasoning, where the items 
to be considered are listed, 
 
ÒÉThe notion of necessity implies a pressing social needÉÓ100 
ÒÉthe economic well-being of Guernsey must be balanced against the applicants' 
right to respect for their ÔhomeÕÉÓ101 
ÒÉwhether the obligation imposed on the applicantsÉÓ102 
ÒÉthe applicants attached considerable weight to the factsÉÓ103 
 
Even though ÒÉthere was no longer any pressing social need for the housing control 
legislationÉÓ104, and although ÒÉthe legislation had succeeded in containing within 
acceptable limits the pressure on residential accommodation in the islandÉÓ,105 the Court 
decided that the fact that the Geurnsey authority acted to exercise its power in the domain 
of housing matters doesnÕt run afoul of Article 8 (ÒÉthe statutory obligation imposed on 
the applicants to seek a licence to live in their "home" cannot be regarded as 
disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursuedÉÓ106). Going further, the Court stated that 
ÒÉwhilst recognising the relevance of the facts relied on by the applicantsÉthe Guernsey 
legislature is better placed than the international judge to assess the effects of any relaxation 
of the housing controlsÉÓ107 
 
                                            
100 Gillow at ¤55. 
101 ibid. 








Nonetheless, the manner in which the Government imposed their authority remained in question. 
The Court reasoned ÒÉthat insufficient weight was given to the applicants' particular 
circumstancesÉÓ108 .The Gillows ÒÉ[a]t that time, they possessed Ôresidence qualificationsÕ and 
continued to do so until the entry into force of the Housing Law 1969ÉÓ109. Like the spatialisation of 
time in S and Marper, the length of time of their residence (and the weight given to that fact) 
metaphorically extended through space. This was to be balanced against the weight of the Act that 
had less time to propagate and, in this sense, the extra mass of the GillowsÕ rights arguably 
outweighed that of the act itself. Furthermore, ÒÉthe decisions of the Housing Authority were, 
despite the granting of certain periods of grace, even more strikingÉÓ110.The efforts of the 
Government to rectify the situation, in the CourtÕs interpretation, ÒÉdid not materially alleviate Mr. 
and Mrs. Gillow's already precarious situationÉÓ111 
 
The use of force and weight in Gillow is quite consistent with what we have found in Connors. The 
use of an abstract quantity of weight and force to balance the needs and rights of two parties, 
particularly in the sense of necessity and legitimacy on the part of the GovernmentÕs actions, help 
clarify the sense of embodied grounding the Court gives its abstract concepts. This is true of the 
cases stemming from Gillow as well.112 Concretely, we have two different lineages leading up to 
Schrems which take different viewpoints on understanding the margin of appreciation when it 
comes to privacy.  
 
If what is asserted here is true, we would expect that: first, the sections cited by both Connors and 
Evans will share a mix of these conceptions; and second, that the final outcome in Schrems will be a 
blend of these metaphors as well, albeit in a slightly different way. The next section investigates the 
first claim and the following section investigates the latter. 
 
                                            




112 See for instance, Lingens v. Austria, Judgement of the Court of 8 July 1986. CE:ECHR:1986:0708JUD000981582. 
(Lingens) ¤39-40 has a high centrality measure of (.1971). Though the case has to do with Article 10, it still looks at the 
notion of necessity with a similar approach to metaphor use, though not as much. It relies a bit more on the LAW IS A 
STRUCTURE metaphor. This is due to the account, as one could surmise, of having to do with free-expression rather 
than privacy, where a different conception may be used.  
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4. Mixed cases 
 
Both sections from Evans and Connors cite two common case sections: Dudgeon113 ¤52 and 
Goodwin114 ¤90. Dudgeon involved the distinction between public and private interests in light of the 
laws in Northern Ireland regulating acts between consenting homosexual adults. Mr. Dudgeon 
argued Òthat homosexual acts which he might commit in private with other males capable of valid 
consent are criminal offences under the law of Northern Ireland,Ó115 and thus the law violated his 
right to private life under Article 8. The Court agreed that there was indeed interference. 
 
However, the Court was required to decide whether or not the term necessity applied to the 
infraction, in that it was necessary for a democratic society to have the authority to interfere with 
Mr. DudgeonÕs private life. They state, 
 
Firstly, "necessary" in this context does not have the flexibility of such expressions as 
"useful", "reasonable", or "desirable", but implies the existence of a "pressing social 
need" for the interference in questionÉ116 
 
In doing this, the Court used a number of different conceptions of the margin of appreciation and 
of the duty of the government to balance a pressing social need with the rights of the applicant. In 
characterising the understanding of necessity with the metaphor of weight and force, the Court is 
stating that the need must be of a significant value to be passable as necessary. However, the 
weight conception is not particulary dominant throughout the decision. Unlike the cases in the 
previous two sections, Dudgeon contains references to a number of competing conceptions of the 
conditions of how the margin of appreciation will be interpreted, but no one formulation appears 
to supersede the others. Below are several examples of this. 
 
STRUCTURE metaphors: 
ÒÉit is on that basis that the case has been argued by the GovernmentÉÓ117 
                                            
113 Dudgeon v. The United Kingdom, Judgement of the Court of 22 October 1981. CE:ECHR:1983:0224JUD000752576. 
114 Christine Goodwin v. The United Kingdom, Judgement of the Court of 11 July 2002. 
CE:ECHR:2002:0711JUD002895795.(Goodwin). 
115 Dudgeon ¤39 
116 id at ¤51. 
117 id at ¤39. 
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ÒÉthe two purposes relied on by the GovernmentÉÓ118 
ÒÉto draw a rigid distinction between "protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others" and "protection of moralsÉ"119 
ÒÉThe CourtÕs task is to determine on the basisÉÓ120 
 
FORCE/WEIGHT: 
ÒÉthe maintenance in force of the impugned legislationÉÓ121  
ÒÉwhich directly affected the applicant in the enjoyment of his rightÉ.Ó122 
what the United Kingdom Government judged to be the strength of feeling in 
Northern Ireland against the proposed changeÉÓ123 
 
TIME AS SPACE: 
ÒÉconstitutes a continuing interference with the applicantÕs right to respect for his 
private lifeÉÓ124  
ÒÉthe very existence of this legislation continuously and directly affects his private life 
41 
a specific measure of implementationÉÓ125  
 
UP/DOWN 
 ÒÉthe threat hanging over him was realÉÓ126  
ÒÉIn the GovernmentÕs submission, the law in Northern Ireland relating to 
homosexual acts does not give rise to a breach of Article 8.Ó127 
ÒÉIt next falls to be determinedÉÓ128 
ÒÉissue arising under Article 8 (art. 8) in this caseÉÓ129 
 
VISION: 
ÒÉit showed thatÉÓ130 
                                            
118 id at ¤45. 
119 id at ¤47. There is also the competing metaphor here of the physicality of drawing this distinction rather than building 
it that could be understood not as structure but of physical action. However, given the point here is to show the 
variety of metaphors this distinction in this limited context isnÕt as important. 
120 id at ¤54. 
121 id at ¤41. 
122 ibid. 
123 id at ¤46. 
124 id at ¤41. 
125 ibid. 
126 ibid. 
127 id at ¤42. 
128 id at ¤45. 
129 id at ¤48. 
130 id at ¤41. 
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ÒÉthe Government took the view thatÉÓ131 
ÒÉthe Government drew attention toÉÓ132 
ÒÉas was illustrated by more restrictive laws even in the fieldÉÓ133  
ÒÉmeasures must be seen in the contextÉÓ134  
 
SUBSTANCE: 
ÒÉit would be seriously damaging to the moral fabric of Northern Irish societyÉÓ135  
ÒÉit is somewhat artificial in this contextÉÓ136 
 
SPATIAL EXPANSE: 
ÒÉis to what extent, if at allÉÓ137 
ÒÉfor some degree of control may even extendÉÓ138  
ÒÉremain within the bounds of what, in a democratic societyÉÓ139 
 
WEATHER 
ÒÉit follows that the moral climate in Northern IrelandÉÓ140  
 
 
These are, of course, not all of the metaphors identified in Dudgeon, but a chosen sample showing 
the broad range of conceptions regarding the conditions of measuring the balance between 
competing public and private interests. The conclusion to be drawn is that the use of a 
predominant metaphor is absent, but the top metaphors are certainly a mix of the structure, 
expanse, vision, and force metaphors that we have seen in the cases documented so far. 
 
The Goodwin case shows a similar pattern of metaphor use. The case of Goodwin was brought 
forward in the UK by a post-operative transsexual (male to female) who wasnÕt allowed to file 
sexual harassment claims as she was Òconsidered in law to be a man.Ó141 Christine Goodwin further 
                                            
131 id at ¤47. 
132 id at ¤56. 
133 ibid. 
134 ibid. 
135 id at ¤46. 
136 id at ¤47. 
137 id at ¤48. 
138 id at ¤49. 
139 ibid. 
140 id at ¤57. 
141 Goodwin ¤15. 
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stipulated that she was discriminated against on the basis of her transsexuality in other areas of her 
life, such as sexual categorisation when it came to pensions or automobile insurance. Through a 
mix of conceptual metaphors similar to those quoted in Dudgeon, the Court decided that the 
evidence was not substantial enough to view the StateÕs margin of appreciation as wide and ruled 
in favour of Christine Goodwin. Both of these cases validate the hypothesis that cases that are 
cited by two distinct lineages of metaphor conception will display a mixed use of metaphor in 
conceptualising the same right, at least in terms of how to understand the balance between public 
and private interests. Whether this is the case for standards or rules with clearer definitions is yet 
to be determined and should supplement research in this field in future investigations. 
 
The next section aims to answer the final question in this chapter: how do the two competing 
metaphor constructions blend (or are actively blended) to form a framework for the understanding 
of the margin of appreciation in Schrems? 
 
5. Conceptual Blending  
 
The Schrems case adopted the expanse metaphor to comport with the idea that the breadth of 
infringement was as important as its depth, with Digital Rights Ireland acting as the intermediary of a 
conceptual blend. A conceptual blend, as discussed in Chapter 3, is the theory proposed by 
Fauconnier and Turner142 that Òsets out to explainÉhow blended spaces are constructed via the 
selective projection of elements from multiple input spaces.Ó143 Fundamentally, there are two or 
more Òinput spacesÓ (in our case conceptual metaphor frames) which, when combined, produce a 
Ògeneral spaceÓ which contains Òwhat the inputs have in commonÓ and a Òblended spaceÓ which 
Òcontain[s] generic structure captured in the generic space but also contain more specific 
structure.Ó144 
 
                                            
142 See Fauconnier, Gilles & Turner, Mark; 2008. The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and The Mind's Hidden 
Complexities. Basic Books. 
143 Veale, Tony, Shutova, Ekaterina, & Klebanov, Beata Beigman; 2016. Metaphor: A Computational Perspective. Morgan & 
Claypool Publishers. at 26. 
144 Fauconnier, Gilles & Turner, Mark; 2008 at 41-46. 
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The concepts used in the cases in this chapter exhibited two distinct lineages regarding the use of 
conceptual metaphor. We can understand these concepts as input spaces for blending. What is 
interesting in these two lineages is that the metaphors are borrowed from their prototypical cases 
(the hubs) with notions of expanse, weight, structure, and vision appearing far more frequently 
than constructions of journey, path/goal, or container, among others, that come from outliers in the 
network. The conceptual metaphors that have become combined are those that are the typical, 
even prototypical, notions of the relationship between the conditions that lead to a balancing of a 
margin of appreciation and international judicial review. Taking these two observations in 
conjunction, we can begin to see how the concepts are combined to make the ideational claim 
that breadth and depth are equally important and part of the same coherent systematic metaphor 
structure. 
 
Fig. 6.3 shows the basic relationship of conceptual blending that translates depth to breadth in 
Schrems. The metaphors surrounding the understanding of the margin of appreciation in Schrems, 
unsurprisingly (or perhaps surprisingly), exhibit features of both the Connors' and Evans' (through S 
and Marper) lineages. 
    
Connors  S and Marper (through Evans)  Schrems145 
LAW IS A STRUCTURE THAT 
CAN WITHSTAND FORCE 
+ LAW IS A STRUCTURE 
THAT PROVIDES CLEAR 
VISION 
à LAW IS A STRONG STRUCTURE 
THAT PROVIDES CLEAR VISION 
AND SUPPORT 
PROPORTIONALITY IS A 
CONSISTENCY OF EQUAL 
WEIGHT AND FORCE 
+ PROPORTIONALITY IS A 
CONSISTENCY OF EQUAL 
AREA  
à PROPORTIONALITY IS A 
CONSISTENCY OF EQUAL AREA 
AND WEIGHT 
Time?  n/a PERMANENCE IN TIME IS 
EXPANSE IN AREA  
à PERMANENCE IN TIME IS 
EXPANSE IN AREA 
Fig 6.3 
 
Schrems contains a number of metaphors with the highest proportion coming from a blend of 
these two lineages, a small selection of which can be seen below. 
 
UP/DOWN 
                                            
145 Through the intermediary case of Digital Rights Ireland. 
! 
 156 
ÒÉSuch a check is requiredÉwhen evidence gives rise to a doubtÉÓ146 
ÒÉthe circumstances that have arisenÉÓ147 
ÒÉnot ensuring an adequate level of protectionÉÓ148 
ÒÉthe CommissionÕs discretion as to the adequacy of the level of protection ensured 
by a third country is reduced.149 
 
VISION 
ÒÉin view of, firstÉÓ150  
ÒÉin the light of the fundamental right to respect for private lifeÉÓ151 
ÒÉas is apparent from the second subparagraphÉÓ152 
 
FORCE/WEIGHT 
ÒÉin force in the third countryÉÓ153  
ÒÉresults in responsibility being shiftedÉÓ154  
ÒÉArticle 25 of Directive 95/46 imposes a series of obligationsÉÓ155 
ÒÉwhere US law imposes a conflicting obligationÉÓ156  
 
EXPANSE 
ÒÉthe large number of personsÉÓ157  
ÒÉthe third country covered by itÉÓ158  
ÒÉThe national supervisory authorities have a wide range of powers for that 
purposeÉÓ159  
 
TIME AS SPATIAL EXPANSE 
ÒÉthe continuity of data protection rights of EuropeansÉÓ160 
ÒÉcould not be profitably put forwardÉÓ161 
                                            
146 Schrems at ¤76. 
147 id at ¤77. 
148 id at ¤78. 
149 ibid.  
150 ibid. 
151 ibid. 
152 id at ¤64. 
153 id at ¤2. 
154 id at ¤20. 
155 id at ¤50. 
156 id at ¤85. 
157 id at ¤78. Large number here could reasonably be thought of as an UP/DOWN schema, but considering the subject 
is people it is more likely to be thought of over an expanse. 
158 id at ¤52. 
159 id at ¤43. 
160 id at ¤25. 
161 id at ¤29. 
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ÒÉbased on considerations of national securityÉÓ164 
ÒÉin support of such a claim are unfounded and therefore rejects itÉÓ165  
 
Combinations of VISION and EXPANSE: 
ÒÉ[a]ny gap in transparencyÉÓ166 
 
 
If we take the metaphor constructions from the precedent cases and blend them, what we find in 
Schrems is precisely what we would expect: a mix between the metaphorical features of a tangible 
embodied understanding of ÒbalanceÓ and a reflection on how to measure that balance. As we saw 
from the previous cases, this is not always done the same way, but taking into account the lineage 
of the precedent cases, the measuring process becomes somewhat predictable. Take, for instance, 
the traditional metaphor for the margin of appreciation that describes it as either narrow/wide or 
strict. In Schrems, It is interesting that the Court decided to use UP/DOWN metaphor and the 
imagery of reduction (or reduced) vs the more traditional strict or narrow articulation/framing. What 
may help to explain this choice is the structure that is formed from blending the two lineages of 
metaphor construction. 
 
It gives an idea of how the Court understands the meaning of specific and general state action in 
this frame. LetÕs picture for a moment what this frame looks like using the diagram of conceptual 
blending from Fauconnier and Turner as support.  
 
                                            
162 id at ¤64. 
163 id at ¤15. 
164 id at. ¤34. 
165 id at ¤64. 















:KLOHWKLVVWDWLFZD\RILOOXVWUDWLQJDVSHFWV RIFRQFHSWXDOLQWHJUDWLRQ LV FRQ
YHQLHQW IRU XV VXFK DGLDJUDP LV UHDOO\ MXVW DVQDSVKRW RIDQ LPDJLQDWLYH DQG
FRPSOLFDWHGSURFHVVWKDWFDQLQYROYHGHDFWLYDWLQJSUHYLRXVFRQQHFWLRQVUHIUDP
LQJ SUHYLRXV VSDFHV DQG RWKHUDFWLRQV :H WKLQNRIWKH OLQHV LQ WKLV GLDJUDP





,Q WKH QHWZRUN LOOXVWUDWHG LQ WKH %DVLF 'LDJUDP WKHUH DUH IRXU PHQWDO
VS
DFHV WKHWZRLQSXWVWKHJHQHULFVSDFHDQGWKHEOHQG7KLVLV DPLQLPDO
QHWZRUN &RQFHSWXDO LQWHJUDWLRQ QHWZRUNV FDQ KDYH VHYHUDO LQSXWVSDFHV
DQGHYHQPXOWLSOHEOHQGHGVSDFHV
 0DWFKLQJDQGFRXQWHUSDUW FRQQHFWLRQV ,Q FRQFHSWXDO LQWHJUDWLRQ WKHUH LV
SDUWLDO PDWFKLQJEHWZHHQ LQSXWVSDFHV7KHVROLGOLQHV LQ WKH %DVLF 'LD
JUDP UHSUHVHQW FRXQWHUSDUWFRQQHFWLRQV SURGXFHG E\ PDWFKLQJ 6XFK
FRXQWHUSDUWFRQQHFWLRQVDUH RIPDQ\NLQGV FRQQHFWLRQVEHWZHHQ IUDPHV
DQGUROHV LQIUDPHV FRQQHFWLRQVRILGHQWLW\RUWUDQVIRUPDWLRQRUUHSUHVHQ
WDWLRQDQDORJLFDOFRQQHFWLRQVPHWDSKRULFFRQQHFWLRQVDQGPRUHJHQHU
DOO\ YLWDO UHODWLRQV PDSSLQJV DVH[SODLQHGLQ&KDSWHU ,Q WKH6NLLQJ
:DLWHU FDVH IRU H[DPSOH VNL SROHV DUH FRXQWHUSDUWV RID WUD\ :KHQ
PDWFKHVDUHFUHDWHGEHWZHHQ WZRVSDFHVZHVD\WKDWWKHUHLVDFURVVVSDFH
PDSSLQJEHWZHHQWKHP
 *HQHULF VSDFH $WDQ\ PRPHQW LQ WKH FRQVWUXFWLRQ RIWKH QHWZRUN WKH
VWUXFWXUH WKDW LQSXWVVHHP WR VKDUH LV FDSWXUHGLQDJHQHULFVSDFH ZKLFK
LQ WXUQ PDSV RQWR HDFK RIWKH LQSXWV$ JLYHQ HOHPHQW LQ WKH JHQHULF
VSDFHPDSVRQWRSDLUHGFRXQWHUSDUWV LQ WKH WZRMSSXWVSDFHV ,Q WKH,URQ
/DG\FDVH WKH JHQHULFVSDFH LV VRPHWKLQJOLNH :HVWHUQGHPRFUDF\ZLWK
ODERU XQLRQV DQGYRWHUV /DERUXQLRQV LQ WKH JHQHULF VSDFH PDSV RQWR






WR DQHZVSDFH WKH EOHQG *HQHULFVSDFHVDQGEOHQGHGVSDFHVDUH UHODWHG
%OHQGV FRQWDLQ JHQHULF VWUXFWXUHFDSWXUHG LQ WKHJHQHULFVSDFH EXWDOVR
FRQWDLQPRUHVSHFLILFVWUXFWXUHDQGWKH\FDQFRQWDLQVWUXFWXUHWKDWLV LP
SRVVLEOHIRU WKHLQSXWVVXFKDV WZRPRQNVZKRDUH WKHVDPHPRQN
 6XFWLYHSURMHFWLRQ 1RWDOOHOHPHQWVDQGUHODWLRQVIURP WKHLQSXWVDUHSUR
MHFWHG WR WKH EOHQG7KH FDOHQGULFDO WLPHRIWKH MRXUQH\LQ WKH %XGGKLVW
0RQNFDVH LV QRWSURMHFWHGWR WKHEOHQG,QWKH6NLLQJ:DLWHU
FDVH QHLWKHU
ZDONLQJQRUWKHFXVWRPHUQRUWKHSULFHRIWKHFKDPSDJQHLVSURMHFWHGIURP
WKHZDLWHU LQSXW 6RPHWLPHV WZR FRXQWHUSDUWV DUH ERWK SURMHFWHG ERWK
SDWKV ERWKPRQNV VRPHWLPHVRQO\RQH LQ WKH ,URQ/DG\H[DPSOH RQO\
$PHULFDQYRWHUVDUH SURMHFWHGQRW%ULWLVKYRWHUVVRPHWLPHVQRQH LQ WKH
%XGGKLVW0RQNH[DPSOH FDOHQGULFDO GDWHV 6RPHWLPHV FRXQWHUSDUWV LQ
WKHLQSXWVSDFHVDUH IXVHG LQ WKHEOHQGWKHWZR SDWKV EXWRIWHQQRWWKH
WZR PRQNV $QG ILQDOO\ VRPHWLPHV DQHOHPHQW LQRQH LQSXWZLWKRXW D
,
 
Fig 6.4 The basic conceptual blending diagram from Fauconnier and Turner167 
 
If we think of input space 1 (I1) as containing the metaphor constructions from Connors, and input 
space 2 (I2) as containing the constructions from S and Marper, with the dots within those spaces 
marking their respective conceptual frames, we can think of the blended space as containing the 
combination of those spaces in Schrems, and the generic space as the space that only contains the 
similarities between I1 and I2. The result is a denser construct than would have been achieved by 
nvestigating each of the precedent cases on their own. It would be fair to ask whether it is possible 
that Dudgeon and Goodwin undergo this same kind of blend? They likely do, but to understand how 
that functions and to substantiate the claim would take a full networking of all of the precedents 
for every single case, and not just a look into the cited sections in Schrems. The future options for 
research of this type are discussed in Chapter 9. 
 
                                            
167 Fauconnier, Gilles & Turner, Mark; 2008 at 46. 
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To see how this construction impacts on the reading of depth vs breadth in Schrems, we have to 
visualise the law as it is constructed in the blended space. This can be done by looking at the 
pargraphs paying particular attention to the italicised words which are cited in [one, or more, of] 
the cases we have already discussed . 
 
We need to imagine a three-dimensional space with a plane that represents the law running 
horizontally across it in all directions, then we can add in the components. First, letÕs imagine the 
space as described for the State. The State is understood as both underlying society and building up 
a structure; a peak on that plane that comes into existence and is built up with every legislative act; 
giving meaning to the understanding of something being foundational. This peak must have clear 
vision over its domain. This scope of vision can be understood as the proper functioning of the law. 
Any obstacle to that vision, either by obstruction or something existing outside of its view can be 
understood as a legal ambiguity, an objection or claim being raised in front of the law, or an 
improper functioning of the system. The clarity and expanse of that view are important, but it also 
crucial to recognise that law's force to impose power over all that it can see.  
 
Now we add in the spatial construct of the private citizen. Our citizen is represented by a point on 
this plane. If the law imposes a burden on this citizenÕs rights, that point is depressed beyond the 
vision of the law; their congruity to the plane is disrupted. If the infringement is necessary or 
proportional to a legitimate aim, this measure will not add such a burden that the point is depressed 
beyond reach/sight. Likewise, if a claim has good support or strong and forceful reasons underlying it, if 
it holds enough weight,  or if the seriousness is grave, the depression can be deepened, which 
correlates to an infringement taking place. However, even if the depression is given more weight 
(depth in this spatial sense), if the depression is deep enough to undermine or endanger the 
structure of the law as it is set up to view its entire domain (think a tower toppling over), then 
even though a claim holds the quality of being serious, it cannot escape the proscription of the 
State to do what is necessary to keep its structure and foundation intact; namely, determining that 
the State is within its margin of appreciation to reverse the depression back into its contiguous plane. 
If there is a pressing social need for a certain law, that weight is what holds the structure together 




Now add in time. If a small depression continues over a long period of time, the pressure deepens 
which makes a small problem bigger. Or, one could visualise it by imagining the depression 
travelling through that plane, and gradually turning a small hole into a crevice or, using the 
terminology from many of the cases, a gap.  
 
Now add in predictability. This plane must posess the quality of being transparent, so that any 
individual on the plane can see how it is built and how far it extends. The ups and downs of this 
plane must be patterned and predictable. If they are not in accordance with previous up and down 
movements within this space, then they are infractions of the law.  
 
Of course, this isnÕt what is literally going on in the mind of a judge as they deliberate. But the 
conceptual representation has enough consistency for us to confidently posit that this is the 
construction that allows the intuitive physics of tangible space to aid the interpretation of an 
abstract concept like proportionality in privacy law. 
 
With this in mind, it is useful to revisit the specific legal test we set up for the margin of 
appreciation in point 1.2 of the previous chapter, which outlined how to test the proportionality of 
data interception and how to measure the margin of appreciation given to states. 
 
1.2 Purpose and duration of the operations must be proportional to a legitimate aim 
1.2.1 Is the interception or processing targeted and specific? 
1.2.2 Is the interception or processing legitimate to national security? 
1.2.3 Has the data been retained beyond the duration needed to achieve that aim? 
 
These are no longer straight forward or one-dimensional questions. 
 
1.2.1 deals with the number of points on the plane where pressure is applied. If the number is not 
specific, this will cause a general depression and the plane will be lowered, thus falling out of sight 
of the overseeing structure and putting its structural integrity into jeopardy.  
 




1.2.3 asks about the nature and size of the gap that has been opened up in the plane. 
 
We can see that by placing the concept of data interception within the 'container' provided by our 
existing notion of privacy, the Court is working within its own framework which does not require 
the legal landscape to be remodelled in order to understand the qualifications of data privacy to 
the old conceptions of privacy using necessary and sufficient conditions or through strict analogical 
case comparison. To the Court, a phrase such as Òmust be understood to meanÓ is apparently 
clear. Why wouldnÕt it be? It is just a combination of the prototypical concepts that the Court has 
already dealt with and understands. 
 
In this metaphor, citizensÕ rights are the same as StateÕs rights. They are part of the same fabric. But 
there are still questions and answers outstanding: how do we measure pressure and stress on a 
structure or citizen? How do we measure the height and depth of arguments? Those are questions 




 Chapter 7: 
Evaluative Judgement ¤91 
 
ÒÉwe should not just describe concepts and 
categories by means of an abstract definition, but É 
we should also take into account the things that the 
definition is about, if we are to achieve an adequate 





The analysis of the precedents stemming from ¤78 of the Schrems case gave us an idea about the 
construction of the abstract spatial conception of proportionality. However informative the analysis 
of the margin of appreciation may be, to show how that spatial construction helps inform narrow 
or wide discretion through conceptual blending is only one facet of the issue at hand. What 
remains is to show how the Court uses that framing to infer an evaluative judgment about 
competing conceptual constructions. To do this, we can use ideas expressed by research on 
evaluative judgment and particularly, the metaphoric fit hypothesis.  
 
The first stage is to look at the constitutive chains in the network stemming from ¤91, which refers 
to the quality of a law and how each one can be marked as containing sufficient safeguards. To 
review quickly, the Schrems case hinged on a judgment determining whether or not the US privacy 
protection scheme (in how it was constructed under the Safe Harbor arrangement) could be 
understood as giving Ôadequate protectionÕ or as having Ôessential equivalenceÕ to the EU data 
protection regime.  
 
The leading question in this chapter is: how does the Court use the spatial framing of its precedent 
network to evaluate the quality, sufficiency, or adequacy of two sets of legal frameworks, and to 
then qualify the deference given to national governments in interpreting their own standards? 
 
                                            
1 Geeraerts, Dirk; 2006. ÒIntroduction: A rough guide to Cognitive LinguisticsÓ in Cognitive Linguistics: Basic Readings. 
Dirk Geeraerts, Rene ́ Dirven and John R. Taylor (Eds.). Walter de Gruyter at 1. 
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To answer this, a similar analysis was developed for the network stemming from section 91. ¤91 
deals with the understanding of the Òlevel of protection of fundamental rights and freedomsÓ2 of 
EU citizens with regard to their data and (in conjunction with the previous and following sections) 
how that standard compares to the laws in a third country. It is a measure of equivalence between 
two systems that both try to balance the competing interests of the state and the individual. As in 
the previous section, a network was constructed based on the cited case law in Schrems to, 
hopefully, elucidate how and when Òthe persons whose personal data is concerned have sufficient 
guarantees enabling their data to be effectively protected against the risk of abuse and against any 
unlawful access and use of that data.Ó3  
 
The construction of the network followed the method outlined in Chapter 4, and subsequently 
used in Chapter 6. The result can be seen below, in Fig 7.1 
 
 
Fig 7.1 ¤91mapped for Eignevector centrality.  
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The colour groups were identified using a clustering coefficient to identify 5 communities among 
the case sections: groups one (pink), two (light green), three (orange), four (dark green), and five 
(blue). The sizes of the nodes correspond to their Eigenvector Centrality. Within the entire 
network, five nodes were immediately identified for their high centrality measure: Association for 
European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria ¤75-77,4 Liberty and Others v. The 
United Kingdom ¤62,5 Weber and Saravia v. Germany ¤93-95,6 Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain ¤46,7 and 
Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others v. Minister of Communications and Others ¤54-55.8 
While these were the largest hubs in the network as a whole, each group contained its own 
smaller hubs with different relations to the entirety of the network. These results are shown in Fig. 
7.2. 
 
Label E_Cent Label E_Cent Label E_Cent Label E_Cent Label E_Cent
AEIHR v Bulgaria 75-77 1.0000 Liberty and Others 62 0.7773 Klass and Others 49 0.0786 Kopp v Switzerland 50 0.0779 Leander v Sweden 50 0.0522
Weber and Saravia 93-95 0.5985 DRI 54-55 0.3821 Leander v Sweden 60-67 0.0723 Niemetz v Germany 30-33 0.0411 Malone v UK 66 0.0520
Valenzuela v Spain 46 0.4120 Schrems 91 0.1583 Rotaru v Romania 57-59 0.0676 Niemetz v Germany 29 0.0255 Silver and Others 85 0.0108
Halford v UK 49 0.1637 S and Marper 103 0.0047 Handyside v UK 48 0.0411 Huvig v France 25 0.0156 Sunday Times 48 0.0047
Rotaru v Romania 55 0.1628 Liberty and Others 63 0.0047 Engels 100 0.0156 Klass and Others 41 0.0047 Silver and Others 86 0.0047
Khan v UK 26 0.1540 M.K. v France 35 0.0000 Golder v UK 45 0.0047 Marckx v Belgium 31 0.0047 Silver and Others 87 0.0047
Amann v Switzerland 56 0.1529 Z v Finland 95 0.0000 Klass and Others 50 0.0000 Chappell v UK 51 0.0000 Sunday Times 47 0.0000
Leander v Sweden 51 0.0947 Weber and Saravia 18 0.0000 Klass and Others 58 0.0000 Huvig v France 8 0.0000 Wemhoff v Germany 8 0.0000
Kopp v Switzerland 64 0.0909 De Wilde 93 0.0000 Campbell v UK 32-33 0.0000
Malone v UK 67 0.0870 Belgian Linguistic Case 10 0.0000 Malone v UK 64 0.0000
Huvig v France 29 0.0838 Niemetz v Germany 28 0.0000
Kruslin v France 30 0.0838 Halford v UK 42-45 0.0000
Malone v UK 68 0.0156 Belgian Lingusitic Case 7 0.0000
Silver and Others 90 0.0108 Amann v Switzerland 76 0.0000
Kopp v Switzerland 72 0.0095
Klass and Others 55 0.0047
Silver and Others 88-89 0.0047
Golder v UK 34 0.0000
Klass and Others 42 0.0000
Sunday Times 49 0.0000
Huvig v France 32 0.0000
Kruslin v France 33 0.0000
Huvig v France 34 0.0000
Kopp v Switzerland 55 0.0000
Kruslin v France 35 0.0000
Klass and Others 25 0.0000
Klass and Others 26 0.0000
Kruslin v France 27 0.0000
GROUP 2 GROUP 3GROUP 1 GROUP 5GROUP 4
 
Fig 7.2 Group distribution and their nodesÕ respective eigenvector centrality 
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The sufficiency we are concerned with here relates to a number of universal rules, as set out by 
the CJEU and ECtHR's case law. The first step is to trace the legal rules underpinning that test of 
sufficiency. 
 
1. Characteristics of Sufficiency:  
 
As Group 2 contained the origin node of the present network, Schrems ¤91, it is the logical starting 
point for the chapter's investigation. Though the group contains 8 nodes, only 5 have a centrality 
measure above the threshold of 0.0000: Liberty and Others ¤62, Liberty and Others ¤63, Digital Rights 
Ireland ¤54-55, S and Marper ¤103, and the origin node Schrems ¤91.  
 
Schrems ¤91 states in full, that any,  
EU legislation involving interference with the fundamental rights guaranteed by 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter must, according to the CourtÕs settled case-law, 
lay down clear and precise rules governing the scope and application of a 
measure and imposing minimum safeguards, so that the persons whose personal 
data is concerned have sufficient guarantees enabling their data to be effectively 
protected against the risk of abuse and against any unlawful access and use of 
that data.9 
 
The cited cases detail the conditions of this rule more explicitly. ¤62 in Liberty and Others calls for 
Òthe requirement of legal Òforeseeability,Ó10 where foreseeability is quoted at length from the Weber 
and Saravia case (which we will look at in a moment). The second cited section in Liberty and 
Others, transfers the original circumstances of the case law on the Òmeasures of surveillance 
targeted at specific individuals or addressesÓ11 to the context of general surveillance in Liberty and 
Others, 
The Court does not consider that there is any ground to apply different 
principles concerning the accessibility and clarity of the rules governing the 
                                            
9  Schrems at ¤91. 
10 Liberty at ¤62. 
11 id at ¤63. 
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interception of individual communications, on the one hand, and more general 
programmes of surveillance, on the other.12 
 
Liberty and Others concerned the interception of communications data (Ò10,000 simultaneous 
telephone channels coming from Dublin to London and on to the continentÓ13) by the UK 
government. Like the cases examined in the previous chapter, it relied on both the clear vision and 
strong structure metaphors that the Court uses to frame the discretion of a national government 
to justifiably interfere with citizens' fundamental rights. Though not specifically pertinent to the 
realm of Ôpersonal dataÕ, the principles set out in this case are carried over to Digital Rights Ireland  
(and subsequently Schrems) by blending with a case that definitely does relate to personal data: S 
and Marper.  
 
The third cited case section14 adresses  the question of DNA data retention, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, and outlines certain proscriptions for the handling of such intimate data. The 
domestic law of a country must: 
1. Òafford appropriate safeguards to prevent any such use of personal data as 
may be inconsistent with the guarantees of this Article [Article 8]Ó 
2. Òensure that such data are relevant and not excessive in relation to the 
purposes for which they are storedÓ 
3. Òpreserved in a form which permits identification of the data subjects for no 
longer than is required for the purpose for which those data are stored.Ó 
4. Òafford adequate guarantees that retained personal data was efficiently 
protected from misuse and abuse.Ó15 
 
These conditions are weighted more heavily if the law recognises or Òregards the protection of 
special categories of more sensitive dataÓ, Òand more particularly of DNA informationÓ, which Òare 
used for police purposesÓ, and/or Òundergo[É] automatic processing.Ó16 Using the framework 
established in the previous chapter to combine these two contexts (where the circumstances of 
DNA collection can be understood as mental space 1, and the interception of communications 
                                            
12 ibid. 
13 id at ¤5. 
14 S and Marper at ¤103. 




data can be understood as mental space 2), it is easy to see how Digital Rights Ireland conscripts 
properties from both cases to inform its own blended space in order to make general rules 
applicable to a specific case. In the second space, we have proscriptions of foreseeability, as 
outlined in Weber and Saravia ¤93-95; the law must give, Òclear, detailed rules on interception of 
telephone conversationsÉÓ and outline Òthe circumstances in which and the conditions on which 
public authorities are empowered to resort to any such measuresÓ, it must be Òopen to scrutiny by 
the individuals concerned or the public at largeÓ, where it Ò must indicate the scope of any such 
discretionÓ, and Òthe manner of its exercise.Ó17 The case proceeds to stipulate that the minimum 
safeguards must include:  
the nature of the offences which may give rise to an interception order; a 
definition of the categories of people liable to have their telephones tapped; a 
limit on the duration of telephone tapping; the procedure to be followed for 
examining, using and storing the data obtained; the precautions to be taken 
when communicating the data to other parties; and the circumstances in which 
recordings may or must be erased or the tapes destroyed.18 
 
Like the cases in the last chapter, the process takes relevant features from each mental space to 
construct a blended space which lends itself to the wider categorical use of a general rule. And, 
again like the cases in the last chapter, this is done through a process of underlying image schemas 
that infer the way the court conceptualises the distinction between different types of data 
(communications, DNA, or digital data). It is important to explore this notion, and in order to do 
so we must first look at how these ideas have become manifest by working backwards through the 
network. To backtrack properly, particular attention must be paid to the concept of circumstances 
requiring Òadded weightÓ, and understanding what counts as being foreseeable, and most 
importantly, to noting instances where the Court makes an evaluative judgement on the quality of a 
law or sufficiency of a specific framework of safeguards to protect a citizenÕs Art. 8 rights. To 
investigate the evaluative judgment of the Court, we need to establish the main path of the CourtÕs 
use of precedent; we need to look at the path that connects the central hubs in their respective 
groups and the schemas that underlie their framing. This path can be seen in fig. 7.3. 
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Fig 7.3 Basic path structure between the main hubs of the five groups 
 
It is one thing to focus on the cited sections that are represented by each node, but those sections 
need to be understood in the wider context of their respective circumstances of fact, particularly 
with respect to the dominant framings within them. Our first task, therefore, is to set out the 
factual circumstances of the central node cases to lay out the different situations in order to then 
compare them substantively, while analysing how the evaluative judgments of the Ôquality of lawÕ 
themselves play out. 
 
2. The Circumstances of Fact in the Central Cases: 
 
Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria:  
 
Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria is a case in which 
the applicants, the Association for European Integration and Human Rights (hereafter AEIHR) and 
an independent lawyer, contested the protocol that had to be followed to bring human rights 
applications before the ECtHR. They contended that a piece of legislation (the Special Surveillance 
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Means Act of 1997, hereafter SSMA) was in violation of Articles 6.1, 8, and 13 of the Convention, 
even though they themselves had not been subjected to any surveillance under the legislation. The 
first requirement in the case was to determine whether or not the AEIHR could be considered as 
an entity that can be legally covered by a notion of private life, given their contested status as a 
Ôlegal personÕ. The Court decided that,  
While it may be open to doubt whether, being such a person, it can have a 
Òprivate lifeÓ within the meaning of that provision, it can be said that its mail and 
other communications, which are in issue in the present case, are covered by the 
notion of ÒcorrespondenceÓ which applies equally to communications originating 
from private and business premises.19 
 
Given this assessment, the Court had to decide on the two partiesÕ differing claims as to whether 
the purported interference with Article 8 satisfied the conditions of being Òin accordance with the 
lawÓ and Ònecessary in a democratic society.Ó20 In regard to the first, the Court stated that,  
The expression Òin accordance with the lawÓ, as used in Article 8 ¤ 2, does not 
only require that the impugned measure should have some basis in domestic 
law. It also refers to the quality of this law, demanding that it should be 
accessible to the person concerned, who must moreover be able to foresee its 
consequences for him or her, and compatible with the rule of law.21 
 
The court was satisfied that the SSMA met the first two conditions of the rule of law standard; as 
for being accessible, however, it held that the legislation failed on account of its lack of 
foreseeability. The Court referred to the hub node to find the description of foreseeability in the 
case law, ¤75-77, as discussed in the beginning of the chapter. Given the possibilities for abuse, the 
fact that the law did not require an independent authority to oversee the use of secret surveillance 
and that such surveillance did not have to be disclosed to those being monitored (even after the 
fact), the Court ruled that the measures were not sufficiently foreseeable and therefore not Òin 
accordance with the lawÓ. It concluded that the SSMA was in violation of Article 8.  
 
                                            
19 AEIHR at ¤60. 
20 id at ¤70. 




Weber and Saravia v. Germany: 
 
This case concerned the interception and recording of a newspaper reporter's telecommunications 
data and correspondence.  In the course of her duty, the reporter often travelled to South and 
Central America, and with relevance to the complaint, often corresponded with the second 
applicant during these trips. The applicants contended that amendments to the G10 Act (the ÒFight 
Against Crime ActÓ) infringed their Article 8, 10, and 13 rights under the convention. Concerning 
Article 8, the applicants specified 5 major infractions: 
 
1.! Òthe process of strategic monitoringÓ22 
2.! Òthe transmission and use of personal dataÓ23 
3.! Òthe transmission of personal data to the Offices for the Protection of the Constitution and 
other authorities and its use by themÓ24 
4.! Òdestruction of personal dataÓ25 
5.! Òthe provision authorising the refusal to give notice of restrictions on the secrecy of 
telecommunicationsÓ26 
 
The Court was of the opinion that the amendments to the G10 act were an infringement on Art. 
8 rights, and so continued on to discuss whether the interference was justified by being Òin 
accordance with the lawÓ and Ònecessary in a democratic societyÓ.  On the first point - whether it 
was in accordance with the law - the Court noted that given the legal definition for minimum 
safeguards (as referenced earlier in the chapter), the act provided those safeguards and was 
therefore in accordance with the law. As for necessity, the Court examined all of the supposed 
infractions and assessed the parties' competing arguments, counterbalancing the rights of the 
applicants vs the necessity of the government's action (namely, the risk of abuse). Given that the 
German Constitutional Court had amended and strengthened those safeguards the Court found 
that, Òthe applicantsÕ complaints under Article 8 must be dismissed as being manifestly ill-
founded.Ó27 
                                            









Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain: 
 
This case involved a Spanish citizen, Valenzuela Contreras, who, at that time, was the Òdeputy head 
of personnel of the W. company.Ó28 An employee, Ms. M., had made a complaint to the Spanish 
authorities about a number of threatening telephone calls and letters she had received. The 
Spanish authorities inquired into the calls by tapping Ms. M's telephone, at her request, to find their 
origin. The calls were subsequently found to to have been made from the W. companyÕs 
telephones. The access to the phones was narrowed down to a few suspects, including Mr. 
Valenzuela Contreras. The judge ordered that the company telephones be tapped, letters analysed 
for their origin (make of typewriter), and saliva and fingerprint samples taken. Given the evidence 
presented, Mr. Valenzuela ContrerasÕs telephone was ordered to be tapped. That line tapping 
uncovered, Òthat a number of calls had been made from his telephone to Mrs. M., her fianc ́, and 
their close relatives. Although, Òthe caller had hung up as soon as the telephone was answered,Ó29 
thus while withholding their identity, a total of Òtwenty-two calls had been made from the 
applicantÕs telephone while it was being tapped, three to Mrs. M.Õs home, eight to Mr. R.Õs home, 
two to Mr. R.Õs aunt and nine to his superior.Ó30  
 
Given the evidence, a criminal proceeding was launched in which Mr. Valenzuela Contreras was 
eventually convicted. In response to this ruling, he appealed to the supreme and constitutional 
courts, and finally to the Commission, complaining, Òthat he had not had a fair hearing in that his 
guilt had not been established by lawful means and that the monitoring of his telephone line had 
infringed his right to respect for his private life.Ó31 The Court found that there was an infringement 
of Article 8 in that the telephone surveillance constituted an interference, however the 
foreseeability of the law32 was at stake, and Ò[t]he Court must therefore assess the quality of the 
legal rules that were applied in Mr. Valenzuela ContrerasÕs caseÓ33 The Court noted that although, 
since the time of the wire tapping, the Spanish authorities had taken measures to ensure adequate 
                                            
28 Valenzuela at ¤7. 
29 id at ¤15. 
30 id at ¤18. 
31 id at ¤35. 
32 id at ¤51. 
33 id at ¤53. Emphasis added. 
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safeguards, at the time of the infringement, those safeguards were inadequate in their specificity 
and as such, ÒMr. Valenzuela Contreras did not, therefore, enjoy the minimum degree of legal 
protection to which citizens are entitled under the rule of law in a democratic society,Ó34 and a 
violation of his Article 8 rights had consequently been committed. 
  
Halford v. The United Kingdom: 
 
This case concerned Ms. Alison Halford, of the Merseyside police. She was, at the time, the Òmost 
senior-ranking female police officer in the United Kingdom.Ó35 She applied numerous times for 
higher positions as vacancies opened up. These promotions were not granted. She subsequently 
complained to the Industrial Tribunal that she had been discriminated against on the grounds of 
her sex. She also claimed that telephone calls had been intercepted and leaked to the press to 
create a ÒcampaignÓ against her, 36 which she presented strong evidence of to multiple tribunals and, 
finally, to the Commission. Ms. Halford had two telephone systems at her disposal, one at home 
and one in her office. Within the office system, she had two lines; one of which was designated for 
private use. The Court found, given that previous case law had determined that business premises 
encompass the domain of private life under Art. 8 and that the Òdomestic law did not provide any 
regulation of interceptions of calls made on telecommunications systems outside the public 
network,Ó37 the interference with Ms. HalfordÕs business telephone system was not Òin accordance 
with the law.Ó38 
 
Her home telephones, on the other hand, were a different matter. Ms. Halford argued that the 
interception of her private telephone communications qualified as an interference on the basis that 
the CourtÕs case law supported that the mere ÒmenaceÓ of surveillance, as proscribed by a law, is 
tantamount to an infraction of Art. 8.39 However, given that the alleged interception was 
undertaken ÒunlawfullyÓ, the Court could not apply that standard. The court stated, 
                                            
34 id at ¤61. 
35 Halford v. The United Kingdom at ¤9. 
36 id at ¤12. 
37 id at ¤50. 
38 id at ¤51. 
39 id at ¤53. 
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the essence of Ms HalfordÕs complaintÉwas not that her Article 8 rights (art. 8) 
were menaced by the very existence of admitted law and practice permitting 
secret surveillance, but instead that measures of surveillance were actually 
applied to her. Furthermore, she alleged that the Merseyside police intercepted 
her calls unlawfully, for a purpose unauthorised by the 1985 Act.40 
 
The Court then went on to reason if there was a Òreasonable likelihoodÓ this interception took 
place which they could not establish,41 and therefore decided that her Art. 8 rights in respect to her 
home telephones were not infringed.  
 
Leander v. Sweden: 
 
This case concerned Mr. Torsten Leander, a carpenter, who applied for a temporary position at a 
Swedish naval base. Because this entailed working within a secure area, the applicant was required 
to undergo Òpersonnel controlÓ, which is ostensibly equivalent to a background check made 
through police registers.42 However, he had already started working at the vacancy before the 
check was carried out, and was therefore told to take leave while it was being processed. The 
outcome of the personnel control was ultimately not in Mr. LeanderÕs favour. Mr. Leander 
petitioned the Navy, requesting access to the information that had determined this decision. This 
information was collected by the National Police Board, and Mr. Leander asserted, in regards to 
this information, ÒÉthe Government should, before taking a decision É give him the right to be 
apprised of and to comment upon the information thus released by the Board,ÓÉ Òat least orally 
and subject to a duty of confidentiality.Ó43 Mr. LeanderÕs fear was that his personnel control had 
been rejected due to his past political associations which, if it were the case, would be contrary to 
                                            
40 id at ¤57. 
41 There is some dubious reasoning here that should be pointed out. Even though it isnÕt of significant importance to 
the current study, it is interesting nonetheless. ¤59 states, ÒThe Court observes that the only item of evidence which 
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Swedish law. Mr. Leander complained to the Commission that his rights under Articles 6,8,10, and 
13 had been violated because, 
he had been prevented from obtaining a permanent employment and dismissed 
from a provisional employment on account of certain secret information which 
allegedly made him a security risk; this was an attack on his reputation and he 
ought to have had an opportunity to defend himself before a tribunal.44 
 
The Commission found no breach of Mr. LeanderÕs Art 8 rights, and the case was taken to the 
ECtHR, with the contention that his rights were infringed because, 
nothing in his personal or political background Écould be regarded as of such a 
nature as to make it necessary in a democratic society to register him in the 
Security DepartmentÕs register, to classify him as a "security risk" and accordingly 
to exclude him from the employment in question. He argued in addition that the 
Personnel Control Ordinance could not be considered as a "law" for the 
purposes of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2).45 
 
The Court agreed with Mr. Leander that the control was an infringement on his private life; with 
regard to it being in accordance with the law, the Court determined that the quality of the law 
(namely itÕs foreseeability: Òthe law in question must be accessible to the individual concerned and 
its consequences for him must also be foreseeableÓ46) took precedence over a simple ÒcomplianceÓ 
with domestic law.47 This opinion contains a strong caveat; in the context of Ònational securityÓ and 
the hiring of staff, this foreseeability ÒcannotÓ include the ÒpreciseÓ checks that the security forces 
carry out, it needs only to be Òsufficiently clear.Ó 48 The Court concluded that in this regard, the 
infringement was in accordance with the law. As for the necessity component, the Court reasoned 
that in balancing the infringement of Mr. LeanderÕs right to private life, the State had implemented 
enough safeguards to outweigh that infringement. They concluded,  
The fact that the information released to the military authorities was not 
communicated to Mr. Leander cannot by itself warrant the conclusion that the 
interference was not "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
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national security", as it is the very absence of such communication which, at least 
partly, ensures the efficacy of the personnel control procedure.49 
 
Given its compliance with the standards of Art. 8-2, the Court upheld the Commission's decision 
that the State had sufficiently met the standards set out by the Convention in not releasing the 
information of the personnel control to Mr. Leander, and thus, there was no breach of Article 8. 
 
Malone v. The United Kingdom: 
 
The Malone case pertained to the wiretapping and surveillance of the accused (and acquitted), Mr. 
James Malone. Though acquitted - twice - of a crime, Mr. Malone contended that the use of 
wiretapping and intercepted correspondence was beyond the scope of a warrant issued in order 
to produce evidence in the cases against him concerning the handling of stolen goods. Mr. Malone 
asserted that, although the use of warrants was an accepted administrative practice at the time, Òno 
power to tap telephones had been given by either statute or common law, [and as such] the 
tapping was necessarily unlawful,Ó50 thus violating his Art. 8 rights. The Commission agreed with this 
appraisal and the case was sent to the ECtHR, upon the UK government's request, to ascertain if 
the interception was legitimate under the terms set out in Art. 8.   
 
The Court, in considering whether the interference was in accordance with the law, made clear 
that this line does not necessarily mean only Òdomestic law but also relates to the quality of the 
law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law.Ó51 Like in the Leander case, the Court 
considered that though foreseeability is a requisite factor in domestic law, it can also be more 
widely construed in special contexts. In this context, the Court held that an administrative practice, 
while not strictly part of domestic law, must have at least Òsufficient clarityÓ to provide Òadequate 
protectionÓ.52 Given the above, the main question for the Court was to determine Òto what extent 
the circumstances in which a warrant might be issued and implemented were themselves 
circumscribed by law.Ó53 The Court decided that without Òany reasonable certainty what elements 
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of the powers to intercept are incorporated in legal rules and what elements remain within the 
discretion of the executive,Ó54 the practice of issuing a warrant by executive fiat was not  
satisfactory to the requirement of being in accordance with the law, and thus found it unnecessary 
to discuss the condition of necessity, concluding that Mr. MaloneÕs Art. 8 rights had been breached. 
 
Kopp v. Switzerland: 
 
Like many of the aformentioned cases, Kopp involved a breach in Art. 8 rights relating to the 
tapping of telephones. The case concerned the telephones of Mr. and Mrs. Kopp, two Swiss 
lawyers who resigned from their firm after being suspected of money laundering (Mr. Kopp) and 
disclosing confidential information (Mrs. Kopp). After an inquiry conducted by the Swiss authorities, 
it came to light that an American citizen (Mr. X), suspected of being involved in organised crime, 
had obtained confidential information withheld by the Swiss authorities about himself and the 
supposed crimes of Mr. Kopp. This information came from within the Swiss Federal Department of 
Justice and Police, and so Òthe Federal Public Prosecutor opened an investigation against a person 
or persons unknown in order to question the informant Y and to identify the person working at 
the Federal Department of Justice and Police who might have disclosed official secrets,Ó55 and 
tapped the phone lines of Mr. X, Mr. Y, and Mr. and Mrs. Kopp (Òmonitored as a Òthird partyÓ, not 
as a suspectÓ56).   
 
The investigation found that Mr. and Mrs. Kopp were innocent of any wrongdoing, and was 
subsequently closed. Shortly thereafter, the Swiss authorities revealed to Mr. Kopp that his 
telephone lines had been monitored during the investigation. Mr. Kopp asked to receive the file 
containing the details of his intercepted telephone calls. This request was denied, and in response 
Mr. Kopp asserted that the tapping which had taken place was contrary to both Swiss law and his 
Article 8 rights. Applying through the Commission, the Court appraised the matter and ruled in 
favour of Mr. Kopp, stating that through an extension of what it considers ÒlawÓ beyond its formal 
sense, the tapping could be seen as having a basis in domestic law.57 However, ÒSwiss law, whether 
                                            
54 id at ¤79. 
55 Kopp v. Switzerland at ¤15. 
56 id at ¤16. ÒThe order expressly mentioned that Ôthe lawyersÕ conversations [were] not to be taken into accountÕÓ, id 
at ¤18. 
57 id at ¤61. 
! 
 177 
written or unwritten, does not indicate with sufficient clarity the scope and manner of exercise of 
the authoritiesÕ discretion in the matter.Ó58 Therefore, Mr. KoppÕs Art. 8 rights had been infringed. 
 
Niemietz v. Germany: 
 
Mr. Gottfried Niemetz was a lawyer whose firm represented a man accused of Òthe offence of 
insulting behaviourÓ59 arising from the accusedÕs refusal to pay the state church tax and then 
allegedly sending a pseudonymous letter to the district court judge demanding his acquittal. Given 
the anonymity of the letter's author, a warrant was issued to search the offices of the lawyers 
representing the accused to reveal this person's identity. The Court dedicated several sections in 
their decision to a meticulous analysis of whether or not the searching of a business premises 
constituted an interference, as this had not been addressed in such a forthright manner in previous 
case law. They ultimately found it to be an interference, an estimation cited in other cases included 
in this chapter where surveillance of a business premise is at issue, although this decision isn't 
reasoned out and is simply stated categorically in the affirmative. 
 
Pertaining to the quality of the law, the Court declared that the warrant was a disproportionate 
remedy, stating that Òthe warrant was drawn in broad termsÉ without any limitation,Ó and without 
Òany special procedural safeguards, such as the presence of an independent observer.Ó60 As such, 
there was a breach with regard to Mr. NeimetzÕs Art. 8 rights. 
 
Klass and Others v. Germany: 
 
Gerhard Klass and the four other applicants in this case were lawyers and judges working for the 
judiciary in Germany who challenged a law pertaining to the surveillance powers of the state 
(hereafter the G10), Òin that it permits those measures without obliging the authorities in every 
case to notify the persons concerned after the event, and in that it excludes any remedy before 
the courts against the ordering and execution of such measures.Ó61 Unlike the cases detailed above, 
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this case contained no element of personal harm to a specific individual but was lodged on the 
basis of an objection to the legislation itself. The Court considered the quality of the legislation 
against the backdrop of the criteria applied in the previous cases. The main contention was 
whether or not the structure of the safeguards against arbitrary interference was comparable to 
the standards set by the understanding of Art. 8. While the government argued Òthat the system of 
review established under the G 10 does effectively protect the rights of the individual,Ó62 the 
applicants saw that same system as a ÒÕform of political controlÕ, inadequate in comparison with the 
principle of judicial control which ought to prevail.Ó63 The Court was tasked with deciding, 
whether the procedures for supervising the ordering and implementation of the 
restrictive measures are such as to keep the "interference" resulting from the 
contested legislation to what is "necessary in a democratic society".64 
 
In their review, the Court considered the implications of the time aspect of covert surveillance 
measures: Òwhen the surveillance is first ordered, while it is being carried out, or after it has been 
terminated.Ó65 The Court found that, in all three circumstances the protection offered to individuals 
was sufficient and that, even though Òthe applicants have constantly invoked the danger of abuse as 
a ground for their contention that the legislation they challenge,Ó66 there was no breach of Article 8. 
They reasoned, 
While the possibility of improper action by a dishonest, negligent or over-
zealous official can never be completely ruled out whatever the system, the 
considerations that matter for the purposes of the CourtÕs present review are 
the likelihood of such action and the safeguards provided to protect against it.67 
 
The Court set the balance between the two paragraphs of Article 8 (8-1 and 8-2) and found no 
forseesable issue in the structure of the legislation that provided reasonable grounds to rule in 
favour of Klass and others. 
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Rotaru v. Romania: 
 
This case involved a man seeking redress from the former communist regime in Romania for 
unlawful imprisonment based on a secret file that contained false information. Mr. Rotaru claimed, 
in essence, that the existence of a file in his name holding information that could not plausibly be 
correct (which domestic courts corroborated) allowed the government to Òat any moment make 
use of information about his private life,Ó and because this information was specious, this 
constituted a violation of his Art. 8 rights.68  Though the information about him was (as the 
government argued) of a ÒpublicÓ nature,69 the Court didn't accept that this justified the 
information's exclusion from consideration as part of the make-up of the term private life, 
public information can fall within the scope of private life where it is 
systematically collected and stored in files held by the authorities. That is all the 
truer where such information concerns a person's distant past.70 
 
Noting that the interference was applicable under Art. 8 and that it was based in domestic law, the 
Court again turned to the quality of the law. It found that, Ò[n]o provision of domestic law, 
however, lays down any limits on the exercise of those powers,Ó71 and Òthe ground allowing such 
interferences is not laid down with sufficient precision.Ó72 Lastly, it was noted that the adequacy of 
those safeguards should be measured by the extent to Òwhich [they] applyÉsupervision of the 
relevant services' activitiesÉ[and]É must follow the values of a democratic society as faithfully as 




All of these cases describe situations of infractions of private life in some form that ask for 
rectification by assessing the ÔqualityÕ, ÔadequacyÕ, or ÔsufficiencyÕ of a law intended to balance the 
protection of individual rights with the rights of a state to implement measures, within a certain 
margin of appreciation. Balance, however, is not the dominant schema in the language of these 
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cases. As we saw in the Chapter 6, the dominant constructions were spatial in nature (verticality, 
vision/light, and expanse) with a significant emphasis on structure and weight, the soundness of 
structures, and/or their ability to depress a point or push it out of view; which differs from the 
EQUILIBRIUM schema of balance. Our aim at the beginning of the chapter was to examine how the 
invoked image schemas might function in the Court's depictions and derivative evaluations of the 
quality or effectiveness of the law. Before looking at this explicitly in the cases themselves, we must 
first consider the function of framing and inference on evaluative judgment. 
 
3. Evaluative Judgment and Metaphoric Fit 
 
The preceding chapter focused on the framing of issues and the general reasoning of inference 
using blended mental spaces. Inferential reasoning can produce a number of possible options (is x, 
y or y1?) where a solution can be found by a blended space of those two options, as we saw. It 
focuses on what the literature would call Òsolution generation,Ó74 where Òmessages metaphorically 
comparing an abstract problem to an embodied problem cause people to generate solutions to 
the abstract problem that fit their understanding of how to solve the embodied problem.Ó75 
However, this doesnÕt explain how to proceed when those two spaces are incongruous, or how 
either respective framing provides an effective solution to a given problem. As Keefer et. al. state, 
this is the role of evaluative judgment or Òsolution evaluationÓ, 
voters decide among proposed policies, consumers choose products to meet 
their needs, and politicians select among negotiation strategies. Such evaluations 
can be difficult when not only the problem is abstract, but so too are the means 
by which candidate solutions purportedly address that problem. Using metaphor 
to understand both the problem and the effectiveness of candidate solutions 
may facilitate evaluation in such cases.76 
 
There are a number of empirical studies that address the evaluative judgment process in terms of 
metaphorical framing. For instance, Landau et. al. showed that,  
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participants were more likely to judge immigrants negatively after being primed 
to view their own country as a human body (e.g., a nation undergoing a growth 
spurt) rather than as an abstract entity (e.g., a nation undergoing a period of 
innovation), an effect that is congruent with a conventional metaphor that 
describes immigrants and immigration in terms of disease.77 
 
This study is corroborated by numerous others. Paul Thibodeau, for instance, considered the 
effects of congruency of metaphor framing when people evaluate the effectiveness of solutions to a 
given problem. In his study, Thibodeau focused on the metaphorical framing of crime. He found 
that, Òpeople are more likely to endorse approaches to crime-reduction that emphasize social 
reform when crime is framed as a virus,Ó and more telling, Òthey are even more likely to do so 
when the reform is described as a ÒtreatmentÓ (i.e., in the context of a re-instantiation of the initial 
metaphor frame).Ó78 Lichtenstien and Shutova give an example of the same result in their study of 
metaphor framing relating to the economy and economic solutions, 
given a description of economic hardship in terms of a BALANCE schema, 
participants preferred a solution that involved Òreturning to equilibriumÓ. When 
the description was given in terms of a SPLITTING schema, they preferred one 
that Ònarrowed the gapÓ.79 
 
In a similar study, Keefer et. al. looked at the framing of depression; the effects of the choice 
between different metaphorical frames used to talk about depression, and how solutions aimed at 
depression were evaluated given different metaphorical and non-metaphorical (literal) framings.80 
Over four studies, participants were presented with differing metaphorical frames where 
depression was presented as Òbeing spatially down or lowÓ or similar to being in Òa state of 
darkness.Ó81 They were then asked to evaluate the efficacy of treatments which were either given a 
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metaphorically congruent, a metaphorically incongruent, or a literal framing. Keefer et. al. expected 
to find that, 
when a down- or dark- metaphoric framing of depression is salient, framing a 
depression treatment as ÒupliftingÓ or ÒilluminatingÓ will influence its perceived 
effectiveness, despite the fact that these metaphoric framings are, in a strict literal 
sense, peripheral to understanding depression's nature or the actual means by 
which a candidate treatment purportedly alleviates depression symptoms.82 
 
The treatments Keefer et. al. proposed were two fictional anti-depressant drugs - ÒLiftixÓ and 
ÒIlluminixÓ -  each of which was presented with a suitable or corresponding metaphorical frame: 
Liftix was described using phrases such as Ò Ôhas been shown to lift moodÕ; Ôpatients everywhere 
have reported feeling uplifted,Õ Ó83, and Illuminix was framed with statements such as Ò Ôhas been 
shown to brighten moodÕ; Ôpatients everywhere have reported a brighter outlook.ÕÓ84The purpose 
was to test their hypothesis of, what they call, Òmetaphoric fit.Ó85 The metaphoric fit hypothesis tests 
the following premises: 
If an embodied-metaphoric framing of an abstract problem prompts people to 
reason about it using their knowledge of a bodily problem, then they should 
positively evaluate candidate solutions that are themselves framed metaphorically 
as addressing that bodily problem.86   
And, 
that metaphorically framing a problem not only increases preference for 
metaphorically fit solutions, but also decreases preference for metaphorically 
misfit solutionsÉ[In this instance] framing depression as being darkened would 
cause participants to evaluate the elevating anti-depressant as less effective than 
the non-metaphoric alternative, because spatial solutions fail to address the 
bodily problem of being darkened.87 
 
To further bolster the metaphoric fit hypothesis, Lichtenstien and Shutova investigated whether this 
phenomenon was restricted to English, or whether it occurred cross-linguistically - in similar ways in 
different languages. Referencing the work of Keefer et. al.,  they asked, Òif spatial metaphors for 
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depression were predominant in one language, while visual metaphors for depression were in 
another, would speakers of the first language favour Liftix and speakers of the second Illuminix?Ó88 
This research was done by analysing whether metaphoric framings of the economy (either as 
MOTION or VOLUME) would affect participantsÕ confidence in evaluative judgements across two 
languages (English and Spanish speakers). Their results suggested that, Òevaluative judgment, which 
differs from reasoning in that it is not logic-based, is a crucial component of decision-making,Ó89 and 
that all of these studies Òtaken togetherÉ present compelling evidence that the image schematic 
information specified by metaphorical language can impact how people evaluate situations.Ó90 
 
In our terms, this is akin to the measure of coherence derived from a linguistic analysis of the texts, 
as opposed to the less precise results obtained from the application of other models (such as 
those discussed in Chapter 2, e.g. Peczenik and AlexyÕs greatest number thesis or AlexyÕs weight 
formula). In this way, we are buttressing assumptions about the way judicial decisions are made by 
using an empirical analysis of the data that is supported by psychological and cognitive research. 
The concept of evaluative judgment when conceived of as a process that is partly made up by 
metaphoric fit, may help us to understand the process of weight attribution and to identify the 
mechanisms by which a decision evaluates (read: balances) competing options or measures the 
effectiveness of solutions provided by competing sides of a case.  
 
4. Applying the Metaphoric Fit Hypothesis to the Quality of a Law in the ¤91 
Cases: 
 
Let us take, for instance, the use of independent authority of sufficient safeguards to decide upon the 
quality of a law in the cases documented in this chapter. We learned from the previous chapter 
that the law could be understood by schematic reference to its existence as a strong structure on a 
three-dimensional plane. This structure must be understood (as any reference to the strength of a 
structure would in a non-metaphorical sense) to have a strong foundation and multiple levels of 
support that cannot be undermined by an upward force against it (as would metaphorically be the 
case if it is open to a high risk of abuse or to claims that raise a high level of concern). In the Leander 
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case, the support structure is easily identifiable and given the multiplicity and independence of its 
supportive struts, it can withstand the risk of abuse by authorities. ¤62 lists multiple checks that the 
law proscribes for protection against abuse. Notably, twelve independent measures: 
(i) the existence of personnel control as such is made public through the 
Personnel Control Ordinance; (ii) there is a division of sensitive posts into 
different security classes É; (iii) only relevant information may be collected and 
releasedÉ;(iv) a request for information may be made only with regard to the 
person whom it is intended to appointÉ;(v) parliamentarians are members of 
the National Police BoardÉ;(vi) information may be communicated to the 
person in question;É(vii) the decision whether or not to appoint the person in 
question rests with the requesting authority and not with the National Police 
BoardÉ;(viii) an appeal against this decision can be lodged with the 
GovernmentÉ;(ix) the supervision effected by the Minister of JusticeÉ;(x) the 
supervision effected by the Chancellor of JusticeÉ;(xi) the supervision effected 
by the Parliamentary OmbudsmanÉ; (xii) the supervision effected by the 
Parliamentary Committee on Justice.91 
 
Similarly, in the Klass case, the Court describes the multiple Òlimitative conditionsÓ92 on state action, 
asserting that Òunder the law there exists an administrative procedure designed to ensure that 
measures are not ordered haphazardly, irregularly or without due and proper consideration.Ó93 Add 
to this the multiple independent supportive props of oversight (Òthe Minister is bound every month 
to provide the G 10 Commission with an account of the measures he has ordered,Ó and ÒThe 
Commission membersÉare completely independent in the exercise of their functions,Ó94 Òthe 
democratic character is reflected in the balanced membership of the Parliamentary Board,Ó95), and 
one can see that when taken in the context of a solid-structure schema, any haphazard or irregular 
feature, any unbalanced measure, or non-independent functioning of duties causes the structure to 
fail or be subject to failure. In this way, the concrete image schema is used to attribute features of 
that schema to functions of the law. If it is a question of the quality of the law, we are reasoning 
with the embodied quality of strong structures. Figure 7.4 shows a sketch of this kind of embodied 
metaphor, where the underlying structure schema is used to make inferences that would normally 
concern the qualities of strong structures to the judgement made about the quality of the law. 
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Fig. 7.4 Metaphoric fit 
 
In both Klass and Leander, the Court reasoned that given the multiple independent and flexible 
mechanisms to prevent abuse of authority, the applicants' requests to recognise the infringement 
of their  Art. 8 rights were unfounded . LetÕs take a further example. 
 
In Weber and Saravia, the applicantsÕ appeal on the grounds that the quality of the law infringed 
upon their Art. 8 rights was also denied. Interestingly, in this case the Court used distinct image 
schemas to encapsulate the competing arguments of the applicants and the government. For 
instance, in describing the harm caused to the applicants by surveillance, the image schema of a 
tree was used (a rich domain variant of the structure schema): 
The Federal Intelligence Service was entitled to monitor all telecommunications 
within its reach without any reason or previous suspicion. Its monitoring powers 
therefore inhibited open communication and struck at the roots of democratic 
society.96 
 
In a later section, the Court then made reference to the applicants' argument by mixing the tree 
structure with the schema of CONTAINMENT: 
The fact that interception was limited to content of Òrelevance for the intelligence 
serviceÓ Éas a result of the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, was 
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not sufficient to constrain effectively the monitoring powers of the Federal 
Intelligence Service.97 
 
Contrast this to the Court's portrayal of the governmentÕs argument, in which we find a 
predominance of the more familiar structures as buildings metaphor:98 
Éthe Federal Constitutional Court raised the threshold for interception by finding 
that such an offence could be serious enough to justify monitoring only if it was 
capable of threatening monetary stability in Germany. Surveillance could be 
ordered only on a reasoned application by the President of the Federal 
Intelligence Service or his deputy and if the establishment of the factsÉ99 
 
Now compare this wording to the language used where the Court did find reason to accept that 
the circumstances gave rise to an Art. 8 violation.  
 
For instance, in Rotaru, the Court again describes the government's and the applicant's arguments 
in different schematic terms. When assessing whether there was interference on the government's 
part, the Court employed several image schemas: CONTAINMENT, CONTROL, and MECHANISMS. 
For instance,  
As to the alleged impossibility of refuting the information, the Government 
maintained that, on the contrary, it was open to the applicant to refute untrue 
information but that he had not made use of the appropriate remedies.100 
 
Here, the Court found in Mr. Rotaru's favour. To examine the quality of the Romanian law and 
determine whether it was of a good enough (or I should say high enough) standard, the Court 
employs the traditional structural metaphor. In considering whether the measure in question had a 
basis in the law, the Court described this as asking ÒwhetherÉthe organisation and operation of 
the RIS, which was likewise relied on by the Government, can provide the legal basis for these 
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measures.Ó101 It found that the Romanian government's actions were grounded in the national law. 
However, when describing the quality of the law in terms of its foreseeability and necessity, the 
Court ruled that the structure was lacking the integrity required of a strong structure (Ò[n]o 
provision of domestic law, however, lays down any limits on the exercise of those powers.Ó102; 
ÒÉthe ground allowing such interferences is not laid down with sufficient precision.Ó103). On the other 
hand, when describing the applicantÕs claim, the Court used a higher measure of verticality (ÒHe 
argued that the circumstances that had given rise to the application had not fundamentally 
changedÓ104). Whether or not this is how the applicant and government argued their respective 
cases themselves is a different question, and could be a topic for future research (as discussed in 
Chapter 9). What can clearly be seen is the justificatory rhetorical wrangling the Court uses in 
describing both arguments, and the conclusions they arrive at that are inferred from those 
metaphorically fit schemas. 
 
One further example. Recall that Malone v. The United Kingdom similarly involved the tapping of the 
applicantÕs telephone. In Malone, we can see a clearer instance of the Court vying with different 
image schematic frames resulting in different inferences and interpretations. When reasoning 
between the various framings given in the pleadings, the Court noted that,  
the pleadings revealed a fundamental difference of view as to the effect, if any, of 
the Post Office Act 1969 in imposing legal restraints on the purposes for which 
and the manner in which interception of communications may lawfully be 
authorised by the Secretary of State.105 
 
That Òdifference of viewÓ is best highlighted by the framing applied by the Vice Chancellor of the 
Chancery Division of the High Court, Sir Robert Megarry, where the claim originated. The Vice 
Chancellor, reasoning through the applicant's many configurations of how privacy might be 
conceptualised, Òheld in substance that the practice of tapping on behalf of the policeÉwas legal 
and accordingly dismissed the action.Ó106 In considering the question of whether the wire-tapping 
was illegal, he was not concerned with other analogical extensions of communications interception, 
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and they were discarded, and Sir Megarry focused exclusively on Òtapping which consists of the 
making of recordings by Post Office officials in some part of the existing telephone system, and the 
making of those recordings available to police officers for the purposes of transcription and use.Ó107  
He refuted the idea that the tapping violated any Òright of property (as distinct from copyright) in 
words transmitted along telephone linesÓ108 or ÒconfidentialityÓ109, and further argued that telephone 
tapping, Òdid not involve any act of trespassÓ and thus, for Malone, Òno assistance could be derived 
from cases dealing with other kinds of warrantÓ110, such as warrants for the search of a premises. He 
concluded that in spite of deficiencies in the English system of law, it was not within his purview to 
decide the matter himself as Ò[a]ny regulation of so complex a matter as telephone tapping is 
essentially a matter for ParliamentÉÓ111. Given that the English system did not require him to 
enforce the ConventionÕs interpretation of privacy, and in view of the UK's existing legislation 
relating to the legality of the uses of Post Office interception, he sided with the government.  
 
What is particularly interesting for the current study is the Vice Chancellor's characterisations of 
the English system and its European counterpart. When focusing on the tenets the English 
Common Law system, he uses the image schema of bodily structure and animism; when focusing 
on the requirements of the Convention, he uses the familiar schema of the law as structure. In 
regards to the English system, he states in full, 
It may perhaps be that the common law is sufficiently fertile to achieve what is 
required by the first limb of [the above-stated proviso]: possible ways of 
expressing such a rule may be seen in what I have already said. But I see the 
greatest difficulty in the common law framing the safeguards required by the 
second limb. Various institutions or offices would have to be brought into being to 
exercise various defined functions. The more complex and indefinite the subject-
matter the greater the difficulty in the court doing what it is really appropriate, 
and only appropriate, for the legislature to do. Furthermore, I find it hard to see 
what there is in the present case to require the English courts to struggle with 
such a problem. Give full rein to the Convention, and it is clear that when the 
object of the surveillance is the detection of crime, the question is not whether 
there ought to be a general prohibition of all surveillance, but in what 
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circumstances, and subject to what conditions and restrictions, it ought to be 
permitted. It is those circumstances, conditions and restrictions which are at the 
centre of this case; and yet it is they which are the least suitable for 
determination by judicial decision.112 
 
Compare this framing to that of the protection required under the Convention, which is 
dominated by a mixture of MECHANISM and STRUCTURE schemas, 
Ò... Not a single one of these safeguards is to be found as a matter of established 
law in England, and only a few corresponding provisions exist as a matter of 
administrative procedureÉÓ113 
Ò...it is impossible to read the judgment in the Klass case without it becoming 
abundantly clear that a system which has no legal safeguards whatever has small 
chance of satisfying the requirements of that Court...Ó114  
ÒÉEven if the system [in operation in England] were to be considered adequate 
in its conditions, it is laid down merely as a matter of administrative procedure, so 
that it is unenforceable in law, and as a matter of law could at any time be altered 
without warning or subsequent notification.Ó115 [leading to a weakness in foundation] 
 
He summarises that ÒÉ[c]ertainly in law any Ôadequate and effective safeguards against abuseÕ are 
wantingÉÓ. ÒIn lawÓ, in this sense, has better metaphorical links to STRUCTURE than to 
CONTAINMENT, given the above framing. He concludes with the imperative, ÒI therefore find it 
impossible to see how English law could be said to satisfy the requirements of the Convention.Ó 
When referring to the Vice-ChancellorÕs ruling and its reading by the Commission, the Court 
evokes the verticality model of STRUCTURE,  
Whilst the exact legal basis of the executiveÕs power in this respect was the 
subject of some dispute, it was common ground that the settled practice of 
intercepting communications on behalf of the police in pursuance of a warrant 
issued by the Secretary of State for the purposes of detecting and preventing 
crime, and hence the admitted interception of one of the applicantÕs telephone 
conversations, were lawful under the law of England and Wales. The legality of 
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this power to intercept was established in relation to telephone communications in 
the judgment of Sir Robert MegarryÉ116  
Given that it was lawful, the Court continues that,  
The issue to be determined is therefore whether, under domestic law, the 
essential elements of the power to intercept communications were laid down 
with reasonable precision in accessible legal rules that sufficiently indicated the 
scope and manner of exercise of the discretion conferred on the relevant 
authorities.117 
 
In discussing this question, the Court does not adopt the Vice-Chancellor's body schema of Òfirst 
limbÓ and Òsecond limbÓ but stays with the more familiar spatial terms of Òfirst pointÓ and Òsecond 
point.Ó118 In fact, it singles out the different bodily reading, as unsatisfactory, 
It was also somewhat surprising, so the Commission observed, that no mention 
of section 80 as regulating the issue of warrants should have been made in the 
White Paper published by the Government in the wake of Sir Robert MegarryÕs 
judgment (see paragraph 21 above). Furthermore, the Home Secretary, when 
presenting the White Paper to Parliament in April 1980, expressed himself in 
terms suggesting that the existing arrangements as a whole were matters of 
administrative practice not suitable for being "embodied in legislation"119 
 
Given the divergence in the government's, the applicant's, and the Commission's interpretations, 
the Court found the English Law wanting in its obligation to establish a system with foreseeable 
consequences, particularly when one of those submissions was framed within an ill-fitting and 
inappropriate rhetoric. The Court chose the option with metaphorical fit, which lends support to 
the metaphoric fit hypothesis outside of the controlled conditions of the laboratory. It is an 
example of the kind of rhetorical choices a court might make if we are to take the metaphoric fit 
hypothesis seriously when considering what it looks like in the wild. One might argue that this is 
simply a rhetorical choice of the Court in choosing its terms. This is an acceptable retort, but one 
that nonetheless assumes the premise that rhetorical choices are free from any form of constraint; 
a premise which the previous two chapters have offered a fair amount of evidence to show is 
untenable.   
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The evidence provided thus far would suggest that the explanation for the Court's use of framing 
in a consistent and often constrained manner is more likely to be found in the realm of cognitive 
linguistics than in the traditional legal notions of weight, balance, and ultimately, coherence. 
Through the use of conceptual blending, framing, and metaphoric fit, the Court builds a structure 
of law that asks: what use x law is to the greater structure of the Law itself? The previous two 
chapters have looked into the intricacies of margin of appreciation and spatial constructs of the EU 
privacy regime, and the force of the framing of precedent to inform future cases. They have 
considered the form and content of the rules surrounding privacy, but have not established what 











ÒBelieve me, dear Wilhelm, I did not allude to you when I spoke 
so severely of those who advise resignation to inevitable fate. I 
did not think it possible for you to indulge such a sentiment. But 
in fact you are right. I only suggest one objection. In this world 
one is seldom reduced to make a selection between two 
alternatives. There are as many varieties of conduct and opinion 
as there are turns of feature between an aquiline nose and a flat 
one.Ó 
 
-! Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.1 
 
 
The two fundamental questions throughout this work are: how is privacy framed, and how are 
competing frames weighed against each other?  By asking these questions, the intention was to 
broach and ideally answer the larger, theoretical questions of how universal principles can be 
applied to specific cases by using precedent and, ultimately, how a coherent body of law is made. 
Asking this in the specific context of the Schrems case has provided a sample study which raises 
foundational questions of its own; namely, how does the breadth of interference compare to a 
deep interference, as explained in privacy jurisprudence, and how does the court make use of 
those framings to arrive at a degree of certainty in their decisions? These enquiries were resolved 
by looking at the notions of metaphorical framing, conceptual blending throughout the precedent, 
and the overarching idea of metaphoric fit. We saw ways in which competing notions were 
combined to blend differing metaphorical frames, ways in which frames were eliminated and 
deemed to be less weighty or less persuasive than others, and ultimately how they interacted 
throughout the chain of precedent. These processes all followed the general proscriptions laid out 
by conceptual metaphor theory and cognitive linguistics. If our goal is to show pattern recognition, 
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and if legal certainty and coherence is tied into being able to describe that pattern, then the tenets 
of CMT can certainly give our search that direction. 
 
The Court doesnÕt use its jurisprudence to fit the circumstances of facts or privacy into a coherent, 
essentialised whole with necessary and sufficient conditions, as implied by the use of a traditional 
legal test. At least not directly. The Court proceeds indirectly through the use of inferences made 
from a more concrete notion of what the law requires. Inferences made by applying conceptual 
metaphor to each element in the legal test.  The notion of privacy is built (metaphor intended) by 
an argument structure with conditions which are both necessary and sufficient, like proportionality 
and margin of appreciation. However, those conditions must have a certain quality, and that quality 
is judged by inference from a spatially based idealised cognitive model of what a proper structure is 
made of, looks like, and does.  
 
What remains to be explored is the rationalisation of the link between data protection and privacy. 
In order to do this, we must first look at alternative framings of what the law requires to further 
buttress this argument by analysing the content of dissenting opinion. Some of the dissenting 
opinion anticipates the tentativness of the link between data protection and privacy. It asks; what 
connects traditional privacy case law to the idea of data protection? We see hints of this elusive 
link in cases involving surveillance and the retention of surveillance records, but in Schrems, we have 
yet to discover exactly what the personal of personal data is that propels it into the domain of 
private life. 
 
1. Dissenting Opinions in Rotaru v Romania 
 
Let us return for a moment to Rotaru. The Court held (by a margin of 16 to 1) that there had 
been an infringement of RotaruÕs article 8 rights. The dissenting judge expressed an interesting and 
singular view on exactly why private life is private. Judge BonelloÕs primary concern was ÒOpening up 
Article 8 to É new perspectivesÓ2 that, Òwould add an exciting extra dimension to human rights 
protection.Ó3 If this were to occur, it is a conceptual shift that, in his opinion, should be explicit and 
                                            




not glossed over. In BonelloÕs words, Òthe Court, in my view, ought to handle this reform frontally, 
and not tuck it in, almost surreptitiously, as a penumbral fringe of the right to privacy.Ó4 Bonello, 
known for his rhetorical flair, embodies a plethora of divergent conceptual metaphors in framing his 
assertion that there was no violation of Article 8 in this case. Recall that in the judgment in Rotaru, 
the Court weighed the applicantÕs claim and the quality of the Romanian law by means of the LAW 
IS STRUCTURE schema, as well as incorporating CONTAINMENT and MECHANISM. Judge Bonello has 
a different take on whether privacy itself, as a concept, fits into this scheme, and he raises the issue 
through his conception of what makes an act private and therefore applicable to the STRUCTURE 
schema itself. He states in his dissent: 
Article 8 protects the individual's private life. At the core of that protection lies 
the right of every person to have the more intimate segments of his being 
excluded from public inquisitiveness and scrutiny. There are reserved zones in our 
person and in our spirit which the Convention requires should remain locked. It is 
illegitimate to probe for, store, classify or divulge data which refer to those 
innermost spheres of activity, orientation or conviction, sheltered behind the walls of 
confidentiality.5 
 
Judge Bonello lays out the difference in his formulation of the requirements of the quality of law in 
regards to privacy. The private is set in the framing of locked containment where it is beyond the 
purview of data or information that flows, or can be caused to flow, from within that inner sphere 
or zone. Contrast this with his notion of public data, Òactivities which are, by their very nature, public 
and which are actually nourished by publicity, are well outside the protection of Article 8.Ó6 Data, 
information, or public vs private activities are sublimated to the domain of NATURE and the rich 
domains of fluid, flow, natural growth, etc. Though the spatial elements are retained from the 
visibility schema, this framing sees the public as an area nourished by light and visibility wherein the 
nature of an act, or information about that act, is framed as an organism that needs publicity 
(light/vision in this sense) to flourish.  
 
He refers to the information gathered and stored by the Romanian security services (concerning 
Rotaru's political affiliations and his political writings) as being Ò[e]minently publicÓ7: He states, 
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Òpolitical and publishing activism requires, and depends on, the maximum publicity for its existence 
and success,Ó a statement that, although not metaphorical in itself, reflects the framing of PUBLICITY 
IS NOURISHMENT as a common premise. Bonello asks, Ò[i]n what way does the storage of records 
relating to the eminently public pursuits of an individual violate his right to privacy?Ó8 and then 
makes a distinction between Òpublic activismÓ9 and the type/classes of data that the Court has 
traditionally viewed as private: 
such as medical and health data, sexual activity and orientation, family kinship 
and, possibly, professional and business relations and other intimate areas in 
which public intrusion would be an unwarranted encroachment on the natural 
barriers of self.10 
 
Bonello seeks a common thread to reiterate and reinstate what he sees as the natural barriers of 
public and private. A thread we will return to in a moment. The major criticism articulated in 
BonelloÕs dissent is his condemnation of the conflation of the infringements on Article 8 with the 
storage of RotaruÕs criminal records. He refers twice to his dissatisfaction with the CourtÕs 
judgement in section 44, which contains the discussion of RotaruÕs criminal records and whether 
the storage of that information should be considered under Art. 8 ¤ 1. The Court, following the 
traditional visiblitity/structure/weight blend described in the previous two chapters, found that, 
Òwhen systematically collected and stored in a file held by agents of the State, [it] falls within the 
scope of 'private life' for the purposes of Article 8 ¤ 1 of the Convention.Ó11 Bonello, however, 
quite vehemently disagrees with the caveat that it is the Òstorage of criminal records,Ó12 and not the 
Òwanton and illegitimate disclosure of the contents of those records,Ó13 that he takes issue with. It is 
interesting to note Bonello's repeated use of the sphere schema when conceptually framing the 
distinction between public/private (allbeit a common metaphorical device). His issue with the 
storage of Rotaru's information is twofold, and relates to problematic aspects of the nature of the 
information itself: Òthat of the falsity of the information, and that of its defamatory nature.Ó14 He 
continues,  
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Some of the data in the applicant's security file actually referred to another 
person sharing the applicant's name, and not to him. This, undoubtedly, 
rendered that information ÒfalseÓ in the applicant's regard. But does falsity 
relating to matters in the public domain alchemise that public information into 
private data? The logic behind this sequence of propositions simply passes me 
by.15 
The choice of the word alchemise in this context should be telling of the different frames that 
Judge Bonello applied to shape his decision. While the use of the alchemy metaphor (to transmute 
one substance to another) could arguably be deliberate, the intentionality would not take away 
from the evidence of a different framing of the concepts of private and public information. 
Furthermore, there are a number of other facets to this statement that are important to note. 
 
It isnÕt simply the use of the alchemy metaphor that is intriguing, it is the coherence of that framing 
to the NATURALISM conceptual framework Judge Bonello has set up. It makes use of characteristics 
from within each frame space and extends them into a coherent whole. Private actions are those 
contained in a locked sphere from which information can flow or be forced/allowed to flow. Public 
actions are those that live (using this word intentionally) outside this sphere of private information 
and action. The role of the fundamental right to private life is to protect that sphere from being 
penetrated and thus compromised, except in situations of dire need for national security, or for 
use in pursuit of a legitimate aim. In BonelloÕs view, the law under review must be one that cannot 
violate that rule. Let us think of the private sphere as possessing the physicality of a hard, semi-
impenetrable shell. If it is fundamental right we are talking about, that shellÕs hardness would 
increase and the structure would become more resistant. The realities, situations, and actions that 
live outside this shell, necessarily live in a world that requires them to been seen and visible. Their 
substance and make up must, therefore, be different to that of the things inside this shell, if we are 
to take the conceptual metaphor seriously. So, by inverting their places - the act of calling 
something that thrives outside the protection of the shell an 'inside' element, and vice versa - must 
change their respective substances altogether. It is no surprise, then, that perhaps the alchemy the 
Court employs Òpasses [Judge Bonnello] byÓ. 
 
This disagreement is a perfect example of corrective framing. In short, corrective framing is a 
deliberate alteration of the frame of a concept  so as to create a context where the two 
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explanatory frames are in diametric opposition, and then using that second frameÕs constituent 
attributes to explain a phenomenon, category, or conceptual metaphor.16 In this case, it takes the 
form of an ÒA is B, not CÓ construction, a construction commonly found in political and media 
rhetoric.17 For Bonnello, privacy is a natural sphere of containment, not the interaction of structure, 
weight, and visibility. By using the construction he views unfavourably, Bonnello is asking the reader 
directly: which one draws a more coherent picture? Or rather, which better fits their understanding 
of the concept, his own or the framing applied by the Court? The struggle here is to find a 
common thread which establishes the concrete difference between one substance and another. 
And, essentially, this is just a slightly different way of phrasing the fundamental investigation of this 
research: what makes the private, private? Even when certain criteria can be laid out which allow us 
to say that these types of acts or issues belong in the private rather than the public domain (such 
as those pertaining to our intimate our sexual life), the argumentation still relies on conceptual 
framing to make the point.  This argument can be given some more clarity by referring back to 
Dudgeon. 
2. Dissenting Opinion in Dudgeon v The United Kingdom 
 
In the Dudgeon case, Jeffery Dudgeon complained Òagainst the existence in Northern Ireland of 
laws which have the effect of making certain homosexual acts between consenting adult males 
criminal offences.Ó18 The Northern Irish government began to look at reforming the existing laws (in 
force since 1865 and 1885) that make sodomy a crime between consenting (male) adults. After a 
process of consultation with institutions and the public, it was decided that the reform would not 
take place. One of the many reasons given for not enacting the reform was that the law was rarely, 
if ever, enforced. In 1976 (5 years before the case was brought to court), the police entered Mr. 
DudgeonÕs home on a drug warrant and, 
Personal papers, including correspondence and diaries, belonging to the applicant 
in which were described homosexual activities were also found and seized. As a 
result, he was asked to go to a police station where for about four and a half 
hours he was questioned, on the basis of these papers, about his sexual life.19 
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Ultimately, no charges of Ògross indecencyÓ, as termed by the 19th century acts, were pressed, and 
Mr. DudgeonÕs effects were returned to him after a period of one year. The Court, in determining 
the infringement of his Article 8 rights, decided 15 to 4 that his right to privacy had been breached. 
 
As documented in Chapter 6, there was no obvious dominant construction (in numerical terms) in 
the metaphors and frames used by the Court in Dudgeon. However, this isnÕt to say a closer look 
might not reveal more about the conception of privacy which comes across, particularly if we 
examine the separate opinions of the dissenting judges.  
 
In the determination of the majority, the Court considered how to decide, Òwhether the 
interference is aimed at Ôthe protection of moralsÕ or Ôthe protection of the rights and freedoms of 
othersÕ, the two purposes relied on by the Government.Ó20 In deciding between the two, the Court 
ultimately stated that, Òit is somewhat artificial in this context to draw a rigid distinction between 
Ôprotection of the rights and freedoms of othersÕ and Ôprotection of moralsÕ,Ó21 because although  
the strength of feeling in Northern Ireland against the proposed change, and in 
particular the strength of the view that it would be seriously damaging to the 
moral fabric of Northern Irish societyÉ the general aim pursued by the 
legislation remains the protection of morals in the sense of moral standards 
obtaining in Northern IrelandÉ22  
as, 
"protection of the rights and freedoms of others", when meaning the 
safeguarding of the moral interests and welfare of certain individuals or classes of 
individuals who are in need of special protection for reasons such as lack of 
maturity, mental disability or state of dependence, amounts to one aspect of 
"protection of morals"23 
 
In conceptualising morality, the Court relies on two main metaphors: MORALITY IS A FABRIC24 and 
MORALITY IS CLIMATE/NATURAL FORCE25. Both are rich domain variants of MORALITY AS A WHOLE 
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SUBSTANCE, MORALITY IS AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM. These, in turn, are variants of the structure 
metaphor. This general source domain is clear, for instance, when the Court discusses the necessity 
of the legislation to protect morals with reference to Òthe moral ethos of society as a whole.Ó26 The 
understanding of the underlying debate surrounding the notion of morality, as one of the 
preconditions for a State to interfere with the private life of a citizen, is a crucial precondition to 
understanding privacy itself. The framing of morality as a whole substance brings its own inferences 
into play, and in turn affects the argumentation of the Court and the basis of its dissents. 
 
Take, for instance, the Court's consideration of the will of the public in opposition to 
homosexuality in Northern Ireland, where the Court refers to it as, Òa strong body of opposition 
stemming from a genuine and sincere conviction.Ó27 Reading Òa strong body of oppositionÓ in the 
context of an effect on a fabric requires the force to be strong enough to do more than pull on a 
small thread. Rather than conceptualising morality in terms of the structural (building variant) 
metaphors the Court is want to use in describing the function of law where a small change in the 
foundations of the structure will have devastating consequences, through conceptual metaphor the 
Court can infer that without substantive evidence showing a devastating force on the whole of the 
fabric, the necessity of an interference cannot be justified. Thus, it can rightly conclude that, 
[n]o evidence has been adduced to show that this has been injurious to moral 
standards in Northern Ireland or that there has been any public demand for 
stricter enforcement of the law. It cannot be maintained in these circumstances 
that there is a "pressing social need" to make such acts criminal offences, there 
being no sufficient justification provided by the risk of harm to vulnerable 
sections of society requiring protection or by the effects on the public.28 
 
Looking at morality in terms of an integrated and natural system (e.g. climate, climate acting on a 
terrestrial body, etc.), the Court can lean towards a similar conclusion. 
[T}he moral attitudes towards male homosexuality in Northern Ireland and the 
concern that any relaxation in the law would tend to erode existing moral 
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standards cannot, without more, warrant interfering with the applicantÕs private 
life to such an extent.29 
 
If the Court used the structural framing of morality, it might conceivably have a more protectionist 
attitude towards a small change. But here it is conceptualised as a force acting on a whole body 
which can withstand the pressure (societal fabric) vs the point concept of the individual and the 
application of a targeted vertical pressure (as discussed in the previous chapters). In this framing, Mr 
Dudgeon has the weight of the law as a real Òthreat hanging over him.Ó30 The dissents in Dudgeon 
see things differently. 
 
The first of the dissents discussed the precondition of the protection of morality by a State to 
interfere with private life by dissecting the idea into a question of a private vs a public morality. In 
essence, it questions whether sexual life itself is to be judged as a private or public act, given sexÕs 
(supposed) moral entanglements. This is diametrically opposed to the CourtÕs firm judgment that 
sex is Òan essentially private manifestation of the human personality.Ó31 Judge Walsh asks, 
Éwhether sexual morality is Ôonly private moralityÕ or whether it has an 
inseparable social dimension. Sexual behaviour is determined more by cultural 
influences than by instinctive needs. Cultural trends and expectations can create 
drives mistakenly thought to be intrinsic instinctual urges.32 
 
Judge Walsh (we must set his questionable scientific credentials aside), establishes a distinction 
between the homosexual and heterosexual act when constructing a legal category of Òprivate 
family lifeÓ. As stated in Art. 8¤1, 
It is to be noted that Article 8 ¤ 1 (art. 8­1) of the Convention speaks of "private 
and family life". If the ejusdem generis rule is to be applied, then the provision 
should be interpreted as relating to private life in that context as, for example, 
the right to raise oneÕs children according to oneÕs own philosophical and 
religious tenets and generally to pursue without interference the activities which 
are akin to those pursued in the privacy of family life and as such are in the 
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course of ordinary human and fundamental rights. No such claim can be made 
for homosexual practices.33 
 
He attempts to link private family life to the concept of reproduction and 'the traditional family' by 
invoking the FAMILY LIFE IS/MORALITY IS/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ARE A JOURNEY metaphor in 
statements such as ÒpursuingÓ, Òthe course of ordinaryÉrights,Ó, that Ò[v]irtue cannot be legislated 
into existence but non­virtue can be if the legislation renders excessively difficult the struggle after 
virtue,Ó or finally that, Ò[t]he ultimate justification of law is that it serves moral ends.Ó34 
 
Perhaps more tellingly, he highlights the risk posed by the development of a public morality by 
framing the role of morality as inseparably linked to that of the law, through references to the 
CourtÕs verticality and its control frames: ÒThe legal arrangement and prescriptions set up to 
regulate sexual behaviour are very important formative factors in the shaping of cultural and social 
institutions.Ó35 But his sense of morality is not the small force on a whole substance; it is an obstacle 
in the way of a pursuit of virtue, and thus even small pressures can have a great affect, meaning 
that sexual behaviour cannot be treated in the same way as other types of fundamental rights, 
In all cultures matters of sexual morality are particularly sensitive ones and the 
effects of certain forms of sexual immorality are not as susceptible of the same 
precise objective assessment that is possible in matters such as torture or 
degrading and inhuman treatment.36 
 
So, when Judge Walsh speaks of, what he terms as, sexual immorality having Òan eroding effect on 
the moral ethos of the community in question,Ó37 this erosion doesn't impact a whole substance, as 
in the CourtÕs example, but is a form of erosion that makes the pursuit of virtue and justice an 
impossibility.38  
                                            
33 id at ¤23. 
34 id at ¤14. Emphasis added. 
35 id at ¤15. Emphasis added. 
36 id at ¤18. 
37 id at ¤14. 
38 Judge Matscher takes a similar journey based approach: ÒAt paragraph 51, it is said that the adjective "necessary" 
implies the existence of a "pressing social need" for the interference in question... To my mind, however, once it has 
been granted that an aim is legitimate for the purposes of Article 8 ¤ 2 (art. 8­2), any measure directed towards the 
accomplishment of that aim is necessary if failure to take the measure would create a risk that that aim would not be 
achieved. It is only in this context that one can examine the necessity for a certain measure and, adding a further factor, 
the proportionality between the value attaching to the aim and the seriousness of the measure (see paragraphs 54 and 




Judge Zeika approaches his dissent in a slightly different manner by mixing the metaphors of 
MORALITY IS CLIMATE/NATURAL FORCE (where MORALITY should be understood to mean solely 
public morality) with the verticality of GOOD IS UP. For instance, he posits that his proximity to a 
religious nation (Cyprus) puts him in Òa better position in forecasting the public outcry and the 
turmoil which would ensue if such laws are repealed or amended in favour of homosexuals either 
in Cyprus or in Northern Ireland.Ó39 Given that Ò[m]oral conceptions to a great degree are rooted in 
religious beliefsÓ40 and that the Òreligious­mindedÉadhere to moral standards which are centuriesÕ 
oldÓ41, rather than erode the fabric of public morality, the turmoil unleashed by any such changes to 
the legal framework would uproot the society's centuries'-old tree of morality. And this is 
unthinkable for a tree that is held in the highest of esteem: 
we must not forget and must bear in mind that respect is also due to the people 
holding the opposite view, especially in a country populated by a great majority 
of such people who are completely against unnatural immoral practicesÉA 
democratic society is governed by the rule of the majority. It seems to me 
somewhat odd and perplexing, in considering the necessity of respect for oneÕs 
private life, to underestimate the necessity of keeping a law in force for the 
protection of morals held in high esteem by the majority of peopleÉA change of 
the law so as to legalise homosexual activities in private by adults is very likely to 
cause many disturbances in the country in question.42 
 
Judge Walsh, Judge Matscher, and Judge Zeika all view private and family life with a distinction or 
separation between homosexual and heterosexual sex (and any related acts or behaviours), and as 
such cannot conceive of the former within the same rubric of protected intimate private life 
befitting the latter.43 These dissents cannot be ascribed in full to failures of basic scientific 
                                                                                                                                             
assessment whether the aim itself is legitimate, something that the judgment appears to do when it links "necessary" 
with "pressing social need". Dudgeon v. The United Kingdom (Separate opinion of Judge Matscher) at para. 5. Emphasis 
added. 
39 Dudgeon v. The United Kingdom (Separate opinion of Judge Zeika) at ¤2. Emphasis added. 
40 ibid. Emphasis added. 
41 id at ¤1.  
42 id at ¤3. Emphasis added. 
43 ÒThe judgment of the Court does not constitute a declaration to the effect that the particular homosexual practices 
which are subject to penalty by the legislation in question virtually amount to fundamental human rights. However, that 
will not prevent it being hailed as such by those who seek to blur the essential difference between homosexual and 
heterosexual activities.Ó Dudgeon v. The United Kingdom (Separate opinion of Judge Walsh) at ¤20; ÒOf course, the 
applicant and the organisations behind him are seeking more: they are seeking the express and formal repeal of the 
laws in force, that is to say a "charter" declaring homosexuality to be an alternative equivalent to heterosexuality, with 
all the consequences that that would entail (for example, as regards sex education). However, this is in no way 
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understanding, they are in part catalysed by the ways in which morality is framed to begin with. By 
breaking the notion of sex into the categories of moral and immoral sex, their respective 
conceptions of morality can influence how they form their opinions as to whether there is an 
infraction of a right to private family life to begin with, or whether a recognised interference can be 
justified. 
 
 It is interesting to note that the dissents in both cases - Rotaru and Dudgeon-  use ideas of 
naturalism to describe a public and private divide. Neither of these conceptions fits neatly into the 
coherent whole of the structure/vision/weight metaphors in the CourtÕs jurisprudence (at least not 
in the network we have looked at here), and instead use corrective framing devices to deliver their 
message (albeit in the second case, a rather abhorrent one). Why is that? LetÕs return to this in a 
moment. 
3. ÒBoundÓ by law: 
 
In sections 38 and 39 in Schrems, the Court stated, 
It should be recalled first of all that the provisions of Directive 95/46, inasmuch 
as they govern the processing of personal data liable to infringe fundamental 
freedoms, in particular the right to respect for private life, must necessarily be 
interpreted in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter44 
and, 
It is apparent from Article 1 of Directive 95/46 and recitals 2 and 10 in its 
preamble that that directive seeks to ensure not only effective and complete 
protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, in 
particular the fundamental right to respect for private life with regard to the 
processing of personal data, but also a high level of protection of those 
fundamental rights and freedoms. The importance of both the fundamental right 
to respect for private life, guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter, and the 
fundamental right to the protection of personal data, guaranteed by Article 8 
thereof, is, moreover, emphasised in the case-law of the Court45 
 
                                                                                                                                             
required by Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention.Ó Dudgeon v. The United Kingdom (Separate opinion of Judge Matscher) 
at para. 14. 
44 Schrems at ¤38 
45 Schrems at ¤39. 
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The cited case law refers to the link between Article 7 and 8 in the Charter, which brings us 
straight back to the question: what connects privacy and personal data?  
 
One answer, given by the ÒArticle 29 Working PartyÓ46 (Òthe European advisory board concerning 
data protection and privacyÓ47), is that it is through the development of the legislative history from 
ECHRÕs Article 8 to the CharterÕs articleÕs 7 and 8. Beginning from the ECHRÕs definition of the 
concept of protection of Òprivate lifeÓ and  the conditions of a Òlegal basisÓ of interferences with 
that right48, the Council of Europe's Convention 10849 subsequently introduced Òthe protection of 
personal data as a separate concept.Ó50 They explain, 
The underlying idea at the time was not that processing of personal data should 
always be seen as 'interference with privacy', but rather that to protect 
everyone's fundamental rights and freedoms, and notably their right to privacy, 
processing of personal data should always fulfil certain conditions.51 
 
This is also stressed by the OECD guidelinesÕ emphasis on ÒlawfulnessÓ in the protection of 
personal data.52 This is all incorporated into Directive 95/46 where, 
In addition to a broader requirement set forth in its Article 6(1)(a) that personal 
data must be processed 'fairly and lawfully', the Directive added a specific set of 
additional requirements, not yet present as such in either Convention 108 or the 
OECD Guidelines: the processing of personal data must be based on one of the 
six legal grounds specified in Article 7.53 
 
These articles and their content are enshrined in The Charter, where the Òprovisions reinforce 
both the importance of the principle of lawfulness and the need for an adequate legal basis for the 
processing of personal data.Ó54 It isnÕt hard to see the structural metaphorical precepts being 
                                            
46 See, Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 7 of Directive 
95/46/EC Adopted on 9 April 2014. 
47 See Article 30 of Directive 95/46/EC and Article 15 of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) entry into force 31/07/2002 
48 Opinion 06/2014 at 6. 
49 Convention 108 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data. (opened for 
signature on 28/1/1981) (entry into force 01/10/1985) 
50 Opinion 06/2014 at 6. 
51 id at 6-7. 
52 id at 7. 
53 ibid. 
54 id at 8. 
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interpreted when data protection is understood as relating to the quality of law vs an infringement 
on privacy. Cue BonelloÕs ire.  
 
The interpretation is that the quality of the law must be read Òin the lightÓ of fundamental 
freedoms, in particular the right to privacy. They are indissolubly linked. How that reading affects 
the notions of the quality and legitimacy of a law (or the processing of data) has been the remit of 
this study. While the Art29 Working Group might decide that personal data was introduced as a 
separate concept, they cannot escape that it is structural metaphor that grounds the quality of law. 
To be read in the light of a structure is to be proximally close, and ultimately, to be bound by it. 
The metaphor calls for a way to read legitimate aims that are, to all intents and purposes, 
unavoidable. Through the use of the negation of legitimate aims that the jurisprudence has set up, 
protection of data is appropriated by the concept of privacy as an extended member of the radial 
category of privacy. It is set within privacyÕs casting light. 
 
The radial categoryÕs innermost layer is comprised of the most intimate rights: those areas which are 
so prototypical in the category of private that they cannot be conceived of in any other way; 
medical data, sexual life, family and children, the home, and correspondence. The next layer out, by 
extension through the use of negating legitimate interference, contains things such as: business 
correspondence and public records. In the outer layer, we could add: data of an identified, or even, 
identifiable person. It is all based on a concept of privacy as a notion measured on the legitimacy of 
the interference with, not the constituents of the category.  
 
Steven Winter makes a similar point about the notion of free speech in the US, 
ÒSpeech,Ó in other words, is a radial category whose central case is characterized 
by the CONDUIT metaphor-system and its cognate, the marketplace of ideas. 
Speaking, writing and publishing are the prototypical cases. First tier extensions 
include the protest march and the demonstration, relatively early additions that 
differ from the central case because they involve conduct implicating pragmatic 
concerns (traffic, congestion) that justify reasonable time, place and manner 
restrictions. Second tier extensions include the non-print media and symbolic 
commercial speech. Thus, the broadcast media are subject to legal mandates - 
the fairness doctrine, the regulation of indecent but non-obscene language - that 
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would not be tolerated for more prototypical mediaÉAs one moves further 
from the core, First Amendment protections progressively weaken.55 
 
This would also seem to be the case with the radial category of privacy. However, unlike the 
category of speech at its Òprenumbral fringesÓ (to use BonelloÕs term), the law must introduce an 
entirely separate act to cover personal data as it canÕt be wrestled in as a prototypical member on 
its own merit. This is exactly what happened, for example, in Directive 95/46. The use of a 
separate category of privacy protection (informational data and particularly its processing) added 
another layer around the radial category of privacy. Privacy is both the delineation of spheres and 
the basis of the laws made to protect it. One can argue about the value or utility of drawing a line 
in the sand somewhere between data and personal data, but that line is drawn through the lens of 
a conceptual path dependence built on metaphors that wade through the borders of the radial 
categories it has set up for itself.   
 
Put simply, path dependence, as noted in Chapter 3, is the idea that preceding events can have 
Òlock-in effectsÓ56 dictating a specific outcome. Legal theorist Oona Hathaway describes it in more 
depth. Much like the work here, HathawayÕs goal is to seek out conceptual change using 
instruments and theories borrowed from outside the law. The disciplines of economics, rational 
choice theory, and evolutionary biology57  provide the backdrop for Hathaway to study the role of 
history in law's determination of concepts named Òpath dependenceÓ.58 In her words, path 
dependence,  
means that an outcome or decision is shaped in specific and systematic ways by 
the historical path leading to it. It entails, in other words, a causal relationship 
between stages in a temporal sequence, with each stage strongly influencing the 
direction of the following stage. At the most basic level, therefore, path 
dependence implies that Òwhat happened at an earlier point in time will affect 
the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in 
time.Ó59 
 
                                            
55 Winter 2001 at 279. 
56 Larsson, Stefan; 2017. Conceptions In The Code: How Metaphors Explain Legal Challenges In Digital Times. Oxford 
University Press at 151 (digital edition). 
57 Hathaway, Oona A.; 2003. 'Path Dependence In The Law: The Course And Pattern Of Legal Change In A Common 
Law System ,' Paper 270 John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Papers 101, at 105. 
58 id at 103. 
59 id at 104. Internal reference omitted. 
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HathawayÕs work is reliant on the premise that it is a ÒcourtÕs adher[ence] to the doctrine of stare 
decisisÓ60that allows us to look at the path dependence of precedent, (though she admits it fits any 
system that Òlook to non-binding decisions for persuasive precedentÓ61). However, as the previous 
chaptersÕ exposition has clearly shown, the model is equally applicable in systems where precedent 
is not legally binding, where the use of metaphor, frames, and conceptual blending still produce 
path dependent effects.  
 
She identifies three types of path dependence: Òincreasing returnsÓ, ÒevolutionaryÓ, and 
ÒsequencingÓ,62 based on theories from economics, evolutionary biology, and rational choice theory 
respectively.63 In the increasing returns theory, Ò[p]ath dependence occurs because once a court 
makes an initial decision, it is less costly to continue down that same path than it is to change to a 
different path.Ó64 In evolutionary path dependence, the Òpossibilities for today and tomorrow are 
determined by the evolutionary changes of the past,Ó irrespective of whether these changes occur 
as a steady process or as the frantic starts and stops of Òpunctuated equilibriaÓ65. Sequencing refers 
to the idea that Òthe order in which the alternatives are consideredÑor the path by which they 
are selectedÑshapes the outcome.Ó66 
 
LetÕs consider each of these strands of path dependence in relation to the evidence presented 
here, using the lens of cognitive linguistics. In HathawayÕs work, increasing returns path dependence, 
 
operates through the gradual building of legal rules upon one another over time. 
Not only does an earlier decision influence the later decisions of courts, but it 
also influences them in a particular way: It makes it more likely that courts will 
choose to resolve similar legal dilemmas in a similar manner.67 
 
She gives the example of a situation where a case Òdoes not constitute formally binding 
precedentÉ[but] the judge may nonetheless draw on the insights and knowledge gained from 
                                            
60 id at 102. 
61 id at 106. 
62 id at 104. 
63 id at 106. 
64 id at 107. 
65 ibid. 
66 id at 108. 
67 id at 127. 
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such cases.Ó68 The evidence presented in Chapters 6 and 7 appears to be in accordance with this 
theory. Both conceptual blending and systems of metaphoric fit give acuity for how ÒinfluenceÓ, 
ÒknowledgeÓ, and ÒinsightsÓ are built. The Òself-reinforcingÓ mechanisms described by increasing 
returns theory can be partially explained by the conceptual dependence built by metaphoric 
framing, and with a tool like cognitive linguistic analysis, a legal scholar can hope to Òpredict the way 
the system will operate.Ó69 
 
The evolutionary paradigm, as Hathaway notes, is not a new insight for traditional jurisprudential 
theory.70  In tracing the history of its use in legal theory, Hathaway highlights the Òclassical 
evolutionary paradigmÓ that enables the system to efficiently cut out weak links through 
competitive rules and principles.71 This Òevolution-to-efficiency argumentÓ, as she calls it, is 
incompatible with the path-dependent model.72 Instead, evolutionary path dependency should be 
understood in concordance with its biological analogue in that,  
Òsurvival of the fittestÓ simply indicates that natural selection favors those animals 
that are most successful at reproducing in a given environment (which of course 
requires that they possess qualities that allow them not only to reproduce 
successfully but also to survive to an age at which they can reproduce).73 
 
It is more about an environment-organism interaction than efficiency or Òobjective perfect[ion].Ó74 
This work has given evidence of that interaction in the process of fitting frames to their precedent 
analogues. Firstly, as it has been shown, this is done through a relation of comparison to 
prototypical group members (rather than correlation with those on the peripheries of a radial 
category), and when it is not rejected by dissent that considers alternate frames. Secondly, 
comporting with HathwayÕs evolutionary path dependence, this change can often be likened to the 
                                            
68 id at 128. 
69 id at 129. 
70 see Cardozo, Benjamin; 1921.ÒThe Nature of the Judicial ProcessÓ at 48-9 ÒThe implications of a decision may in the 
beginning be equivocal. New cases by commentary and exposition extract the essence. At last there emerges a rule or 
principle which becomes a datum, a point of departure, from which new lines will be run, from which new courses will 
be measured. Sometimes the rule or principle is found to have been formulated too narrowly or broadly, and has to 
be reframed. Sometimes it is accepted as a postulate of later reasoning, its origins are forgotten, it becomes a new 
stock of descent, its issue unite with other strains, and persisting permeate the law.Ó as quoted in Hathaway, Oona A.; 
2003 at 135. See also, Elliot, Donald; 1985. 'The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence,' 85 Columbia Law Review 38. 
71 Hathaway, Oona A.; 2003 at 137-8. 
72 ibid. 
73 id at 139. 
74 id at 138. 
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punctuated equilibrium of biology when a new circumstance forces a rethink of an old category.75 
This is the exact circumstance required by the Court in Schrems.  
 
The last of HathawayÕs three models of path dependence, sequencing, is also supported by the 
research's investigation.  The evidence in this work clearly shows a relationship of conceptual 
blending and, furthermore, that hub cases dictate the composition of future cases in a sequenced 
way. Though sometimes gradual and sometimes punctuated, the referenced cases build on existing 
rules, such as the margin of appreciation, by adding new circumstances and conditions for 
consideration. Had Evans or Connors not come before Schrems, or in fact Digital Rights Ireland, the 
combination of structural schemas may have been quite different or, in the least, a different set of 
cases would have been cited to support the same decision and the same framing. Although that 
counterfactual canÕt be tested, in light of the evidence, there is good reason to believe that the 
relationships would have evolved in a different way. What could be interesting for future research 
would be to run an automated analysis of the entire body of the case law, testing different 
conditions by removing certain cases from the network to see which conceptual schemas are 
weakened and/or strengthened by doing so.  
 
All of the concordant evidence notwithstanding, this analysis ultimately does not reach the same 
conclusion as Hathaway. It is her determination that, 
[l]egal change is unpredictable ex ante and nonergotic, and early outcomes may 
become locked in. The law evolves gradually over time, drawing on an existing 
stock of precedent, punctuated by periods of rapid adaptation. And ultimate 
legal outcomes depend significantly on the order in which decisions are made.76 
 
This interpretation bypasses any opportunity to develop a method to forecast models of legal 
change through conceptual path dependence. It is not a weakness of the system, but it is the key 
to escaping its own murky aporias.  
                                            
75 id at 141. 




4. From Private to Personal 
 
The radial category of private life relies very heavily on its metaphorical spatial structure. Its path-
dependence in the use of the precedents building up to the Schrems case give us insight into the 
personal of private life. PrivacyÕs spatial structure is not just a series of spheres of interference, or a 
quality of visibility, it is embodied in the ways it is described. The idea that Òprocessing of personal 
data should [not] always be seen as 'interference with privacy'Ó77 is one that could be kept separate 
if only it hadn't become part of the radial category of privacy protection and thus reliant on the 
prototype of privacy protection: the personal sphere. Dinev et. al. assert that, amongst the many 
varying themes in definitions of privacy from different disciplines, the common trait is to portray 
privacy as a state: 
the most common theme that emerges is that privacy is a state in which an 
individual is found in a given situation at a given moment of time. This consensus 
emerges regardless of how the authors begin their conceptualization of privacy 
or whether basic assumptions varied. For example, WestinÉ refers to Ôstates of 
privacyÕ and both Altman É and Westin É discuss Ôstate of controlÕ and Ôstate 
of limited accessÕ... Also, Warren and BrandeisÕs Édefinition of general privacy as 
a Ôright to be left aloneÕ implicitly refers to a state Ð of being left alone.78 
 
This conceptualisation fits well with the linguistic evidence we have seen throughout this study. A 
change of state can most easily be visualised through a mix of ICMs that depend on a spatial 
schema. Dinev et al note that Ò[d]ue to the inconsistencies in conceptualizing and measuring 
privacy per se, much behavioral research on privacy uses privacy concerns as a proxy for privacy.Ó79 
Much the same can be said in regards to the CourtÕs reasoning. By basing the protection of data on 
the structural schema of the right to privacy, the Court has created a path for itself to follow that 
necessarily involves the radial category of privacy protection. If one were to look at competing 
                                            
77 Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC 
Adopted on 9 April 2014. at 6-7 
78 Dinev, Tamara, Heng Xu, Jeff H. Smith & Paul Hart ; 2013. 'Information Privacy And Correlates: An Empirical 
Attempt To Bridge And Distinguish Privacy-Related Concepts ,' 22 European Journal of Information Systems 295 at 
298, internal references omitted (see works cited). 
79 ibid. Original emphasis. 
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frames, this may not be the case. Take, for instance, the writing in Directive 95/46 defining the 
notion of processing: 
'processing of personal data' ('processing') shall mean any operation or set of 
operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic 
means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or 
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or 
otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or 
destruction;80 
 
This doesnÕt refer to a change of state that data undergoes, but to any position along a path that 
describes a state (a dubiously static understanding to give the moniker ÔprocessingÕ to). Though the 
terms themselves refer to operations which are a state change, the definition lacks the conceptual 
framework to understand them, namely a state change from what to what. When the definition 
refers to collection for instance, is it collection in the sense of gathering indiscriminately or the 
notion of collection for a purpose? Or both? Is it talking about the ÔnaturalÕ state of data being 
altered, collected, then housed and stored in a place where it did not originate? A state change is a 
narrative distinction which often invokes the schemas of ÒPART-WHOLEÉSOURCE-PATH-
GOALÉBALANCEÉandÉFORCE-BARRIER.Ó81 The spatial representations of a change of state 
invoke movement, not a static conception of being in a specific state. Directive 95/46 doesnÕt 
convey processing of data in this way, but instead links data processing on the periphery of the 
larger category of privacy, and invokes privacy jurisprudenceÕs definitions and legitimate purposes to 
constrain the category, rather than defining and designating data processing on its own merit. This 
is neither a good or a bad thing. It is merely useful to note because, due to the conceptual path 
dependence of privacy law, the consequences for anticipating the legal uses of data processing are 
subject to the definition of privacy when, as Solove notes, ÒÔprivacy seems to be about everything, 
and therefore it appears to be about nothing.Ó82  
What if we took a different perspective? If state change is understood as a change from natural to 
artificial, for instance, then the state change would be the subject of discussion. To elucidate this 
argument, it is helpful to return to the alternative framings of the dissents in Rotaru.  
 
                                            
80 95/46/EC Art 2(b) 
81 Winter 2003 at 110. 
82 Solove, Daniel J.; 2006. 'A Taxonomy of Privacy,' 154 University of Pennsylvania law review 477, at 479. 
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Recall that BonelloÕs position was based on the naturalism of privacy. As continually stated in this 
chapter, private actions are those contained in a locked sphere from which information can flow or 
be forced/allowed to flow. Public actions are those that live outside of this sphere of private 
information and action. The importance of a fundamental right to private life is to protect that 
sphere from being penetrated, with exceptions made for situations of dire need to national 
security, or for use in pursuit of a legitimate aim. For Bonello, a state change (and his use of the 
term alchemise) is the important issue. There are data that are public and those that are private. 
The corrective frame is used to interrogate a state change from natural to artificial. The issue is not 
that data was stored, but that there is a lack of criteria to determine whether the kind of stored 
data is now public or private. Then through its processing (its change of state), we can investigate 
whether the processing itself is what alters the state of information from private to public (or vice 
versa). Perhaps if DATA AS COMMODITY had been invoked from the beginning, the state change 
wouldnÕt be as important, so the only logical legal recourse would to be to classify it as a market 
product and consequently hold it to different standards. While the desirability of this option is 
questionable, it would certainly alter the conversation about the metric of natural vs artificial states. 
Recall that Directive 95/46 states,  
Whereas the establishment and functioning of an internal market in whichÉthe 
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured require not 
only that personal data should be able to flow freely from one Member State to 
another, but also that the fundamental rights of individuals should be 
safeguarded;83 
 
This comes awfully close to naming personal data a good in itself. If it had, the last clause about 
fundamental rights would certainly lose some of its sway, the cases cited would change, and the 
conceptual path dependent structure of the network would take a different direction. The 
jurisdiction or area of law covering the issue of personal data wouldn't change; it would just 
become a different question.  
 
SoloveÕs quip that because privacy means everything it does not mean anything, isnÕt true. Privacy 
and data protection require a negotiation between competing corrective frames, that have 
allegiances to the path that came before them. By tying the breadth of categories of personal data 
                                            
83 95/46/EC recital 3 
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to those of the intimate protections of privacy means that, going forward, the idea of privacy can 
be transposed beyond the sphere schema that many scholars (and laymen alike) use to delineate 
the layers of the radial category of traditional privacy. Just as in Schrems, new prospects and new 
cases will rely on the justifications found within the network of case citations. Whether these 
rationalisations are justified will be determined by the normal validations of post-hoc analysis and 
argument. However, by investigating those networks for their consistency of metaphor, and indeed 
even by forecasting how specific path dependent models are built on metaphorical constructions, 
we will have a more complete, in-depth understanding of why these rationalisations will be made. 
Privacy, with the addition of data processing, is now subject to a wider sphere of rights than ever 
previously held. And it has got here by the normal stretching by increments of human thought, not 
by the fiat of a judge, or the now less murky aporia of legal reasoning. As a discipline that leans so 
heavily towards defined and strict rules of procedure and edict, a method for interrogating and 
forecasting that thought is more than helpful; it is necessary. 
 
Chapter Nine: 
Towards the Future 
 
ÒThey were tinkerers first, though, and philosophers only 
second. Could they make a bridge from the strange 
attractors they knew so well to the experiments of classical 
physics? It was one thing to say that right-left-right-right-left-
right-left-left-left-right was unpredictable and information 
generating. It was quite another to take a stream of real data 
and measure its Lyapunov exponent, its entropy, its 
dimension. Still, the Santa Cruz physicists had made 
themselves more comfortable with these ideas than had any 
of their older colleagues. By living with strange attractors day 
and night, they convinced themselves that they recognized 
them in the flapping, shaking, beating, swaying phenomena of 
their everyday lives. 
 
They had a game they would play, sitting at a coffeehouse. 
They would ask: How far away is the nearest strange 
attractor? Was it that rattling automobile fender? That flag 
snapping erratically in a steady breeze? A fluttering leaf? ÔYou 
donÕt see something until you have the right metaphor to let 
you perceive it,Õ Shaw said, echoing Thomas S Kuhn.Ó 
 
-!  James Gleick1 
 
This work has established a proof of concept for a new method to investigate the underlying 
conceptual framework on which the notion of privacy is built. The evidence of spatial metaphor 
use, conceptual blends, metaphoric fit, evaluative judgment, and the examination of the 
consequences of alternative framings in this project have shown that a combined linguistic and 
network analysis of cited case law is a powerful tool for investigating how principles are applied to 
novel cases and how concepts change throughout a body of law to provide coherence. The 
research's final task is to reply to certain considerations and counter-arguments, and to reflect on 
                                            
1 Gleick, James; 1987. Chaos: Making a New Science. Penguin. at 262-3. 
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the method so it can be strengthened where deficient and extended where it offers prospects for 
future research. 
 




The first and most glaring critique which could be made of the research is its use of English as the 
primary language. There are two separate challenges to respond to here. The first is that the 
processes described (conceptual blending, metaphoric fit, etc.) are often laboratory tested in 
English, and are not as robustly tested in other languages. The second is that the CourtsÕ decisions 
are not always written in English and are often translated from their original language. On the first 
point, though it is true that CMT has its foundations in the English language, there is a significant 
amount of evidence to show that the processes it describes operate in similar ways in other 
languages. However, the issue of the construction of metaphor (or concepts generally) in different 
languages remains a question of how those differences play out. This is better known as the 
Òlinguistic relativity hypothesisÓ: 
If speakers of different languages exhibit differences in their cognitive and 
linguistic behavior, how do speakers of more than one language behave? Does 
learning a new language entail internalization of an alternative interpretation of 
experience, or does the first language continue to dominate the conceptual 
repertoire of second language users?2 
 
This theory has a much-debated history, and current research still focuses on establishing the 
extent to which linguistic relativity affects thought. As Athanasopoulos et. al. note,  
inquiry by scholars working on the linguistic relativity hypothesis is still far from 
reaching consensus about the nature and extent of the influence of linguistic 
structure on cognitive processes, such as memory, attention, and categorization; 
what conditions suppress or promote this influence; and which experimental 
paradigm may best capture [the] phenomena.3 
                                            
2 Athanasopoulos, Panos, Emanuel Bylund, & Daniel Casasanto; 2016. 'Introduction to the Special Issue: New and 
Interdisciplinary Approaches to Linguistic Relativity,' 66(3) Language Learning 482 at 482-3. 




The lack of consensus, however, doesnÕt equate to a lack of effect, and research into meanings 
derived from conceptual frames of judicial decisions must take the language problem into account. 
For instance, French differs considerably from English in terms of respective speakersÕ conceptions 
of space4 and motion5;  these conceptual differences will certainly have implications for the way that 
the structural metaphors which this work has investigated are constructed in each language, and to 
study this phenomenon it could, and should, be an area for future research (and one which would 
surely produce an enormous amount of interesting data). 
 
The second point, that the original decision may or may not have been translated into English, is 
equally important to address. Translation is an art form and the translator's full fidelity to the 
meanings and uses of metaphor in the original text canÕt be assumed. Where there has been a 
translation of a judgment, responsibility falls to the researcher to either identify and exclude those 
decisions from the analysis or be clear about the tentative reliability of the cited material. In the 
current work, I can only be honest and say that the only way to circumvent this issue would have 
been to personally retranslate each case from the original (or have one person undertake this 
work). Realistically, this would not have been feasible, given the amount of cases in the network 
that incorporate translations. Further research would ideally be conducted in multi-lingual teams 
until automatic translation systems become reliable enough to be entrusted this work. This being 
said, it is not clear how large an effect the use of translated text would have on the present results. 
Given the collegial nature of the documents, it is usually not Ôone voiceÕ that is being heard and 
thus the impact of the idiosyncratic use of metaphors from different languages should be minimal. 
 
Collegial vs Individual Writing of Judgements 
 
Further on this point, the nature and standing of the Courts (and their decisions) examined in this 
work mean that the conclusions drawn will not be applicable in all other court settings. Given the 
panel make-up of the Strausbourg and Luxembourg Courts, in most cases there is a counter-
argument that the text will not reveal the reasoning of ÒaÓ mind. This is perfectly true. However, 
                                            
4 Hickmann, M., and H. Hendriks; 2006. 'Static and Dynamic Location in French and in English,' 26(1) First Language 
103. 
5 Hickmann, M., P. Taranne, and P. Bonnet; 2009. 'Motion in First Language Acquisition: Manner and Path in French and 
English Child Language,' 36 Journal of Child Language 705. 
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this work focuses on the reasoning of a court, not the mind of a judge (perhaps with the caveat of 
singularly written dissents). As noted in the opening chapters, the law is taken as an artefact, as a 
text in itself. It is a considered premise based on the idea that the citations themselves are not the 
work of a single judge, but of a judgment, as a singular work. As this work has shown, when the 
Court writes its decision, the wording is subject to a path dependence of choices made prior to 
the decision about how the law reacts to certain legal tests and principles. Whether a system 
integrates the voices of all its judges, or allows for more singular dissent, doesn't pose much of a 
problem in this approach. The text dependence remains the same in either scenario.  
 
However, this is a sound argument in assessing the applicability or generalisability of this approach 
to other legal systems, for instance the United States Supreme Court or other domestic systems. It 
may be the case that there is no path dependence when dissents are referenced in a manner that 
curtails the majority decision. With this being said, there would be a major benefit to testing the 
current methodology across different legal systems. 
 
Lexical Unit (Length) Choice and Different Types of Metaphor Use 
 
There are a few technical choices made in this work that it is helpful to provide more explication 
of. The first is the choice of where to draw boundaries to determine the length of lexical units. In 
the methodology of the MIPVU approach, one of the first tasks is to identify lexical units. The 
starting point is to take the singular word and to then work towards creating coded sets as lexical 
units.6 Another approach is to choose a lexical unit relative to the sentence construction, where 
the length of the phrase that is marked as metaphorical may vary from a single word to a larger 
piece of text.7 Both approaches have their pros and cons, depending on the purpose of the 
research. If the aim is purely to show the prevalence of metaphor in a text, then consistency in the 
length of phrases obviously has an important quantitative value in determining how prevalent 
metaphorical lexical units are in relation to the number of words in a text. This is one type of 
comparison. In this approach, consistency in lexical unit length would be paramount in achieving 
reliable results. This is particularly true when the same large corpus is used by other researchers to 
                                            
6 See Steen, Gerard J.; 2016. ÔIdentifying Metaphor in LanguageÕ, in The Routledge Handbook of Metaphor and Language. 
Elena Semino & Zsofia Demjen (Eds) 73. 
7 See, Cameron, Lynne & Robert Maslen (Eds); 2010. Metaphor Analysis: Research Practice in Applied Linguistics, Social 
Sciences and the Humanities. Equinox. 
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compare methodological approaches to analysing metaphor, like the oft used British National 
Corpus.  
 
However, if the research is primarily concerned with the prevalence of competing metaphors or of 
the frequency in use of any number of metaphorical frames, then the length of the lexical unit will 
not have a significant effect on the results unless, as in the first approach, it is based solely on a 
quantitative outcome. For the research in the current project, the quantitative value of metaphor 
occurrence was only important insofar as identifying the dominant construction. Dominance, in this 
sense, was quantified, but only in relation to how it linked to certain legal principles or descriptions. 
If, however, this research were to be extended to automatic processing and a larger reliance on 
quantitative metrics, a comparison of the methods and their effects should be done in the 
preliminary stages in order to see how the approaches affect the ÔmetaphoricityÕ of a text. The 
target of the present analysis was not to quantify how much metaphor was used, but to examine 
how metaphor was used. 
 
Linked to this idea of lexical unit length is the differentiation between types of metaphor. This 
could mean classifying metaphors more distinctly into rich and basic domains, identifying metaphor 
vs metonymic usage, separating metaphors in ÔlegalÕ and non-legal senses, creating categories for 
metaphor used in discourse vs meta-discourse situations, and outlining the types of metaphor used 
in different parts of speech. Separating all of the subdomains of metaphor uses would certainly add 
multiple layers to what is already a rich analysis. For this hand-coded project, the choice was made 
to prove the method first. I wholeheartedly agree that looking at delineations of metaphor usage 
could be extremely informative over the entire network of case law, for instance. It may reveal 
underlying mechanisms to elaborate upon the evidence presented here. Given the already 
intimidating amount of data to analyse in the present project, it was important to solidify the 
foundation of the approach before building upwards. It is necessary to establish that it is snowing 
before asking about the structure and dynamics of a floating ice crystals. But, in the following 





2. Extensions & Avenues for further study 
 
Automatic Processing 
This work has relied heavily on the use of hand-coding and techniques for hand-building networks. 
This didnÕt have to be the case, but given the researcher's lack of programming knowledge in the 
early phases of the project design, it didnÕt seem sensible to plan a project built on incomplete 
knowledge. Couple that with the intensely hard task of developing natural language processing 
capabilities that can reliably identify metaphor and figurative language in text. Though it is not yet at 
the height of its power, automatic processing of figurative language is a burgeoning field in 
computational linguistics, and the time will surely come sooner rather than later when automatic 
processing will be a feasible prospect. 
 
Take, for instance, the work being done by Ekaterina Shutova and researchers in her lab at 
Cambridge University. They have been working on the automatic processing of metaphor, but 
have stated from the outset how difficult this is for machines to do.8 Like this current work, she and 
her co-authors state that, Ò[f]or many years, computational work on metaphor evolved around the 
use of hand-coded knowledge and rules to model metaphorical associations, making the systems 
hard to scale.Ó9 There have been a number of different approaches to trying to solve this 
outstanding problem.10 However, much of this work has Òbeen predominantly applied in limited-
                                            
8 Shutova, Ekaterina, Lin Sun, Elkin Dario Gutierrez, Patricia Lichtenstein, & Srini Narayanan; 2017. 'Multilingual 
Metaphor Processing: Experiments with Semi-Supervised and Unsupervised Learning,' 43(1) Computational Linguistics 
71: ÒManifestations of metaphor are pervasive in language and reasoning, making its computational processing an 
imperative task within Natural Language ProcessingÉ metaphor is currently a bottleneck, particularly in semantic tasks. 
An accurate and scalable metaphor processing system would become an important component of many practical NLP 
applications.Ó at 72. 
9 id at 73. 
10 e.g. Li, Hongsong, Kenny Q. Zhu, and Haixun Wang; 2013. 'Data-Driven Metaphor Recognition and Explanation ,' 1 
Transactions of the Association for Computational Linguistics 379; Shutova, Ekaterina and Lin Sun ; 2013. 'Unsupervised 
Metaphor Identification Using Hierarchical Graph Factorization Clustering,' Proceedings of NAACL 2013 978; Mohler, 
Michael, Bryan Rink, David Bracewell, and Marc Tomlinson; 2014. 'A Novel Distributional Approach to Multilingual 
Conceptual Metaphor Recognition,' Proceedings of COLING 2014, the 25th International Conference on Computational 
Linguistics: Technical Papers 1752; Wilks, Yorick, Adam Dalton, James Allen, and Lucian Galescu; 2013. 'Automatic 
Metaphor Detection Using Large-Scale Lexical Resources and Conventional Metaphor Extraction,' Proceedings of the 
First Workshop on Metaphor in NLP 36; Neuman, Yair, Dan Assaf, Yohai Cohen, Mark Last, Shlomo Argamon, Newton 
Howard, and Ophir Frieder; 2013. 'Metaphor Identification in Large Texts Corpora,' 8(4) PloS one; Veale, Tony and 
Yanfen Hao; 2008. 'A Fluid Knowledge Representation for Understanding and Generating Creative Metaphors,'  
Proceedings of COLING 2008 945. 
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domain, small-scale experiments. This is mainly due to the lack of general-domain corpora 
annotated for metaphor that are sufficiently large for training wide-coverage supervised systems.Ó11 
New techniques would need to make those Òmethods scalable to new data and portable across 
languages, domains, and tasks, bringing metaphor processing technology a step closer to a 
possibility of integration with real-world NLP.Ó12 This would certainly aid future research, particularly 
in legal studies incorporating metaphor, and would make the initial steps in comparing cross-
linguistic data to see whether the usage patterns shown in this work are reliable across different 
regions, systems, courts, and/or judges. 
 
Identifying metaphor as a task is something that future research in this area should definitely keep 
pace with. A second avenue would be to conduct a similar type of analysis that relies less on all of 
the metaphors in a text to prioritise automatically identifying image schemas. The strength of this 
approach would be in its capacity to find the spatio-temporal grounding of the metaphors in this 
work and process them in a way which is indicative of what metaphors are dominant in the greater 
legal milieu. This hasnÕt yet been shown, but given the largely dominant structure of spatial 
metaphors, as featured in the repetitive legal speech and in particular when it comes to formal legal 
concepts like balance or proportionality, automatic image schema identification may be able to 
stand-in as a substitute until more advanced methods are able to identify metaphor themselves. 
Work to this effect is being done in computational linguistics and in research on artificial 
intelligence. For instance, Dagmar Gromann and Maria Hedlom have used such a method to 
process image schemas found in the text of the European Parliament.13 By using a system of 
Òsentence parsingÓ, Òsemantic role labellingÓ, and Òspectral clusteringÓ, they can Òsemi-
automaticallyÓ identify image schemas in a corpus.14 However, like metaphor processing and the 
work presented here, there is still a substantial amount of work to be done in formalising an 
approach to ensure its reliability. 
 
                                            
11 Shutova, et. al. 2017 at 73. 
12 ibid. 
13 Gromann, Dagmar & Maria M. Hedblom; 2017. Kinesthetic Mind Reader: A Method to Identify Image Schemas in 
Natural Language. Available at: http://www.cogsys.org/papers/ACS2017/ACS_2017_paper_9_Gromann.pdf. 






Another approach would be to use corpus linguistic methods to extract data from the interlinked 
networks of case citation. Simply put, 
Corpus Linguistics involves the construction of large digital collections of 
authentic texts (corpora) and their investigation through dedicated software 
tools É initially primarily applied to the study of lexis and grammar, but have 
recently been extended to a wider range of areas, including discourse analysis, 
translation studies and (first and second) language acquisition, as well as other 
branches of the humanities and social sciences.15 
 
Corpus Linguistics differs from the approach taken in this project in that it (generally) treats all of 
the text as a single corpus with, for instance, no demarcation of the significance of specific passages 
to an argument. As Semino states, it is often used Òto make or test generalisations about metaphor 
use in a whole (national) language, such as British English, or across two languages.Ó16 This method 
can, and has, been succesfully used to investigate the prevalence and use of metaphor in a variety 
of different disciplines and practices including, among others, healthcare communication,17 language 
learning,18 political and media discourse,19 and the role of metaphor in creativity and humour.20 We 
donÕt have to look outside of the legal realm to see the method of corpus linguistics already being 
introduced, allbeit not specifically for metaphor usage. Sadl and Olsen incorporate corpus methods 
in their investigation of the language of the CJEU and ECtHR when creating legal categories Òwhich 
have not hitherto been recognized in generalist European law scholarship, but which might be 
                                            
15 Semino, Elena; 2017. ÔCorpus Linguistics and MetaphorÕ in The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics. Dancygier, 
B. (ed.). Cambridge University Press 463 at 463. 
16 id at 464. 
17 Demmen, Jane, Elena Semino, Zsofia Demjn, Veronika Koller, Andrew Hardie, Paul Rayson and Sheila Payne; 2015. 
'A Computer-Assisted Study of The Use of Violence Metaphors for Cancer and End of Life by Patients, Family Carers 
and Health Professionals,' 20(2) International Journal of Corpus Linguistics 205 
18 Skorczynska, Hanna; 2010. 'A Corpus-Based Evaluation Of Metaphors In A Business English Textbook,' 29(1) English 
for Specific Purposes 30. 
19 LÕHte, Emilie; 2014. Identity, Narrative and Metaphor: A Corpus-Based Cognitive Analysis Of New Labour Discourse. 
Palgrave Macmillan. 




distinct and significant from the perspective of courts and practitioners in a specific area.Ó21 Like the 
work here, their intention is to link the quantitative corpus data with network citations in order to 
allow Òlegal scholars gain a stable and comprehensive quantitative basis for a qualitative study of 
case law, precedent and interpretation.Ó22 The approach looks for specific wordings throughout the 
precedent chain. To contribute to their goal, it would be extremely fruitful to merge their 
approach with that of linguists working on metaphor use combined with more focused qualitative 
studies. This could be done in a number of ways. 
 
One such approach would be to add more meta-data to the exisiting citation networks. Currently, 
the database used by Sadl and Olsen features metadata provided by the database of the Courts. 
To add further quantitative value to their networks it could be helpful to incorporate more 
collocation techniques, parts of speech tagging, and explicit and implicit metaphor use, among 
others. One way to accomplish this would be to use computer assisted methods, as noted above, 
and through the use of other language parsing algorithms, like NLTK, for instance.  
 
NLTK - the Natural Language Toolkit, an Òopen source libraryÓ23 made for the python 
programming language - would be an optimal tool for adding in this kind of data24 to the network 
of legal citations. NLTK has been used by language scholars to accomplish various goals, not least 
those in natural language processing and computational linguistics.25 The utility of this kind of tool is 
to enrich centrality measures in citation network analysis. For instance, when investigating their 
citation network on Article 14 citizenship rights within ECtHR case law, Sadl and Olsen found 
(much like the present study with Article 8 rights) that, Ò[q]ualitative analysis, which accompanies 
quantitative findings, shows that the ECtHR substantially extended its own jurisdiction by 
broadening the scope of protection of Article 14 ECHR to include new legal categories and 
rights.Ó26 However, their quantative data was limited to looking at meta-data that linked the date of 
judgments to the collocation data with the word ÔeffectivenessÕ to investigate that singular concept. 
                                            
21 Sadl, Urska & Henrik Palmer Olsen; 2017. 'Can Quantitative Methods Complement Doctrinal Legal Studies? Using 
Citation Network And Corpus Linguistic Analysis To Understand International Courts ,' 30 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 327 at 330. 
22 id at 349. 
23 see http://www.nltk.org/ for more information. 
24 e.g. classification, tokenization, stemming, tagging, parsing, and semantic reasoning. 
25 Bird, Steven, Ewan Klein, & Edward Loper; 2009. Natural Language Processing With Python. O'Reilly Publishing. 
26 Sadl, Urska & Henrik Palmer Olsen; 2017 at 344. 
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As they acknowledge, Òwhile the findings of corpus linguistic analysis strongly indicate the increasing 
importance of a new category of effectiveness in legal discourse they are inconclusive in 
themselves.Ó27 Though not completely novel in the field of legal research, this method could be 
improved with the addition of more data for qualitative investigation to the existing repository, 
such as: image schematic constructions, parsing for parts of speech, and by going beyond the 
collocation approach. Incorporating this data into the network could significantly change the 
structure of the centrality of certain hub cases which could, in itself, raise interesting new questions. 
Additionally, improvements in automatic processing would allow as yet uninvestigated data sources 
to be added to the network analysis. 
 
New Data Sources 
 
Scholars working on citation networks - including the author - focus exclusively on the judgments 
themselves to create the link between the citation of a case (or text within a case) to measure and 
track conceptual change. The strength in this method is that it looks at decisions as an artefact of 
human reasoning. However, the obvious drawback is that the same method misses out on an 
enormous amount of data that could be used to support its findings. If conceptual change, 
particularly in the current work, can be measured through metaphor use, blending, metaphoric fit, 
and the use of alternative frames, it is then crucial to look at the persuasive value of the metaphors 
used in argumentation given to the court to consider a particular case. Some scholars already take 
this into account when measuring the influence of the advocate general on the Court of Justice.28 
Within that study there is an enormous obstacle to be overcome in describing the implicit 
influence of the advocate general on the Court.29 They measured implicit influence by  
assum[ing] that it can be observed through four measurable aspects of the case 
law: the choice of precedent (or case law), the method of interpretation, the 
reasoning, and the outcomeÉ30 
 
                                            
27 id at 340. 
28 Sadl, Urska & Suvi Sankari; 2017. 'The Elusive Influence of the Advocate General on the Court of Justice: The Case of 
European Citizenship,' Yearbook of European Law 1. 





where the method of interpretation is defined by proxy as a measure of agreement between the 
Advocate General and the Court Ò[w]ith regard toÉwhether the AG interprets EU law broadly or 
narrowly and whether the Court uses the same method of interpretation as the AG,Ó31 as 
measured on a four-level graded scale from 0-1. This kind of analysis could produce extremely 
interesting results by adding the use of metaphorical analysis to the measure agreement between 
the Court and AsG. And if done automatically, the analysis could be enacted on a very wide-
reaching data set.   
 
That work notwithstanding, the literature which uses empirical methods on a broad swath of case 
law is thin, and is but one of many data sources that could be combined to add another layer of 
rich data to our understanding. The AG is obviously not the only persuasive force within the 
system of law itself. The first glaring data source to explore the influence of metaphorical framing 
on decisions would be the written arguments themselves. Taking the written arguments and 
subjecting them to a process of analysis similar to the one undertaken in the present work (along 
the lines of metaphoric fit and conceptual blending in particular) would add an invaluable data set 
in the empirically based approach to case law and interpretation. Further, it would allow for the 
analysis of the networks of citations that applicants and governments use to construct their 
arguments, and could help to show which networks ended up being used by the Court to 
subsequently ask whether the conceptions of certain principles and legal categories change, are 
adopted in full and are subject to the same dynamics found in the work here, supplying more 
evidence that the phenomena described in the previous chapters holds true not just from decision 
to decision but with the greater weight of potential adopted argumentation and conceptual frames. 
 
In addition to these two data sources that come from outside of the judgments themselves, it 
would be helpful to look at the internal reasoning of the decisions. Though this project looked at 
intertextual citations (section to section rather than case to case), it didnÕt look at the internal 
referencing of the decisions themselves. This could be broken up into two phenomena; that of 
explicit referencing, when a judgment refers to a paragraph within its own decision, and that of 
implicit referencing through the use of logical argumentation. Implicit reasoning could be broken up 
into further subgroups indicated by keywords such as therefore, thus, as noted previously, etc., and 
                                            
31 id at 6. 
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those that come from a more focused qualitative analysis on the argumentative structure within 
the decision. This, again, would be a valid reason for using NLTK or other natural language 
processing tools that can automate the predicates and conclusions of arguments in varied corpora.  
 
All of these approaches will still necessarily rely on the qualitative measure of metaphor analysis. 
The only real quantitative measure, so far, is the occurrence of metaphor. This is a drawback as it is 
our only proxy for adding it to the meta-data in the network analysis. Given this work's results, 
which show a heavy reliance on the spatial language used in the decisions, it would be worth 
considering adapting tools from cognitive linguistics to further elaborate on the construction of 
spatial language. One of those models is Deictic Space Modelling.  
 
Deitic Space Theory uses simple Euclidean geometry to model conceptual structures from the 
perspective of a given speaker (represented by S). This theory has been pioneered by linguist Paul 
Chilton32 to explore the idea that, Òconceptual space...is inevitably tied to a point of view attributed 
to the speaker.Ó33 The model places referents and the relationships between them on three axes 
(distance d, time t, and modality m) corresponding to a speakerÕs inferred conceptual structure that 
is Òessentially deictic, situating entities and events (i) in terms of their relative salience, (ii) in terms 
of their relation to the speakerÕs time and [...] (iii) in terms of epistemic ÔdistanceÕ from the 
speaker.Ó34 These relationships are represented by vectors for their ability to display a relationship 
that represents direction and distance between referents. This modeling could help to visualise and 
ultimately quantify patterns in the data of conceptual space that inhere in the schemas of the 
CourtsÕ reasoning. Figure 9.1 shows the basic axis set up that should be understood as scalar and 
non-quantified but, given the use of vector notation, could certainly generate a quantification. 
 
                                            
32 See Chilton, Paul; 2014. Language, Space and Mind: The Conceptual Geometry of Linguistic Meaning. Cambridge 
University Press. 
33 Chilton, Paul; 2010. 'The Conceptual Structure Of Deontic Meaning: A Model Based On Geometrical Principles,' 












































Figure 9.1 - Fundamental Deictic Space Model35 
 
Referents and their relationships can then be modeled on these axes to create Ògeometrical 
diagrams [as] a form of abstract analytic modelling of conceptualisations.Ó36 These 
conceptualisations result in our ability to go from simple spatial representations to their application 
on Òthe more abstract realms of properties, changes of state, mental processes and causation.Ó37 
The use of Deictic Space modelling could help to investigate the different forms of the up/down, 
and visible/not visible schemas used by the Courts to explore the patterns of conceptual models 
that permeate the precedent chain. Ultimately, quantifying this model would be ideal, and is ripe 
for future research. 
 
Another potential area for future research would be the comparison of categorical qualifications 
across different domains of law. For instance, in the previous chapter the example of an alternate 
framing - DATA AS COMMODITY -  was offered as an alternative frame. By comparing this 
alternative construction in the body of privacy law with, for example, that of the case law of market 
competition or intellectual property law and tracking commodity as a source domain in those 
areas, the research could establish the differing treatments of alternative framings, and their 
consequences for a harmonious and coherent body of principles across different legal domains. 
                                            
35 Chilton, Paul; 2014. 
36 Chilton, Paul; 2010 at 195. 




Combining the different approaches of these methods and data sources is an obvious extension of 
the proof of concept described in this work, and would add dense layers of empirical support to 
the evidence already manifest in the present work.  
 
* * * 
 
3. A Final Note  
 
Bernard Vonnegut worked at General Electric in the 1940s. He worked in a lab where the team's 
aim was to understand and control the weather. They fiddled with dry ice, silver iodide, and 
artificial (and then naturally forming) cloud systems, until they had a small breakthrough; they 
produced snow, and cloud seeding was born.38 The US military jumped at the prospect of this new 
knowledge, organising cloud seeding operations over Vietnam, and eventually causing, or at least 
contributing to, an incontrovertible ban on any weather modification in the US and subsequently 
also by the UN.39 Some years later, Kurt Vonnegut, brother of Bernard, used his brotherÕs work as 
the inspiration for the novel CatÕs Cradle, in which a cloud seeding method using a fictional chemical 
leads to the Earth's reduction to a frozen ice-ball.40 It is often our small achievements that have 
unforeseen consequences. Investigating metaphor in legal language isnÕt building the atomic bomb, 
or diverting hurricanes, but even the smallest degree of tinkering has its consequences. The 
automatic processing of language in law will get to a point where the question will need to be 
asked (and has been asked continually throughout this research): where does this ultimately lead? 
Will we, one day, replace judges with machines? 
 
This point is well taken by the researcher, and the current project does contain an ethical and 
philosophical conundrum. If language processing software becomes reliable enough to recognise 
the patterns of judicial decisions to the extent where models forecasting future decisions can be 
created, will this be the right thing to do? This research has said, from the outset, that answering 
                                            
38 See Barnett, Cynthia; 2016. Rain: A Natural and Cultural History. Broadway Books 
39 Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques 
(adopted 10 December 1976) (Entry into force 5 October 1978) United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1108 
40 See Strand, Ginger; 2015. The Brothers Vonnegut: Science and Fiction in the House of Magic. Farrar, Straus and Giroux 
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the normative questions about law (and principally applying universals to particulars) is not what 
we are after. But the question is raised about coherence being the lynchpin of providing clarity and 
foreseeability in legal systems. This chapter, ÒTowards the FutureÓ, should also include a re-
statement of the questions pertaining to the need for, and utility of, coherence, particularly in a 
world where technology not only changes the world itself but also recalibrates the tools with 
which we investigate it. If this work has emphasised anything, it is the importance of considering 
counter concepts and alternative frames, before deciding what fits. We are often so subject to our 
metaphorical and schematic commitments that our biases go unnoticed. This research implores the 
legal world to notice.  
 
The initial response to the question is no; we are nowhere near ready to replace judges, but that 
doesnÕt mean that supplements to aid in their reasoning, in their search for coherence, canÕt be met 
with a new tool. It is also crucial that legal theorists, and laymen alike, have access to the inner 
workings of judicial decisions not just for ease of access, reducing case processing times, or 
principles like basing the moral foundation of the justice and law on its predictability, equity, and 
coherence. If we canÕt determine the categories that promote justice on objective grounds, one 
might argue that justice is stuck in a relativistic mire, a swamp of shifting lines and arbitrary tests 
bound to tradition and linguistic coherence. And then what? The foundations of justice are not just 
bound by fairness, liberty, or freedom. Justice is not reflected by a line drawn in the sand, but by 
the hand that draws it. It is not designed to make the world fair by fiat or by the application of a 
universal principle, but by action. Justice, in all its guises, is about recourse, and recourse should be 
readily available to all who require it. A tool can do that. A method can do that. As the arc of 
justice bends towards freedom, the law must endeavour to be the force that makes it bough, and a 
tool to help every man and woman be that force. This goal is worth any risk.  
 
It is a worthy goal, but we are not close to achieving itÉ yet. For now, we are developing the tools 
to peel away layers of ambiguity, to trace strands of complexity, and to design gears that create a 
fully functioning legal machine. Understanding different layers of just about anything is so often 
spoken about with the use of metaphor. An onion. A spider web. Mechanical systems. Structure. 
We are left to visualise a complex interconnected system from references to the features of it that 
we deem sufficient to understanding the system as a whole. Peczenik, Alexy, HartÉand the list 
goes on. To borrow a line from Robert Sapolsky, who labours to uncover the layers of complexity 
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that make up the antecedents of human behaviour involved in decision making, violence, religion, 
free will... Ò[i]tÕs complicated. Nothing seems to cause anything; instead everything just modulates 
something else.Ó41 Metaphorical reasoning isnÕt the be all and end all of judicial decision making, 
nowhere near it. But it is a modulating factor. To ignore it and reduce it to an aporia, an 
unobtainable needle in a haystack where each needle alters the haystackÕs shape as it is plucked, is 
a reduction that can be avoided, provided we have the right kinds of tools. It can be said of the 
physicists of chaos theory, meteorologists, biologists, etc.: Ò[t]hey were tinkerers first, though, and 
philosophers only second.Ó42 With a development of a method, the same should be said of legal 
theorists too.  
 
                                            
41 Sapolsky 2017 at 1291 (digital edition). 
42 Gleick 1989 at 262. 
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